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Abstract 
In recent years, great attention has been placed on conservation systems for agricultural 
production. Conservation practices offer economic and environmental benefits, yet conventional 
practices remain the prevailing system in some regions. As conservation efforts are launched by 
different local and federal agencies, understanding farmers’ motivations when adopting 
conservation practices is important to ensure the continuation of adoption through the 
development of programs that are tailored to meet farmers’ preferences and constraints. 
   The purpose of the first essay was to identify the factors affecting farmers’ choice of 
tillage practice at the crop level. Farmer’s choice of No-till, Strip-till and Conventional tillage 
was modeled for dryland corn, wheat and soybean production in Kansas.  The results show that 
tillage decisions are crop-specific and that factors such as risk aversion, baling and grazing of 
crop residue, crop acreage, and farmers’ approach to adopting new technologies are significant 
factors affecting farmers’ decisions. 
The second essay focused on the adoption of continuous no-till, conservation crop 
rotation, cover crops, and variable rate application of inputs and the effect that incentive 
payments, payment mechanism, and off-farm environmental benefits from conservation have on 
the decision to adopt. This essay also examined the risk associated with the variability of net 
returns and its effect on farmers’ willingness to adopt using a non-linear extended expected 
utility framework, allowing for the estimation of a utility parameter for net returns, farmer’s 
subjective judgment of probabilities, and farmers’ risk attitudes. Farmers were found to exhibit 
risk aversion, with an estimated risk premium of approximately 3% of net returns. Results also 
suggested a preference for federally-run programs and for programs with higher off-farm 
environmental benefits.  
  
The third essay examined the timing of adoption of continuous no-till, cover crops, and 
variable rate application of inputs. This study found that risk aversion delays the timing of 
adoption of cover crops and variable rate application of inputs. However, the timing of adoption 
of continuous no-till was not affected by risk aversion. Findings also indicated that farmers who 
consider themselves innovators adopt at a faster rate than their counterparts. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In the last few decades, much attention has been given to environmental degradation and to the 
ways in which sustainable production can be achieved in agricultural systems. The ecosystem 
services produced when conservation practices are in place have a value in society, and by 
creating a market for these services, farmers could receive an incentive to adopt these practices 
(Ribaudo et al., 2010; Whitten and Coggan, 2013). Adoption of conservation practices has 
increased over the past several years, due in part to the increasing public interest in improving 
the environment and the voluntary programs that encourage the adoption of conservation 
practices through monetary incentives and cost-share. These programs primarily focus on water 
quality and conservation, conservation of soil and land, wildlife habitat, air quality and energy 
conservation (Claassen et al., 2008).  
There is a myriad of available conservation practices that can be adopted in crop 
production. No-till is one of the most widely adopted practices in the U.S. however, in many 
cases farmers rotate their tillage practice and continuous no-till might not be as widely adopted 
(Grandy et al., 2006) . It has been suggested that some no-till farmers may till the ground, 
specifically in response to economic and seasonal drivers (Llewellyn et al., 2012). While the 
adoption of no-till provides a variety of benefits, when a no-till-field is tilled some of the 
benefits, particularly carbon sequestration, may be lost when these are tilled (Grandy et al., 
2006). Efforts to intensify conservation may require the adoption of continuous no-till, which is 
using no-till for all the crops planted in a particular field. The choice of no-till practice may 
change based on the crop being planted and it is important to identify how exogenous factors 
affect farmers’ choice of tillage at the crop level. Continuous no-till systems may not always 
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work alone without other practices. In order to control for some pest issues that may arise in 
continuous no-till systems, farmers may need to intensify conservation on their farm to include 
other practices such as conservation crop rotations or cover crops. Conservation practices may in 
many cases be interrelated and provide synergetic benefits. Thus, it is important to encourage 
farmers not only to adopt a particular practice, but to intensify conservation by adopting groups 
of practices that are complementary. 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated factors affecting the adoption of 
conservation practices. Numerous modeling approaches have been used to study the adoption of 
conservation practices and new agricultural technologies and the factors that affect the decision 
to adopt. Several of these studies have relied on approaches to model the adoption at some point 
in time and in some cases the level of adoption. These studies compare the differences in the 
factors between the group of adopters and those of non-adopters at a particular point in time. In 
many cases, these studies do not consider the process of adoption over time and how some 
factors not only affect the decision to adopt but also the timing of adoption. By the same token, 
some factors do not directly restrict the adoption of conservation practices, but they delay the 
adoption process (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). 
The diffusion of technologies is a gradual process; it takes time for the information about 
these new practices to be diffused (Jaffe et al., 2002). Given that farmers adopt a conservation 
practice based on their knowledge or expectations about the benefits of the practice, the timing of 
information collection (learning) and formation of expectations is important (Au and Kauffman, 
2003) and may not be captured in traditional binary adoption models (Burton et al., 2003). In 
addition, different sources of heterogeneity across farmers make them more likely to adopt at 
different points in time (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). Thus, the process and timing of the adoption 
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of agricultural technologies is important (Hoppe, 2002). Duration models are an important tool 
that can be used to examine the adoption and the speed of adoption (or disadoption) of 
agricultural technologies. 
Another powerful tool in adoption research is the use of stated choice methods that allow 
for the examination of attributes that are not present in the market, or if they are present, do not 
have sufficient variation to estimate their parameters (Louviere et al., 2000). For example, the 
use of stated choice methods has allowed researchers to study the effect of varying incentive 
payments/cost-share levels on the adoption, and extent of adoption, of conservation programs. 
The use of stated choice methods have also furthered the study of other attributes in conservation 
programs that are of interest for policy makers.  Some of these attributes are contract length, risk 
attributes, payment mechanism, availability of technical assistance or insurance through a 
conservation program, restrictions on land use, and contract default (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and 
Signorello, 2008; Espinosa‐Goded et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2012; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
While different model approaches have been used to analyze factors affecting adoption, 
some important factors are consistently analyzed. One of those factors is risk. Risk is an 
important component of agricultural production, and it plays an important role in farmers’ 
production decisions, particularly decisions concerning the adoption of conservation practices. 
The introduction and intensification of conservation on the farm introduces potential risks into 
the farm operation and can result in shifts in net returns (crop yields and/or costs). When 
outcomes are uncertain, farmers may be more hesitant to introduce new practices, and additional 
compensation may be necessary to induce adoption. When studying the adoption of new 
agricultural technologies, the perception of the probabilities of the distribution of net returns, the 
variance of net returns, and the strength and direction of risk attitudes are factors affecting that 
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decision (Marra et al., 2003). The effect of risk in adoption models has been commonly studied 
under a deterministic framework and distinctive elements of risk have been partially or 
separately addressed in several studies, however they have not been extensively studied in stated 
choice applications.  
As conservation policies are implemented by different local and federal agencies, 
understanding farmers’ motivations and their thought process when adopting conservation 
practices is important. In many cases the lack of knowledge about some conservation practices 
can be a deterrent to adoption (Lamb et al., 2008). Previous findings in the literature suggest that 
withdrawals from conservation programs take place within the first years of the contract, because 
expectations regarding private benefits may not be met while implementing those practices 
(Cattaneo, 2003). Studying farmers’ adoption processes provides governments and extension 
agencies with important insights into the adoption of important conservation technologies and 
the key aspects that need to be addressed to increase the level of conservation efforts by 
producers. Understanding these factors is important to ensure the continuation of adoption 
through the development of programs that are tailored to meet farmers’ preferences and 
constraints. 
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this this dissertation is to study the factors affecting farmers’ decisions to 
adopt conservation practices. Specifically, the objectives of this research are: 
i) To identify factors such as farm management characteristics, farmers’ attitudes, farmers’ 
risk aversion, and socio-demographic factors that impact farmers’ choice of no-till (NT), 
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Strip-till (ST), and Conventional tillage (CT) for dryland corn, wheat and soybean 
production in Kansas.  
ii) To examine farmers’ willingness to adopt and intensify in-field conservation practices 
under risk using a stated preference approach.; and  
iii) To examine factors affecting the adoption and the time of adoption of conservation 
practices in Kansas and to gain insights regarding the time-path diffusion of these 
conservation practices since their introduction.  
 
The following section presents an overview of the three essays that comprise this dissertation. 
The overviews present a summary of the methods used to meet the research objectives outlined 
above. In addition, the overview of the essays presents some of the results that emerged from 
each research objective. 
 
1.1.1 First Essay: Modeling the choice of tillage used for dryland corn, wheat and 
soybean production by farmers in Kansas 
In recent years, great attention has been placed on conservation systems for agricultural 
production, especially conservation tillage. Conservation tillage offers economic and soil quality 
benefits, yet conventional tillage remains the prevailing system in some regions.  The purpose of 
this essay was to identify the factors affecting farmers’ choice of tillage practice at the crop level 
using data collected from a survey conducted face to face. Farmer’s choice of No-till (NT), Strip-
till (ST) and Conventional tillage (CT) was modeled for dryland corn, wheat and soybean 
production in Kansas using a multinomial logit model.  Studies on tillage adoption are 
commonly conducted at the farm level, or on a particular crop.  This study contributes to the 
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body of literature by modeling the adoption of different tillage practices at the crop level. An 
empirical model that accounts for farm management characteristics, farmers’ attitudes, farmers’ 
risk aversion, and socio-demographic factors was used.  In addition, the effect of crop rotation 
decisions on tillage practice adoption was studied. Including crop rotation decisions provided a 
mechanism to capture the interconnectedness of production decisions.  
An important finding to emerge from this study is farmers’ response to risk, where risk 
averse farmers were found to be more likely to use no-till practices. This may indicate that no-till 
practices are believed by farm managers in this study as a risk reducing practice. This study also 
provides evidence that some no-till adopters change their tillage as crop choice changes. In 
addition, factors such as baling and grazing of crop residue, crop acreage, and farmers’ 
promptness to adopting new technologies were also found to be significant factors affecting 
farmers’ decisions. A better understanding of the factors affecting the adoption of tillage 
practices at the crop level may facilitate the development of policies and educational programs to 
encourage the adoption of conservation tillage methods. 
 
1.1.2 Second Essay: Adoption of in-field conservation practices under risk 
The second essay focuses on the adoption of conservation on the farm and the factors that may 
affect farmer’s decision to adopt conservation using a stated choice experiment. For the stated 
choice experiment, farmers evaluated twelve different conservation contracts. This study 
expands on previous research by examining conservation program attributes that have not been 
widely evaluated in the conservation adoption literature to-date, such as incentive payments, 
incentive payment mechanisms and off-farm environmental benefits from conservation. This 
essay also examined the risk associated with the variability of net returns and its effect on 
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farmers’ willingness to adopt conservation practices using a non-linear extended expected utility 
model that combines aspects of expected utility and prospect theory (Hensher et al., 2011). This 
approach results in a non-linear utility specification within the random utility model and it is 
more flexible because it allows for the estimation of utility parameters for net returns, farmer’s 
subjective judgment of probabilities, and farmers’ risk attitudes.  
Farmers were found to exhibit risk aversion with respect to changes in net returns from 
the adoption of new conservation practices. This study also found significant risk premiums for 
the enrollment in the conservation contract under the different probability weighting 
specifications. Findings suggest farmers require approximately 3% of their current net returns as 
a payment for bearing the risk of potential variability in net returns under a conservation 
contract. The results also suggest that farmers make limited use of subjective probabilities when 
evaluating risk in net returns under the conservation contract. Results also provided evidence 
suggesting a lower likelihood of adoption, for the same level of incentive payment, if the 
mechanism through which the incentive payment was offered was a carbon credit program (as 
opposed to a federally-run program). Findings in this study provide support for the importance of 
considering uncertainty in outcomes when designing incentive programs to encourage the 
adoption of in field conservation systems. 
 
1.1.3 Third Essay: Modeling the factors affecting farmers’ timing of adoption of in-
field conservation cropping practices 
The diffusion of new technologies is a gradual process; it takes time for the information about 
these new practices to be diffused (Jaffe et al., 2002). While the first essay examines adoption at 
a point in time, it is also possible to examine adoption over time using a dynamic model. Using 
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duration models allows for the temporal aspect to adoption and the heterogeneity in the timing of 
adoption to be accounted for (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). The third essay examines the timing 
of adoption of three conservation practices: continuous no-till, cover crops, and VRA of inputs. 
The timing of adoption is measured as the time it takes for farmers to adopt a practice since they 
first started managing the farm or since the introduction of the practice if the practice became 
available after the farmer starting farming. This study seeks to uncover the effect of farmers’ 
demographics (age, education), farmer characteristics and farm management characteristics (risk 
aversion, off-farm work, percentage of income from crop production) and farmers’ attitudes 
(stewardship, innovation), and the adoption of previous conservation practices on the duration of 
farmers decision to adopt a particular practice. In addition, this study seeks to investigate how 
conservation on the farm affects the speed of adoption of other conservation practices. 
Findings in this study suggest that the adoption of certain practices delay the adoption of 
other conservation practices. For example, the adoption of conservation crop rotation and VRA 
of inputs were found to delay the adoption of continuous no-till, and the adoption cover crops 
was also found to delay the adoption of VRA of inputs. In addition, the findings in this study 
suggest that risk aversion is not a significant factor delaying the speed of adoption of continuous 
no-till. Similar to the first paper, it is possible that farmers do not see no-till as a risky practice, 
thus risk aversion may not affect its adoption or speed of adoption. However, risk aversion was 
found to delay the adoption of cover crops and VRA of inputs. In addition, the results in this 
study suggest that farmers who considered themselves innovators adopt the three conservation 
practices at a faster rate than their counterparts. This study provides insight into the factors 
affecting the speed of adoption of some in field conservation practices. Understanding what 
factors delay adoption can allow conservation agencies and extension efforts to tackle such 
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factors in order to accelerate adoption. 
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Chapter 2 - Modeling the choice of tillage used for dryland corn, 
wheat and soybean production by farmers in Kansas 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, great attention has been placed on conservation systems for agricultural 
production.  The Soil Science Society of America (SSSA, 2012) defines conservation tillage as a 
sequence of tillage operations that leaves at least 30% of crop residue on the soil surface and 
whose objective is to diminish the loss of soil and water.  Similarly, reduced tillage (RT) 
practices consist in reducing the number of tillage passes, resulting in a soil coverage ranging 
from 15 to 30 percent (EPA, 2013; SSSA, 2012).  Conservation tillage practices include no-
tillage (NT) and strip tillage (ST) and have proven to be beneficial for the soil. Some of the 
benefits linked to conservation tillage systems are: increase in soil organic carbon; soil microbial 
biomass; reduction of wind and water erosion; and enhancement of nutrient cycling (Blanco-
Canqui et al., 2009a; Campbell et al., 2001; Kladivko, 2001; Kushwaha et al., 2001; Lal 1999; 
Paustian et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2011; Zibilske et al., 2002).  Another advantage is 
conservation of soil moisture (Daniel et al., 1999; Blevins et al., 1971), which may allow farmers 
to reduce the number of fallow periods to increase production intensity in dryer areas while also 
reducing the risk from droughts (Ding et al., 2009).  Overall, conservation tillage practices have 
demonstrated to provide a better alternative for enhancing the physical condition of the soil and 
to increase carbon sequestration (West and Marland, 2002; West and Post, 2002).  
Notwithstanding the benefits associated with conservation tillage, some negative aspects 
have also been reported in the literature.  In some regions, retention of moisture by crop residue 
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on the soil surface could increase the incidence of diseases (Anaele and Bishnoi, 1992, Bockus 
and Shroyer, 1998) and result in lower yields (Heer and Krenzer, 1989).  The need to control 
weeds chemically and the potential for an increase in diseases with NT could result in higher 
chemical costs that in some cases may offset the savings from labor and machinery costs 
(Williams et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2012).  A study by Kaval (2004), who compared the 
profitability and production costs of 198 NT and conventional tillage (CT) systems in the 
literature, suggested that NT is the least costly system.  However, yields and cost savings from 
NT systems vary across regions.  In the short-term, NT practices could result in higher costs and 
increase risk, due in part to the purchasing of new equipment (or modifications) and variability 
of yields during the adoption period (Epplin and Tice, 1986).  However, increased soil stability 
and reduction of the risk of soil erosion, particularly in row crops with limited biomass cover, 
can be observed in the long-term (Alberts et al., 1985; Blanco-Canqui et al., 2009b).   
Although conservation tillage may be more beneficial to the environment, conventional 
tillage still remains the prevailing tillage system for some crops in Kansas.  A 2010 survey of 
tillage practices in 23 Kansas counties showed that conventional tillage was the predominant 
tillage practice in wheat production, being used on approximately 56% of land planted to wheat 
(Kansas State University Research & Extension, 2010).  Only 27% of the land was under 
conservation tillage practices and 12% under RT, which consisted of tillage practices that leave 
15-30% crop residue after planting. Conversely, 56% of corn land was under conservation 
tillage, while 25% was under conventional tillage and 17% under RT.  Soybean land was largely 
planted using conservation tillage practices (62%), while 22% of the land remained under 
conventional tillage and 14% under RT (Kansas State University Research & Extension, 2010).  
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A study by Langemeier (2010) found that NT farms in Central Kansas were generally 
larger and more profitable.  These farms produced less wheat and more feed grains and had 
lower machinery and labor costs than farms with other tillage systems The adoption of 
conservation tillage practices has changed the dynamics of crop production.  According to 
Gasper and Langemeier (2010), corn and soybean production has increased due in part to the 
adoption of conservation tillage practices, which has allowed soils to maintain more moisture in 
the dryer areas of Kansas.  NT practices can facilitate double cropping and increase the 
flexibility of crop rotations (Sandretto, 2001). Langemeier (2010) also suggested that using NT 
improved farms flexibility by allowing them to include feed grains and oilseeds into their crop 
rotations.  
Despite the benefits associated with NT, farmers may choose not to adopt if they believe 
NT requires a big technological adjustment (Schneider et al., 2010).  Hence, the choice of tillage 
practice is a critical decision for any farm enterprise.  To date, the literature has predominantly 
focused on studying the adoption of conservation tillage at the farm level (Belknap and Saupe, 
1988; D’Emden et al., 2008; Davey and Furtan, 2008; Gould et al., 1989; Shortle and 
Miranowski, 1986; Vitale et al., 2011)
1
.  However, tillage decisions may be crop-specific.  Farm 
operators could use NT for some crops, but they may face constraints to adopting NT in other 
crops, because the investment in management skills for these crops is higher (Epplin and Tice, 
1986).  
 
                                                 
1 Fuglie (1999), Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe (2000), and Uri (1997) focused their study of 
conservation tillage adoption on corn production. 
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2.2 Objective 
The objective of this paper is to identify factors such as farm management characteristics, 
farmers’ attitudes, farmers’ risk aversion, and socio-demographic factors that impact farmers’ 
choice of No-till (NT), Strip-till (ST), and Conventional tillage (CT) for dryland corn, wheat and 
soybean production in Kansas.  A multinomial logit model was used to study farmers’ choice of 
tillage practice at the crop level.  Dryland corn, wheat and soybeans were analyzed because of 
their economic importance to agriculture in Kansas.  Knowing the factors affecting the adoption 
of tillage practices at the crop level may facilitate the development of policies and educational 
programs to encourage the adoption of conservation tillage methods. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
Ervin and Ervin (1982) found studies looking at factors influencing the adoption of soil 
conservation practices dating back to the 1950s.  To date, numerous studies have looked at 
factors affecting the adoption of different tillage systems, in particular conservation tillage, using 
different methodologies and sets of explanatory variables.  Commonly, models used in the 
literature to examine famers’ adoption of tillage systems have included logit, probit, ordinary 
least squares and multinomial logit models.  
Most frequently, studies have looked at the adoption of a particular tillage technology as 
a binary response using logit or probit models.  Belknap and Saupe (1988) looked at the adoption 
of no-plow tillage practices among farmers in Wisconsin.  Their findings suggest that the 
decision to adopt no-plow tillage was positively influenced by farm size and percentage of land 
owned, but negatively affected by the level of risk aversion.  Soule et al. (2000) studied the 
adoption of conservation tillage as affected by the type of lease arrangement.  In a base model 
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where no differentiation was made between types of renter, land ownership, land tenure had no 
statistical significance in the model.  However, when a distinction was made between cash-
renters and share-renters, findings suggest that the farmers in the former group are less likely to 
adopt conservation tillage.  Rahm and Huffman (1984) studied adoption and adoption efficiency 
of RT among corn farms in Iowa.  They modeled the efficiency of adoption as the difference 
between the actual farm adoption decision and the predicted probability of adoption, which 
represents the utility maximizing decision.  They found that characteristics of the cropping 
systems affect the decision to adopt RT, while human capital decisions affect the efficiency of 
the decision of tillage technology adoption.  Using data collected in Iowa for the National 
Resource Inventory on farming practices, Pautsch et al. (2001) estimated a model on the 
adoption of conservation tillage and the potential for carbon sequestration.  Their results suggest 
that some climate variables may affect the decision to adopt conservation tillage.  Davey and 
Furtan (2008) investigated the adoption of conservation tillage by prairie farmers in Canada 
using data from an agricultural census.  Variables found to explain the adoption of conservation 
tillage were farm size as well as soil and weather variables.  A study by D’Emden et al. (2008) 
also looked at the adoption of NT in Australia and found that perception of erosion reduction 
associated with NT practices did not explain adoption.  However, other crop production benefits 
associated with NT practices and extension information increase the likelihood of adoption.  
Banerjee et al. (2009) studied the adoption of conservation tillage practices and herbicide 
resistance cotton using a logit model.  Their findings did not find evidence of the use of herbicide 
resistance seed as a factor affecting the adoption of conservation practices. 
Other studies have looked at the adoption of multiple tillage practices using multinomial 
logit models.  Fuglie (1999) conducted a study looking at factors affecting the selection of CT, 
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NT and other conservation tillage practices (mulch or ridge till) in corn production, in the 
Cornbelt region, using data from a survey conducted by the USDA.  In their study, conservation 
compliance was found to be a significant factor in determining the selection of NT.  Their 
findings also suggest that farm size was a significant variable affecting the choice of tillage 
system, while college education and operator experience were not significant factors in the 
adoption of NT.  Pereira de Herrera and Sain (1999) studied the adoption of CT, NT and RT by 
corn producers in Panama.  Their results varied among the studied regions.  The proportion of 
land under livestock and the acreage of corn had a positive effect on the decision to adopt NT 
and RT for some regions and had a negative effect in other regions.  Land ownership was not 
significant in explaining the decision to adopt a particular tillage system. 
The adoption of conservation tillage and the intensity of adoption have also been studied 
using two stage models where the probability of adoption is assessed in the first stage and 
intensity of adoption in the second stage.  Uri (1997) assessed the adoption of conservation 
tillage in corn production using variables related to the farm and farmland characteristics and 
other variables related to agricultural input use from a survey conducted by USDA-NASS.  In 
their study, cash grain farmers were found to be more likely to adopt NT practices.  A slightly 
different approach was used by Gould et al. (1989) and Traore´et al. (1998).  In their two stage 
model, a farmer’s perception or awareness of an environmental degradation was assessed in the 
first stage and in the second stage they modeled the adoption of conservation tillage as affected 
by the farmer’s perception of an environmental problem.  
Additionally, some research has been conducted looking at the adoption of conservation 
tillage as part of a bundle of multiple practices.  Wu and Babcock (1998) conducted a joint 
analysis of the choice to adopt conservation tillage, rotation and soil testing in Central Nebraska.  
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Other studies looking at the choice of conservation tillage in a joint framework are Cooper 
(2003), who used a multinomial probit model to estimate the use and nonuse of different 
practices including conservation tillage; and Bergtold and Molnar (2010) who examined factors 
affecting the adoption of conservation tillage and other practices in the Southeast using a 
multinomial logit approach.  
Most of these studies have included farmers and farm household characteristics, farm 
management characteristics and attitudinal variables.  Additionally, other studies have included 
farm biophysical and climatic data.  A study by Pautsch et al. (2001) on the adoption of 
conservation tillage using a logit model included climatic and land characteristic but did not 
included farm characteristic or attitudinal factors.  Nonetheless, attitudinal factors and farm 
structure are important determinants in the decision to adopt environmentally-friendly practices 
(Welsh and Rivers, 2011).  
Past studies on the adoption of NT or ST examined the choice of tillage when practices 
were not widely embraced by producers.  These practices have now been more widely adopted 
and it is possible that changes in perception have occurred.  The adoption of conservation tillage 
practices, especially NT, has expanded with the dissemination of knowledge (i.e. due to new 
research findings; famers’ experiences; interaction of adopters and non-adopters; and the 
improvement of NT equipment) (Coughenour, 2003).  Hence, it is possible that there may be 
some changes in the way farm household and farm management characteristics impact the choice 
of tillage practices for crop production.  
Studies on tillage adoption are commonly conducted at the farm level, or on a particular 
crop.  This study contributes to the body of literature by modeling the adoption of different 
tillage practices at the crop level for dryland corn, wheat and soybean production for medium to 
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large size farms.  An empirical model that accounts for farm management characteristics, 
farmers’ attitudes, farmers’ risk aversion, and socio-demographic factors is used.  In addition, the 
effect of crop rotation decisions on tillage practice adoption is studied.  Including crop rotation 
decisions provided a mechanism to capture the interconnectedness of production decisions.  This 
study found new insights into how risk-averse farmers’ attitudes affect the adoption of 
conservation tillage practices compared to previous literature.  
 
2.4 Data and methods 
2.4.1 Model 
The decision of tillage practice at the crop level for dryland corn, wheat and soybeans is modeled 
empirically using a random utility framework that allows the model to account for economic 
motivations, as well as other farm and farm management characteristics that may play an 
important role in farmers’ motivation to adopt a particular practice (Skaggs et al., 1994; 
Robinson et al., 1984). Following this approach, farmer i's  utility ( ijU ) from the adoption of 
tillage practice j can be denoted as a function of farm management characteristics )( ix , 
attitudinal factors )( iΓ , farmer’s risk aversion )( ir , and socio-demographic factors )( iz . Farmer’s 
subjective utility from the adoption of a tillage practice can be expressed as 
ijiiiiijij VU  ),,,( zrΓx , where ijV  represents the systematic component of utility, explained by 
observed factors, and ij  is a random component containing unobserved factors affecting the 
utility. Farmers compare the utility derived from each tillage practice available from their choice 
set ( CTSTNTj ,, ) and choose the practice that maximize their utility, i.e.  
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),,max( 0 iJiij UUU   (Louviere et al., 2000). If the random component of the utility is 
distributed Extreme Value type I and assuming linearity of the utility function, the choice model 
becomes (McFadden, 1973): 
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where iT  is a polychotomous index denoting the choice of tillage practice by farmer i, 
),,,( iiiii zrΓxX   is a )1( k  vector containing the observed explanatory variables for the i
th
 
individual, and jβ  is a )1( k vector of unknown parameters for tillage practice j. Marginal 
effects )( ii XP   where P represents the probability that farmer i chooses practice j were derived 
following Greene (2012) and asymptotic standard errors for the marginal effects  were computed 
using the delta method (Greene, 2012).  
 
2.4.2 Survey and Data Description 
A survey was administered by Kansas State University, the USDA, and the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) from November 2010 to February 2011 in the northeast, south central 
and western regions of Kansas. Farmers with 260 or more acres in size and a minimum of 
$50,000 in gross farm sales were randomly selected and contacted to participate in the survey.  
The survey was conducted face to face by USDA-NASS enumerators. A total of 485 farmers 
were initially contacted, of which 290 completed the survey and 38 could not be located, were 
out-of-business, or did not farm; resulting in a response rate of 65%. The sample of farmers 
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surveyed is relatively representative of farmers’ demographics in Kansas. The average age of the 
farm operators as reported in the 2007 U.S.  Census of Agriculture is 57.7 years and the average 
market value of agricultural products is $219,944 (National Agricultural Statistics Service - 
USDA, 2007). The average age of the sample of farmers used in this study was 55.87 and the 
category for market value of agricultural products chosen with the highest frequency by 
respondents was $200,000 to $399,999.  The average farm size reported by farmers in the survey 
was 2,123 acres, larger than the general population (707 acres) since the survey focused on 
medium to larger farmers.  Hence, results in this study should be interpreted as representing 
tillage decisions by medium to large farm operators in Kansas. 
The survey was used to gather data on respondents’ farm management characteristics, 
farmers’ attitudes, farmers’ risk version, and socio-demographic information.  Farmers provided 
information on tillage practices used on dryland corn, wheat and soybean.  These crops were 
selected for this study due to the economic importance of these crops in the state of Kansas.  
Respondents were asked questions relevant to the agronomic practices for each particular crop, 
including their predominant crop rotation patterns, and if they graze or bale their crop residue.  
Respondents also provided information on the acreage planted, as the average values from the 
past three years.  While no questions were asked regarding farmers’ production costs, 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they considered themselves low cost producers using 
a Likert scale.  In addition, questions were included to determine the percentage of household 
income from farming operations; total acreage of land owned and rented from others; and if the 
farmer had a conservation plan.  Farmers’ attitudes such as promptness in adopting new 
technology and whether maximizing farm profits was more important than environmental 
stewardship were elicited using a Likert scale.  To elicit farmers’ risk preferences, farmers were 
 22 
 
asked to self-identify their level of risk aversion by indicating how they thought their neighbors 
would describe their (the interviewed farmers) risk taking behavior with respect to their farm 
operation.  The respondents were presented with six options to this risk taking behavior question. 
Farmers who considered being perceived by their neighbors as an “extreme risk avoider” or 
“cautious” were classified as risk-averse.  Farmers who considered they were perceived as “a 
real gambler,” “enjoy taking risks,” “not concerned about risk” or “willing to take risk after 
adequate research” were denoted as risk-takers or risk-neutral.  Data on farmers’ demographics 
collected included age and education.  
Tillage practices were analyzed at the crop level for dryland corn, wheat and soybeans.  
Information regarding the tillage practices performed by farmers on their planted crops was 
added to form three distinct categories for the analysis here.  The NT and ST category consisted 
of farmers who exclusively responded that they used no-till or strip-till on their crop fields.  The 
CT category comprised reduced tillage, harrow and the combinations of strip tillage-harrow, and 
harrow-chisel as well as moldboard plow, disc, cultivator, ripper and practices where these 
tillage operations were done in different combinations.  
Of the sampled individuals growing dryland corn, 18% used CT, 16% ST and 67% used 
NT.  Twenty-two percent of the farmers used CT in wheat production, while 25% used ST and 
53% used NT.  For dryland soybean production, 18% of the sampled individuals had their land 
under CT, 18% under ST and 65% under NT (Table 2.1).  The distribution of tillage practices 
was contrary to what was expected considering the results of the 2010 survey of tillage practice 
in Kansas previously referenced in this paper, in which a larger percentage of conventional 
tillage was observed.  Differences in the distribution may arise since the Kansas tillage practice 
survey is based on the number of acres under each particular practice as opposed to the number 
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of farmers using that particular practice.  In addition, data from the 2010 Kansas tillage practice 
survey was available only for 23 counties located mainly in the central and northeast regions of 
the state.  The data used in this study included observation from farmers in western Kansas 
where NT practices are more commonly used.   
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Table 2.1   Adoption percentage of tillage practices by crop in Kansas  
  Corn  Wheat  Soybean 
NT 67%  53%  65% 
ST 16%  25%  18% 
CT 18%  22%  18% 
N. Observations 177  165  114 
NT=No tillage, ST= Strip tillage, CT= Conventional tillage  
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2.4.3 Explanatory Variables used in the Analysis 
Variables affecting farmers’ choice of tillage practice at the crop level were grouped into four 
categories: farm management characteristics, farmer’ attitudes, farmers’ risk aversion, and socio-
demographic factors.  These variables have been generally identified in the literature as 
important determinants in the adoption of conservation practices (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; 
Prokopy et al., 2008).  Variable descriptions and their descriptive statistics are reported in Table 
2.2.  
Farm management characteristics evaluated are crop rotation, baling or grazing of crop 
residue, acreage planted to the crop being examined, if the farmer is a low cost producer, on-
farm income (percentage of household income from the farming operation), percentage of land 
rented, and if the farmer has a conservation plan
2
.  Crop rotation variables were included as crop 
rotation and tillage decisions may be interdependent.  Crops in the rotation were grouped into 
three crop categories: corn/sorghum, legumes (i.e. soybeans, alfalfa) and cereals (i.e. wheat, rye).   
A dummy variable was used to indicate the crop type preceding the crop of interest in the 
rotation.  The same crop type was used as the base scenario (i.e. in the corn model, the 
corn/sorghum category was used as the base scenario). Refer to Table 2.2 for additional 
explanation.  Farmers who rotated their crops were expected to be more likely to adopt 
conservation tillage than farmers in a monoculture (Vitale et al., 2011).  It was also hypothesized 
that crop rotations including corn/sorghum and soybean would result in a higher likelihood of 
using NT practices because of these crops sensitivity to moisture stress and NT potential to 
                                                 
2 A variable indicating whether farmers have a conservation plan was included as an alternative to a 
variable indicating whether they receive cost-share or incentive payments (for adopting conservation 
tillage) due to lack of variation within the data which makes it difficult to estimate its effect. 
 26 
 
enhance soil moisture retention (Baumhardt and Jones, 2002; Norwood, 1999).  Famers may also 
use NT to improve water retention in rotations with wheat in dryer areas.  As a whole, the effect 
of crop rotation was expected to be significant if farmers take a systems approach where all the 
elements in the production systems are considered when deciding what tillage practices to adopt. 
Farmers who graze or bale their crops were expected to be more likely to adopt CT.  
Grazing and crop residue removal could result in soil compaction problems, CT practices may be 
used as a tool to break the soil and reduce soil compaction (Hamza and Anderson, 2005; Vitale et 
al., 2011).  The acreage of the crop planted was expected to have a positive effect on the 
adoption of NT because of the potential efficiency gains, particularly labor savings (Prokopy et 
al., 2008; Langemeier, 2010).  Costs considerations are a major factor farmers need to consider 
when making decisions regarding what practices to adopt on their farm (Lichtenberg, 2004; 
Sijtsma et al., 1998).  Due to lack of cost data, this study included a proxy to measure the effect 
of cost as a dummy variable, which takes on a value of 1 if the farmer indicated they were a low 
cost producer and 0 otherwise.  Low cost producers have a greater incentive to adopt cost saving 
practices.  Conservation tillage practices result in lower labor and fuel costs, but they could also 
result in higher herbicide costs (Williams et al., 2012; Mueller et al., 1985).  Production cost 
advantages will then depend on input allocation and prices (Rahm and Huffman, 1984), but 
ultimately farmers’ decision to adopt is affected by their perception of how costly the practice is.   
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Table 2.2  Definition of variables and summary statistics  
Variable Corn Wheat Soybean  Description 
Rotation with corn/sorghum --- 
0.220 
(0.414) 
0.761 
(0.426) 
The crop preceding in the main rotation is 
corn or sorghum )0,1( noyes  . 
Rotation with legume 0.346 
(0.476) 
0.351 
(0.477) --- 
The crop preceding in the main rotation is a 
legume )0,1( noyes  . 
Rotation with cereal crop 0.559 
(0.497) --- --- 
The crop preceding in the main rotation is a 
cereal (e.g. wheat, rye) )0,1( noyes  . 
Graze crop residue 0.447 
(0.497) 
0.149 
(0.356) 
0.257 
(0.437) 
Farmer grazes the crop or crop residue of the 
crop modeled )0,1( noyes  . 
Bale crop residue 0.078 
(0.268) 
0.274 
(0.446) --- 
Farmer bales crop residue of the modeled 
crop )0,1( noyes  . 
Acreage planted of crop 
being examined 
405.447 
(448.33) 
581.875 
(534.54) 
435.195 
(372.65) 
Number of acres planted to the crop modeled 
averaged over the past three years. 
Low cost producer 0.824 
(0.381) 
0.853 
(0.355) 
0.794 
(0.404) 
The farm operator is a low cost producer 
)0,1( noyes  . 
On-farm income percentage 69.318 
(33.59) 
67.815 
(34.78) 
66.991 
(32.5) 
Percentage of household income derived 
from the farming operation. 
Percentage of land rented 57.824 
(30.97) 
55.907 
(31.49) 
58.037 
(31.06) 
Percentage of total land rented or leased 
from others. 
Conservation plan 0.804 
(0.397) 
0.815 
(0.388) 
0.867 
(0.340) 
Existence of a conservation plan for the farm 
)0,1( noyes  . 
First time technology 
adopter 
0.810 
(0.392) 
0.780 
(0.414) 
0.779 
(0.415) 
Farm operator usually adopts new 
technology (e.g. no-till, new seeds, etc.) 
before neighbors )0,1( noyes   
Profit motivation 0.531 
(0.499) 
0.542 
(0.498) 
0.549 
(0.498) 
Maximizing farm profit is more important 
than environmental stewardship to the farm's 
operator )0,1( noyes  . 
 
Risk-averse 
 
0.391 
(0.488) 
 
0.381 
(0.486) 
 
0.407 
(0.491) 
Risk taking behavior in farm management 
decisions )0,1( otherwiseaverserisk   
Age 55.486 
(12.04) 
55.494 
(11.78) 
54.451 
(11.52) 
Farmer's age in years. 
Education 0.307 
(0.461) 
0.321 
(0.467) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
Farm operator has a college degree 
)0,1( noyes  . 
Number of observations 177 165 114 
 
Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviations of the estimates. The standard deviation of binary 
variables was calculated as: )1(   where  is mean value of the binary variable. 
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There was not a prior expectation with respect to the effect of on-farm income on tillage 
decisions.  Farmers who depend more heavily on farm income may be more interested in 
conservation practices to maintain and enhance the productivity of their land.  However, this 
variable could also be capturing some of the effect of off-farm labor.  Farmers who work more 
off the farm could have an incentive to adopt NT practices because of labor savings (Gould et al., 
1989).  The percentage of land rented was hypothesized to have a negative impact on the 
adoption of NT practices.  Tenants have a shorter planning horizon and potentially lower interest 
in the long-term productivity of rented land (Soule et al., 2000).  Farmers with a conservation 
plan were expected to be more likely to use NT practices on all their crops. 
Attitudinal variables consisted of dummy variables denoting if the farmer was a first-time 
technology adopter and if stewardship was more important than profit maximization to the 
farmer. Farmers with these characteristics were expected to have a better attitude towards 
conservation (or the adoption of new practices) and to be more likely to use conservation tillage 
practices (NT and ST).   
Farmers’ risk aversion was captured through the use of a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 if the farmer was risk-averse and 0 otherwise.  The adoption of NT practices may require 
new machinery, knowledge, and management skills, which when coupled with the potential 
variability in yields, may increase the risk of using NT for some farm operators (Larson et al., 
2001).  Several studies have attempted to determine which tillage system would be preferred by 
farmers under different risk preferences by estimating the distribution of returns and/or using 
stochastic dominance analysis.  Some of these studies have suggested that risk-averse famers 
would prefer NT or RT over CT practices (Ribera et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2000). In contrast, 
other studies have found that NT practices might not be an attractive practice for risk-averse 
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farmers (Varner et al., 2011; Larson et al., 2001). While these studies provided important 
insights into what tillage practice risk-averse farmer would prefer, they do not provide evidence 
into farmers’ choices given their perceptions of crop returns and variance of returns under each 
tillage practice.  In the past, when NT or ST practices were not widespread, it was possible that 
risk-averse farm operators were less likely to adopt ST or NT practices.  As conservation tillage 
practices have become more widespread and farmers have more knowledge about their benefits, 
farmers’ perceptions regarding the risk-mitigating potential of conservation tillage practices may 
have changed.  
Socio-demographic factors included in the model were age and education. Education was 
denoted by a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the farmer had a college degree and 0 
otherwise.  Farmers with a college degree were expected to be more likely to adopt conservation 
practices because of a higher exposure to and use of information.  Age was expected to be 
positively related to the use of tillage practices more conventional in nature.  Younger farmers 
may be more eager about trying newer technologies (D'Souza et al., 1993)
3
.  
 
 
2.5 Results 
Parameter estimates and statistical measures from the multinomial logit model of tillage adoption 
in dryland corn, wheat and soybean production are reported in Table 2.3. Marginal effects 
representing the change in the probability of choosing a particular tillage system given a one unit 
change in an explanatory variable are reported in Table 2.4. The models of tillage choice in corn 
                                                 
3 Information on race and gender was not included in the model given the limited variation across 
respondents. 
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and soybean performed better than the model of tillage choice in wheat.  The percentage of 
correct predictions of the choice of tillage use in corn was 71% and 81% for soybean, while 55% 
of the choices were correctly predicted for wheat.  Across the three crops, the decision to use NT 
had the highest rate of correct predictions with 74% for corn, 83% for soybeans, and 56% for 
wheat (Table 2.3).  The McFadden Pseudo R-squared for the corn, soybean, and wheat models 
were 0.16, 0.36, and 0.06, respectively.  
 Crop rotation was not found to be a statistically significant factor in the decision of tillage 
practice for corn, wheat or soybean production. This result supports the idea that tillage decisions 
are crop-specific, and not connected to considerations of the entire cropping system dynamics, 
particularly crop rotations. Previous research in the literature suggested that practices may be 
seen by farmers independently and adopted in a stepwise form (Bergtold and Molnar, 2010; 
Byerlee et al., 1986).  However, the importance of managing the farm as an integrated system in 
order to exploit the synergy benefits from practices that are interrelated cannot be undermined 
(Ikerd, 1993). It was also worth noting that approximately 48% of the farmers who reported 
using NT in corn, wheat, or soybeans had not adopted the use of continuous NT in rotations with 
these crops. For instance, several farmers reported using NT for corn and/or soybeans, but not for 
a wheat crop in the same rotation. An interesting observation to emerge from this result is that 
while NT is widely used by crop producers, continuous NT has not been fully adopted.  This 
finding is in agreement with Williams et al. (2000); and with Grandy et al. (2006), who 
suggested that some NT systems in the U.S. are periodically tilled.   
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Table 2.3  Parameter estimates for the choice of tillage system in dryland corn, soybean 
and wheat 
 
Corn 
 
Wheat 
 
Soybean 
 
 
NT ST 
 
NT ST 
 
NT ST 
Intercept 1.9883  -0.6440   0.5822  1.0091   0.2612  0.7497  
 (2.148)  (2.741)   (1.724)  (1.916)   (2.728)  (3.224)  
Rotation with corn/sorghum           ---    ---   -0.4060  -0.2670   1.2841 * 1.0808  
    (0.588)  (0.643)   (0.746)  (0.948)  
Rotation with legume -0.0114  -0.6515   0.0849  -0.7203           --- 
 
    ---  
 (0.782)  (1.038)   (0.546)  (0.634)     
Rotation with cereal crop 0.5021  -0.2097         ---  ---          --- 
 
    ---  
 (0.780)  (0.991)        
Graze crop residue 
 
0.2158  1.3274 **  -0.3197  -0.4280   1.5627  2.1223 * 
(0.472)  (0.616)   (0.634)  (0.742)   (1.096)  (1.230)  
Bale crop residue -1.4513 * -0.8364   -0.6182  -0.0830         ---    ---  
 (0.796)  (0.951)   (0.527)  (0.592)       
Acreage planted of crop being 
examined 0.0021 ** 0.0023 **  0.0003  0.0005   0.0057 *** 0.0034  
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.002)  (0.002)  
Low cost producer 0.1748  1.0086   0.6330  0.6289   0.4935  2.6085 * 
 (0.551)  (0.920)   (0.577)  (0.681)   (0.833)  (1.457)  
On-farm income percentage -0.0173 ** -0.0216 **  -0.0098  -0.0124   -0.0039 
(0.011) 
 0.0020 
(0.013) 
 
 (0.008)  (0.009)   (0.007)  (0.008)     
Percentage of land rented -0.0084  -0.0068   0.0015  -0.0036   -0.0025  -0.0282 ** 
 (0.008)  (0.011)   (0.008)  (0.008)   (0.012)  (0.014)  
Conservation plan 1.2869 ** 0.3287   0.7055  0.5078   1.8203 * -1.2117  
 (0.523)  (0.644)   (0.535)  (0.602)   (0.954)  (0.999)  
First time technology adopter 0.3311  -1.2963 *  1.0588 ** 0.3170   1.3218 * -0.3821  
 (0.599)  (0.681)   (0.511)  (0.558)   (0.820)  (0.853)  
Profit motivation 0.4177  0.9633   0.1113  0.1122   -0.4417  0.7279  
 (0.464)  (0.619)   (0.451)  (0.509)   (0.669)  (0.842)  
Risk-averse 0.6957  0.5451   1.0184 ** 0.7122   1.9170 ** 0.9448  
 (0.503)  (0.635)   (0.506)  (0.573)   (0.806)  (0.894)  
Age -0.0308  0.0117   -0.0227  -0.0197   -0.0888 ** -0.0536  
 (0.022)  (0.300)   (0.021)  (0.023)   (0.037)  (0.044)  
Education -0.0133  -0.4218   -0.0742  -0.1807   0.3085  -0.9857  
 (0.510)  (0.680)   (0.464)  (0.527)   (0.743)  (1.023)  
               
   
Fit Statistics 
Number of observations 
 
177  
    
165  
    
114  
 Log likelihood 
 
-128.90 
    
-155.77 
    
-64.81 
 Likelihood Ratio Statistic 
 
49.156  
    
22.875  
    
73.576  
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Table 2.3 continued              
 
Corn 
 
Wheat 
 
Soybean 
 
 
NT ST 
 
NT ST 
 
NT ST 
McFadden Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.160 
    
0.068 
    
0.362 
 Percentage of correct predictions 
 
71% 
    
55% 
    
81% 
 NT 
 
74% 
    
56% 
    
83% 
 ST 
 
50% 
    
50% 
    
69% 
 RCT 
 
57% 
    
42% 
    
78% 
 Note: ***, ** and * indicate the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level of significance. 
Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviations of the estimates. NT=No-till, ST= Strip-till, RCT=Reduced/Conventional tillage.  
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Table 2.4  Marginal effects for the choice of tillage system in dryland corn, soybean and wheat
 
 
Corn 
 
Wheat 
 
Soybean 
 
NT ST CT 
 
NT ST CT 
 
NT ST CT 
Intercept 0.4393  -0.2442  -0.1950   0.0047  0.1092             -0.1139   -0.0242  0.0446  -0.0204  
 (0.322)  (0.222)  (0.2496)   (0.335)  (0.284)  (0.257)   (0.308)  (0.235)  (0.174)  
Rotation with corn/sorghum --- 
 
--- 
 
---   -0.0636  0.0059  0.0577   0.0916  -0.0091  -0.0825  
     (0.110)  (0.092)  (0.088)   (0.092)  (0.072)  (0.052)  
Rotation with legume 0.0556  -0.0677  0.0121   0.1205  -0.1471  0.0266   --- 
 
--- 
 
---  
 (0.122)  (0.088)  (0.0922)   (0.107)  (0.093)  (0.082)      
Rotation with cereal crop 0.1151  -0.0666  -0.0485   --- 
 
--- 
 
---   --- 
 
--- 
 
---  
 (0.118)  (0.082)  (0.0918)          
Graze crop residue -0.0762  0.1208 ** -0.0446   -0.0200  -0.0363  0.0563   0.0463  0.0597  -0.1060  
 (0.072)  (0.049)  (0.0551)   (0.129)  (0.115)  (0.095)   (0.104)  (0.073)  (0.072)  
Bale crop residue -0.2047  0.0405  0.1642 *  -0.1415  0.0698  0.0717   ---  ---  ---  
 (0.132)  (0.089)  (0.0906)   (0.105)  (0.089)  (0.078)         
Acreage planted of crop being 
examined 
0.0002 ** 0.0000  -0.0003 ***  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001   0.0005 
**
* -0.0002  -0.0004 
**
* 
(0.000)  0.0001   (0.0001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   0.(000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Low cost producer -0.0558  0.0908  -0.0350   0.0698  0.0308  -0.1006   -0.1419  0.1886 * -0.0467  
 (0.100)  (0.085)  (0.0651)   (0.118)  (0.106)  (0.086)   (0.125)  (0.111)  (0.056)  
On-farm income percentage  -0.0014  -0.0007  0.0022 **  -0.0007  -0.0010  0.0017 * -0.0007 
(0.001) 
 0.0005 
(0.001) 
 0.0002 
(0.001) 
 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0009)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)      
Percentage of land rented -0.0010  0.0000  0.0010   0.0009  -0.0009  0.0000   0.0019  -0.0023 ** 0.0003  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0010)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Conservation plan 0.2182 
**
* -0.0795  -0.1387 **  0.1045  -0.0020  -0.1025   0.3514 ** -0.2531 ** -0.0983  
 (0.085)  (0.058)  (0.0614)   (0.109)  (0.094)  (0.079)   (0.142)  (0.112)  (0.076)  
First time technology adopter 0.1786 ** -0.1660 
**
* -0.0126   0.2182 ** -0.0866  -0.1316 * 0.2150 ** -0.1402 * -0.0748  
 (0.089)  (0.055)  (0.0700)   (0.104)  (0.087)  (0.074)   (0.098)  (0.074)  (0.058)  
Profit motivation -0.0051  0.0645  -0.0594   0.0121  0.0057  -0.0178   -0.1203  0.0994  0.0209  
 (0.072)  (0.052)  (0.0546)   (0.086)  (0.074)  (0.068)   (0.079)  (0.063)  (0.043)  
Risk-averse 0.0854  -0.0042  -0.0811   0.1537 * -0.0068  -0.1469 
*
* 0.1907 ** -0.0721  -0.1187 * 
 (0.076)  (0.052)  (0.0587)   (0.092)  (0.0797)  (0.075)   (0.094)  (0.066)  (0.065)  
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Table 2.4 continued                     
 
Corn 
 
Wheat 
 
Soybean 
 
NT ST CT 
 
NT ST CT 
 
NT ST CT 
Age -0.0070 ** 0.0040 * 0.0030   -0.0029  -0.0006  0.0035   -0.0080 * 0.0025  0.0056 * 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.0026)   (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  
Education 0.0349  -0.0433  0.0084   0.0066  -0.0237  0.0171   0.1226  -0.1112  -0.0113  
 
(0.080)  (0.058)  (0.0600)   (0.092)  (0.079)  (0.069)   (0.092)  (0.074)  (0.048) 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level of significance. Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard 
deviations of the estimates. NT=No-till, ST= Strip-till CT= Conventional tillage. 
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Given the agronomic challenges to implementing continuous NT, alternating NT and tilling 
practices could be in the farmers’ best interest in the short-term (Grandy et al., 2006; Williams et 
al., 2000).  Grandy et al. (2006) highligt the need for active research participation to overcome 
agronomic and economic aspects where continuous NT may be still challenging to farmers.  In 
addition, research and extension education programs could stress the combined effect from 
adopting complementary conservation practices and the importance of an integrated systems 
approach to ease the transition into continuous NT systems (Grandy et al., 2006).  
Producers who graze their corn crop or corn residue were found to be 12.08% more likely 
to use ST.  On the contrary, a study by Vitale et al. (2011) found that operators who graze cattle 
or whose main income source was from livestock were less likely to use conservation tillage, 
including both NT and ST practices.  Grazing crop residue is a common practice among farmers 
to reduce livestock feed cost, but a potential problem that arises from grazed fields is soil 
compaction.  Since tillage could be used by farmers to break the soil and eliminate soil 
compaction, practices such as ST that limit soil surface disturbance may be desirable for some 
farm operators (Hamza and Anderson, 2005).  Farmers who bale their crop residue were found to 
be 16.4% more likely to use CT in corn production. Crop residue is usually harvested and baled 
either for livestock feed or bedding
4
.  Conservation practices (NT and ST) require at least 30% of 
crop residue to remain on the soil surface, which could allow for the possibility of harvesting 
some residue depending on the level of crop biomass produced.  However, in some cases, if crop 
biomass residue is limited, harvesting small volumes of crop residue can be difficult due to 
                                                 
4 An additional future potential use for crop residue is for biofuel feedstock (Banowetz et al., 2008; 
Berndes, Hoogwijk, and van den Broek, 2003). 
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equipment limitations (Perlack et al., 2005).  Using CT does not impose any constraints on the 
amount of crop residue that can be harvested and baled. This may explain why farmers who bale 
their crops are more likely to use CT.  
Crop acreage for the modeled crops was a significant factor in the models of tillage 
choice in corn and soybeans.  Crop acreage was found to reduce the likelihood of using CT 
practices and to increase the likelihood of adopting NT.  CT practices comprise several passes 
across fields with tillage equipment, resulting in a higher use of machinery, fuel, labor, and time.  
NT practices are less labor and machinery intensive than conventional practices, reducing 
production costs and the opportunity cost of time (Harman, et al., 1996; Pendell et al, 2007).  
Opting for this time-saving alternative may allow farmers to cultivate more acres (Williams et 
al., 2012).  A study by Langemeier (2010) found that NT farms in central Kansas are generally 
larger than farms adopting other types of tillage practices.  Another aspect that could explain a 
higher likelihood of adoption for larger crop acreage is that the investment in human capital and 
machinery per unit of land is smaller for larger farms (Epplin and Tice, 1986; Decker et al., 
2009). 
Results with respect to low cost producers suggested that these farmers were 18.9% more 
likely to use ST in soybean production.  The major difference in costs between tillage systems 
arises from the intensity of the primary tillage practice and the number of tillage passes (Karlen 
et al., 2013).  Thus, farm operators may see ST as a lower cost practice when compared to 
conventional tillage systems (i.e. from labor and fuel savings).  ST has been recommended as a 
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good alternative to NT practices because of its economic returns and conservation benefits, 
especially in soils with drainage and compaction issues (Archer and Reicosky, 2009).  
Results with respect to on-farm income indicated that higher on-farm income increases 
the likelihood of using CT by 0.22% in corn and by 0.17% in wheat production.  Farmers with a 
larger portion of income coming from the farm operation may work less off the farm and be less 
time constrained to work the ground and perform tillage passes.  Land tenure was not found to 
significantly affect tillage practice choice in corn or wheat production.  Results from the soybean 
model suggested that a one percentage increase in the proportion of rented land reduced the 
likelihood of using ST by 0.23%.  A study by Lee and Stewart (1983) found that the adoption of 
minimum tillage was lowest among operators with full land ownership.  They suggested that 
land ownership did not pose a constraint for the adoption of minimum tillage because of the 
independence of tenant decisions under common leasing arrangements.  In addition, they argued 
that this practice could be adopted by renters with the objective to reduce costs.  Other studies 
have not found evidence of land tenure effects in the decision to adopt tillage practices (Wu and 
Babcock, 1998; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; and Shortle and Miranowski, 1986).  
Compliance with a conservation plan through farm programs gave rise to an increase in 
the adoption of NT practices since 1990 (Sandretto, 2001).  In this study, farmers with a 
conservation plan were 21.8% and 35.4% more likely to use NT practices in corn and soybean 
production, respectively.  Farmers with a conservation plan were less likely to use CT in corn 
production and less likely to use ST in soybean production.  Conservation is likely an important 
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aspect to farming for those farmers who have a conservation plan, explaining why they would be 
more likely to adopt NT practices.  
Farmers who considered themselves first time adopters of new technologies were 17.9%, 
21.8% and 21.5% more likely to adopt NT practices in corn, wheat and soybean production, 
respectively.  These farmers who adopt new technologies before their peers were less likely to 
use ST or CT practices for the crops examined.  Korsching et al. (1983) suggested that there is 
similarity between farmers who adopt innovative technologies and farmers who adopt 
conservation practices as both are preventive innovations.  They also suggested that the adoption 
of soil conservation practices follows a similar pattern to the adoption of other practices, 
explaining why farmers who adopt new technologies (e.g. seed varieties, GPS, etc.) before other 
farmers may be more likely to adopt NT technologies.  Results with respect to profit motivation, 
the variable indicating whether profit maximization was more important to the farm operator 
than environmental stewardship, was not significant in either model.  While some farmers may 
adopt NT or ST practices because of the environmental benefits, other farmers’ decision to adopt 
these practices may be driven by profit motivations (e.g. higher yields, lower costs). 
Risk aversion was found to be a significant factor in explaining the choice of tillage 
practice in dryland soybean and wheat production.  Risk-averse farmers were 19.1% and 15.4% 
more likely to use NT practices in dryland soybean and wheat, respectively.  Risk-averse farmers 
were also found to be less likely to use CT in both wheat and soybean production.  Previous 
research has identified no-plow adopters as risk-takers (Belknap and Saupe, 1988) and has 
catalogued risk aversion as a delaying factor in the adoption of NT practices (Krause and Black, 
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1995).  And while other studies have also suggested that NT practices may not be an attractive 
practice for risk-averse farmers (Varner et al., 2011; Larson et al., 2001), this study found 
evidence suggesting that risk-averse farmers were more likely to adopt NT practices. Provided 
that farmers who perceive risk in adopting conservation practices are less likely to adopt them 
(Shortle and Miranowski, 1986), it is possible that a higher likelihood of NT adoption by risk-
averse farmers suggest that these farmers consider NT a practice with risk-reducing potential.    
The increase in the adoption of conservation tillage practices and risk averse farmers’ preference 
for NT practices could be the result of positive results experienced by early adopters and 
subsequent flow of information from farmer to farmer over time (Sundermeier et al., 2009; 
Krause and Black, 1995).  In addition, the introduction of herbicide-resistant crop varieties and 
different herbicide options (as alternatives to fight weed pressure mechanically) have reduced 
some of the risk associated with NT adoption over the years (Givens et al., 2009).    
Age was found to reduce the likelihood of adopting NT by 0.70% in corn and by 0.80% 
in soybean production.  The likelihood of using CT was found to be higher (0.56%) in soybean 
production as age increases, in agreement with a prior expectation that older farmers may be 
prone to use tillage practices that are more conventional in nature.  In previous literature, mixed 
results have been found about the effect of age on the adoption of conservation practices (See 
Okoye, 1998; Soule et al., 2000; Vitale et al., 2011; Warriner and Moul, 1992).  Findings in the 
literature with respect to the effect of education on the adoption of conservation tillage practices 
are mixed.  Some studies have found a positive effect (Shortle and Miranowski, 1986; Traoré et 
al., 1998; Wu and Babcock, 1998), while others have found a negative effect (Bergtold and 
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Molnar, 2010).  In this study, college education was not a statistically significant factor in 
explaining tillage choice in any of the models.   
 
2.6 Conclusions 
The decision of NT, ST and CT  practice was evaluated at the crop enterprise level for dryland 
corn, wheat and soybeans production by medium to large farmers in Kansas.  The effect of farm 
characteristics, socio-demographic factors, risk aversion, and farmers’ attitudes were evaluated.  
The results in this study provide additional evidence with respect to the factors affecting the 
adoption of conservation tillage and areas that need reinforced in farmers’ education programs 
and when identifying target populations in designing policy incentives for conservation 
programs.  The key findings of this study are: 
 This study found evidence suggesting that famers’ crop rotation may not affect farmers’ 
choice of tillage practice as evidenced by the statistically insignificant rotation parameters 
across all models.  While dissemination of management information could be targeted at the 
crop level (e.g. dealing with crop residue and adjusting planting timing with different tillage 
practices), an integrated systems approach to production should be encouraged. 
Particularly, the joint adoption of complementary practices (e.g. crop rotation) that could 
provide farmers with weed and nutrient management strategies to reduce their reliance on 
more conventional tillage practices.  In addition, it was found that while crop-specific NT 
was the predominant tillage practice, continuous NT has not been widely adopted. The 
continuity of conservation tillage should be encouraged in order to preserve soil structure 
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improvements attained under NT. These soil improvements can be lost when the land is 
disrupted with tillage passes (Grandy et al., 2006).  
 Increases in crop acreage increases the likelihood of adopting NT practices. The adoption of 
NT practices could be promoted among farmers who want to expand their production land 
under corn or wheat. Information on labor and time savings might be useful for these 
farmers. In addition, to encourage the adoption of NT among smaller farmers, financial aid 
could be provided to help farmers cover some of the start-up costs (e.g. investment in 
management skills and machinery). 
 Baling of crop residue seems to exert a positive effect on the adoption of more conventional 
tillage practices. To encourage the adoption of NT practices among farmers who graze or 
bale their crop residue, programs could engage these farmers by providing them with soil 
conservation methods that would eliminate or alleviate the constraints they faced in adopting 
NT practices. For example, combinations of conservation tillage with other practices (e.g. 
cover crops, crop rotations) that could help provide needed forage and alleviate soil 
compaction issues.  
 Farmers who are low cost producers are more likely to use ST in soybean production. 
Providing research-based information on cost differences between practices might entice 
farmers to adopt cost reducing conservation tillage practices. 
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 While some previous literature has suggested that NT practices may not be attractive to risk-
averse farmers, this study found evidence suggesting that risk-averse farmers were more 
likely to adopt NT, which suggests a change in perception regarding the risk reducing 
benefits of NT practices.  For example, well managed NT can stabilize soil structure and 
improve other soil characteristics, allowing for better crop resilience to mild drought risk 
(Dickey et al., 1989). Effectively conveying information on how NT practices could reduce 
risk in the long-term could be an important component to conservation programs. There is 
room for progress in determining how risk plays a role in farmers’ adoption of conservation 
tillage.  A study with greater focus on the role of risk could be conducted to clearly 
understand how specific aspects of risk (e.g. yield, returns, pest and diseases, resistant-
weeds) affect farmers’ decisions.  In addition, an individual-specific quantitative measure of 
risk aversion could be included to determine how farmers’ decisions are affected at different 
levels of risk aversion. 
 
  
 43 
 
References 
Alberts, E.E., R.C. Wendt, and R.E. Burwell. “Corn and Soybean Cropping Effects on Soil 
Losses and C Factors.” Soil Science Society of America Journal 49(1985): 721-727. 
Anaele, A.O., and U.R. Bishnoi. “Effects of Tillage, Weed-control Method and Row Spacing on 
Soybean yield and certain soil properties.” Soil and Tillage Research 23(1992): 333-340. 
Archer, D.W., and D.C. Reicosky. “Economic Performance of Alternative Tillage Systems in the 
Northern Corn Belt.” Agronomy Journal 101(2009):296-304. 
Banerjee, S., S.W. Martin, R.K. Roberts, J.A. Larson, R.J. Hogan Jr., J.L. Johnson, K.W. Paxton, 
and J.M. Reeves. “Adoption of Conservation-tillage Practices and Herbicide-resistant 
Seed in Cotton Production.” AgBioForum 12(2009):258-268.  
Banowetz, G.M., A. Boateng, J.J. Steiner, S.M. Griffith, V. Sethi, and H. El-Nashaar. 
“Assessment of Straw Biomass Feedstock Resources in the Pacific Northwest.” Biomass 
and Bioenergy 32(2008): 629-634. 
Baumgart-Getz, A., L.S. Prokopy, and K. Floress. “Why Farmers Adopt Best Management 
Practice in the United States: A Meta-analysis of the Adoption Literature.” Journal of 
Environmental Management 96(2012):17-25. 
Baumhardt, R.L., and O.R. Jones. “Residue Management and Tillage Effects on Soil-water 
Storage and Grain Yield of Dryland Wheat and Sorghum for a Clay Loam in Texas.” Soil 
and Tillage Research 68(2002):71-82. 
Belknap, J., and W.E. Saupe. “Farm Family Resources and the Adoption of No-Plow Tillage in 
Southwestern Wisconsin.” North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 
10(1988):13-23. 
Bergtold, J.S., and J.J. Molnar. “Limited Access to Conservation: Limited- Resource Farmer 
Participation in the Conservation Security Program in the Southeast.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics 42(2010): 211-227. 
Berndes, G., M. Hoogwijk, and R. van den Broek. “The Contribution of Biomass in the Future 
Global Energy Supply: A Review of 17 Studies.” Biomass and Bioenergy 25(2003): 1-28. 
Blanco-Canqui, H., L.R. Stone, A.J. Schlegel, D.J. Lyon, M.F. Vigil, M.M. Mikha, P.W. 
Stahlman, and C.W. Rice. “No-till Induced Increased in Organic Carbon Reduces 
Maximum Bulk Density of Soils.” Soil Science Society of America Journal 
73(2009a):1871-1879. 
Blanco-Canqui, H., M.M. Mikha, J.G. Benjamin, L.R. Stone, A.J. Schlegel, D.J. Lyon, M.F. 
Vigil, and P.W. Stahlman. “Regional Study of No-Till Impacts on Near-Surface 
Aggregate Properties that Influence Soil Erodibility.” Soil Science Society of America 
Journal 73(2009b): 1361-1368. 
 44 
 
Blevins, R.L., D. Cook, S.H. Phillips, and R.E. Phillips. “Influence of No-till on Soil Moisture.” 
Agronomy Journal 63(1971):593-596. 
Bockus, W.W., and J.P. Shroyer. “The Impact of Reduced Tillage on Soilborne Plant 
Pathogens.” Annual Review of Phytopathology 36(1998): 485-500.  
Byerlee, D., and E. Hesse de Polanco. “Farmers' Stepwise Adoption of Technological Packages: 
Evidence from the Mexican Altiplano.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
68(1986):519-527. 
Campbell, C.A., F. Selles, G.P. Lafond, and R.P. Zentner. “Adopting Zero Tillage Management: 
Impact on Soil C and N under Long-term Crop Rotations in a Thin Black Chernozem.” 
Canadian Journal of Soil Science 81(2001): 139-148. 
Cooper, J.C. “A Joint Framework for Analysis of Agri-Environmental Payment Programs.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(2003):976-987. 
Coughenour, C.M. “Innovating Conservation Agriculture: The Case of No-till Cropping.” Rural 
Sociology 68(2003):278-304.  
D’Emden, F.H., R.S. Llewellyn, and M.P. Burton. “Factors Influencing Adoption of 
Conservation Tillage in Australian Cropping Regions.” The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 52(2008):169-182. 
D'Souza, G.E., D. Cyphers, and T.T. Phipps. “Factors Affecting the Adoption of Sustainable 
Agricultural Practices.” Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 22(1993):159-165. 
Daniel, J.B., A.O. Abaye, M.M. Alley, C.W. Adcock, and J.C. Maitland. “Winter Annual Cover 
Crops in a Virginia No-till Cotton Production System: II. Cover Crop and Tillage Effects 
on Soil Moisture, Cotton Yield, and Cotton Quality.” The Journal of Cotton Science 
3(1999):84-91. 
Davey, K.A., and W.H. Furtan. “Factors that Affect the Adoption Decision of Conservation 
Tillage in the Prairie Region of Canada.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
56(2008): 257-275. 
Decker, J., F. Epplin, D. Morley, and T. Peeper. “Economics of Five Wheat Production Systems 
with No-till and Conventional Tillage.” Agronomy Journal 101(2009): 364-372. 
Dickey, E.E., D.J. Eckert, W.E. Larson, R. Johndhon, J. Mannering, J. Kinsella, I. Wikner, and 
R.M. Cruse. “To Till or Not to Till During Drought” Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation 44(1989):117-120 
Ding, Y., K. Schoengold, and T. Tadesse. “The Impact of Weather Extremes on Agricultural 
Production Methods: Does Drought Increase Adoption of Conservation Tillage 
Practices?” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 34(2009): 395-411. 
 45 
 
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency. “Soil preparation.” (2013). Available online at:  
http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/ag101/cropsoil.html 
Epplin, F.M., and T.F. Tice. “Influence of Crop and Farm Size on Adoption of Conservation 
Tillage.” Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 41(1986): 424-427. 
Ervin, C.A., and D.E. Ervin. “Factors Affecting the Use of Soil Conservation Practices: 
Hypothesis, and Policy Implications.” Land Economics 58(1982):277-292. 
Fuglie, K.O. “Conservation Tillage and Pesticide Use in the Cornbelt.” Journal of Agricultural 
and Applied Economics 31(1999):133-147. 
Gasper, A., and M. Langemeier. “Efficiency of No-Till Production in Central Kansas.” Paper 
presented at the 2010 Risk and Profit Conference, Manhattan, KS, August (2010). 
Available online at:  
http://www.agmanager.info/events/risk_profit/2010/Papers/4_Gasper_NoTillEfficiency_
Paper.pdf 
Givens, W.A., D.R. Shaw, G.R. Kruger, W.G. Johnson, S.C. Weller, B.G. Young, R.G. Wilson, 
M.D.K. Owen, and D. Jordan. “Survey of Tillage Trends Following the Adoption of 
Glyphosate-Resistant Crops.” Weed Technology 23(2009):150-155. 
Gould, B.W., W.E. Saupe, and R.M. Klemme. “Conservation Tillage: The Role of Farm and 
Operator Characteristics and the Perception of Soil Erosion.” Land Economics 65(1989): 
167-182. 
Grandy, A.S., G.P. Robertson, and K.D. Thelen. “Do Productivity and Environmental Trade-offs 
Justify Periodically Cultivating No-till Cropping Systems?” Agronomy Journal 
98(2006):1377-1383. 
Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis, 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice 
Hall., 2012. 
Hamza, M.A., and W.K. Anderson. “Soil Compaction in Cropping Systems - A Review of the 
Nature, Causes and Possible Pollutions.” Soil and Tillage Research 82(2005): 121-145. 
Harman, W.L., R.M. Davis, J.E. Morrison, Jr., and K.N. Potter. “Economics of Wide-bed 
Farming Systems for Vertisol (clay) Soils: Chisel Tillage vs. No-tillage.” Journal of 
American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers 19(1996):129-134.  
Heer, W.F., and E.G. Krenzer, Jr. “Soil Water Availability for Spring Growth of Winter Wheat 
(Triticum aestivum L.) as Influenced by Early Growth and Tillage.” Soil and Tillage 
Research 14(1989):185-96. 
Hensher, D.A., J.M. Rose, and W.H. Greene. Applied Choice Analysis: A Primer. Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.  
 46 
 
Ikerd, J.E. “The Need for a System Approach to Sustainable Agriculture.” Agriculture, 
Ecosystems and Environment 46(1993): 147-160. 
Kansas State University Research and Extension, Farm Services Agency. “Soil Management - 
Tillage Practice Data”. (2010). Available online at:  
http://www.agronomy.ksu.edu/extension/p.aspx?tabid=143  
Karlen, D.L., J.L. Kovar, C.A. Cambardella, and T.S. Colvin. “Thirty-year Tillage Effects on 
Crop Yield and Soil Fertility Indicators.” Soil and Tillage Research 130(2013):24-41. 
Kaval, P. “The Profitability of Alternative Cropping Systems: a Review of the Literature.” 
Journal of Sustainable Agriculture 23(2004): 47-65. 
Kladivko, E.J. “Tillage Systems and Soil Ecology.” Soil and Tillage Research 61(2001):61-
76.Korsching, P.F., C.W. Stofferahn, P.J. Nowak, and D.J. Wagener. “Adopter 
Characteristics and Adoption Patterns of Minimum Tillage: Implications for Soil 
Conservation Programs.” Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 38(1983): 428-431. 
Krause, M.A., and J.R. Black. “Optimal Adoption Strategies for No-till Technology in 
Michigan.”  Review of Agricultural Economics 17(1995):299-310. 
Kushwaha, C.P., S.K. Tripathi, and K.P. Singh. “Soil Organic Matter and Water-stable 
Aggregates under Different Tillage and Residue Conditions in a Tropical Dryland 
Agroecosystem.” Applied Soil Ecology 16(2001): 229-241. 
Lal, R. “Long-term Tillage and Wheel Traffic Effects on Soil Quality for Two Central Ohio 
soils.” Journal of Sustainable Agriculture 14(1999):67-84. 
Langemeier, M. “Relative Technical and Cost Efficiency of No-Till Farms.” Journal of 
International Farm Management 5(2010): 1-11. 
Larson, J.A., E.C. Jaenicke, R.K. Roberts, and D.D. Tyler. “Risk Effects of Alternative Winter 
Cover Crop, Tillage, and Nitrogen Fertilization Systems in Cotton Production.” Journal 
of Agricultural and Applied Economics 33(2001):445-457.  
Lee, L.K., and W.H. Stewart. “Landownership and the Adoption of Minimum Tillage.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65(1983): 256-264. 
Lichtenberg, E. “Cost-Responsiveness of Conservation Practice Adoption: A Revealed 
Preference Approach.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 29(2004):420-
435. 
Louviere, J.J., D.A. Hensher, and J.D. Swait. Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and Applications. 
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
McFadden D. Conditional Logit Analysis on Qualitative Choice Behavior. Frontiers of 
Econometrics. Zarembka, New York, 1973. 
 47 
 
Mueller, D.H., R.M. Klemme, and T.C. Daniel. “Short- and Long-term Cost Comparisons of 
Conventional and Conservation Tillage Systems in Corn Production.” Journal of Soil and 
Water Conservation 40(1985):466-470. 
NASS - National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA.  “2007 Census Publication”. (2007) 
Available online at: http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/index.php 
Norwood, C. “Water use and yield of dryland row crops as affected by tillage.” Agronomy 
Journal 91(1999):108-115. 
Okoye, C. “Comparative Analysis of Factors in the Adoption of Traditional and Recommended 
Soil Erosion Control Practices in Nigeria.” Soil and Tillage Research 45(1998):251-263. 
Paustian, K., J. Six, E.T. Elliott, and H.W. Hunt. “Management Options for Reducing CO2 
Emissions from Agricultural Soils.” Biogeochemistry 48(2000):147-163. 
Pautsch, G.R., L.A. Kurkalova, B.A. Babcock, and C.L Kling. “The Efficiency of Sequestering 
Carbon in Agricultural Soils.” Contemporary Economic Policy 19(2001):123-134. 
Pendell, D.L., J.R. Williams, S.B. Boyles, C.W. Rice, and R.G. Nelson. “Soil Carbon 
Sequestration Strategies with Alternative Tillage and Nitrogen Sources under Risk.”  
Review of Agricultural Economics 29(2007): 247-268. 
Pereira de Herrera, A., and G. Sain. “Adoption of Maize Conservation Tillage in Azuero, 
Panama.” CIMMYT Economics Working Paper No. 99-01. Mexico, D.F., 1999. 
Perlack, R.D., L.L. Wright, A.F. Turhollow, R.L. Graham, B.J. Stokes, and D.C. Erbach. 
“Biomass as Feedstock for Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry: The Technical 
Feasibility of a Billion-Ton Annual Supply.” U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. (2005). Available online at:  
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/pdfs/final_billionton_vision_report2.pdf 
Prokopy, L.S., K. Floress, D. Klotthor-Weinkauf, and A. Baumgart-Getz. “Determinants of 
Agricultural Best Management Practice Adoption: Evidence from the Literature.” 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 63(2008):300-311. 
Rahm, M.R., and W.E. Huffman, “The Adoption of Reduced Tillage: The Role of Human 
Capital and other Variables.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
66(1984):405-413. 
Ribera, L.A., F.M. Hons, and J.W. Richardson. “An Economic Comparison between 
Conventional and No-tillage Farming Systems in Burleson County, Texas.” Agronomy 
Journal 96(2004):415-424. 
Robinson, L.J., P.J. Barry, J.B. Kliebenstein, and G.F. Patrick. 1984. “Risk Attitudes: Concepts 
and Measurement Approaches.” In: Risk Management in Agriculture, ed., P.J. Barry, pp. 
3-30. Ames IA: Iowa State University Press. 
 48 
 
Sandretto, C. “Conservation tillage firmly planted in U.S. agriculture.” Agricultural Outlook, 
March 2001. USDA Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2001.  
Schneider, F., D. Steiger, T. Ledermann, P. Fry, and S. Rist. “No-Tillage Farming: Co-Creation 
of Innovation through Network Building.” Land Degradation and Development 
23(2010):242-255. 
Shortle, J.S., and J.A. Miranowski. “Effects of Risk Perceptions and Other Characteristics of 
Farmers and Farm Operations on the Adoption of Conservation Tillage Practices.” 
Applied Agricultural Research 1(1986): 85-90. 
Sijtsma, C.H., A.J. Campbell, N.B. McLaughlin, and M.R. Carter. “Comparative Tillage Costs 
for Crops Rotations Utilizing Minimum Tillage on a Farm Scale.” Soil and Tillage 
Research 49(1998):223-231. 
Skaggs, R,K. R.E. Kirksey, and W.M. Harper. “Determinants and Implications of Post-CRP 
Land Use Decisions.”  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 19(1994):  299-
312. 
Soule, M.J., A. Tegene, and K.D. Wiebe. “Land Tenure and the Adoption of Conservation 
Practices.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82(2000):993-1005. 
SSSA - Soil Science Society of America. “Glossary of Soil Science Terms.” (2012). Available 
online at https://www.soils.org/publications/soils-glossary# 
Sundermeier, A., L.F. Fallon Jr., H.D. Schmalzried, and L. Sundermeier. “Conservation Tillage: 
Repacking the Message for Farmers.” Journal of Extension 7(2009):1-6. 
Traoré, N., R. Landry, and N. Amara. “On-farm Adoption of Conservation Practices: The Role 
of Farm and Farmer Characteristics, Perceptions, and Health Hazards.” Land Economics 
74(1998):114-127. 
Uri, N.D. “Conservation Tillage and Input Use.” Environmental Geology 29(1997):188-201.
 
Varner, B.T., F.M. Epplin, and G.L. Strickland. “Economics of No-Till versus Tilled Dryland 
Cotton, Grain Sorghum, and Wheat.” Agronomy Journal 103(2011): 1329-1338.  
Vitale, J.D., C. Godsey, J. Edwards, and R. Taylor. “The Adoption of Conservation Tillage 
Practices in Oklahoma: Findings from a Producer Survey.” Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation 66(2011):250-264. 
Wang, Y., C. Tu, L. Cheng, C. Li, L.F. Gentry, G.D. Hoyt, X. Zhang, and S. Hu. “Long-term 
Impact of Farming Practices on Soil Organic Carbon and Nitrogen Pools and Microbial 
Biomass and Activity.” Soil and Tillage Research 117(2011): 8-16. 
Warriner, G.K., and T.M. Moul. “Kinship and Personal Communication Network Influences on 
the Adoption of Agriculture Conservation Technology.” Journal of Rural Studies 
8(1992):279-291.  
 49 
 
Welch, R., and R.Y. Rivers. “Environmental Management Strategies in Agriculture.” 
Agricultural and Human Values 28(2011):297-302. 
West, T.O., and G. Marland. “A Synthesis of Carbon Sequestration, Carbon Emissions, and Net 
Carbon Flux in Agriculture: Comparing Tillage Practices in the United States.” 
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 91(2002):217-232. 
West, T.O., and W.M. Post. “Soil Organic Carbon Sequestration Rates for Crops with Reduced 
Tillage and Enhanced Rotation.” Soil Science Society of America Journal 66(2002):1930-
1946. 
Williams, J.R., M.J. Pachta, K.L. Roozeboom, R.V. Llewelyn, M.M. Claassen, and J.S. Bergtold. 
“Risk Analysis of Tillage and Crop Rotation Alternatives with Winter Wheat.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics 44(2012): 561-576. 
Williams, J.R., T.W. Roth, and M.M. Claassen. “Profitability of Alternative Production and 
Tillage Strategies for Dryland Wheat and Grain Sorghum in the Central Great Plains.” 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 55(2000):49-56. 
Wu, J., and B.A. Babcock. “The Choice of Tillage, Rotation, and Soil Testing Practices: 
Economic and Environmental Implications.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 80(1998): 494-511. 
Zibilske, L.M., J.M. Bradford, and J.R. Smart. “Conservation Tillage Induced Changes in 
Organic Carbon, Total Nitrogen and Available Phosphorus in a Semi-arid Alkaline 
Subtropical Soil.” Soil and Tillage Research 66(2002): 153-163. 
 
  
 50 
 
Chapter 3 - Adoption of in-field conservation practices under risk 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Risk is an important component of agricultural production, and it plays an important role in 
farmers’ production decisions, particularly decisions concerning the adoption of new 
conservation practices. In some cases, risk can have a larger effect than cost factors (Sattler and 
Nagel, 2010). The introduction and intensification of conservation on the farm introduces 
potential risks into the farm operation due to the introduction of new practices and their impacts 
on the dynamics of cropping systems, contract or practice limitations, and changes in production 
costs. These changes can result in shifts in net returns (due to changes in crop yields and/or 
costs) that may not be anticipated a priori.   
When outcomes are uncertain, given their stochastic nature or their dependence on 
stochastic events (i.e. weather), farmers may be more hesitant to adopt a practice, requiring 
additional compensation to induce adoption (Kurkalova et al., 2006). Thus, risk is an important 
aspect that needs consideration when studying farmers’ adoption decisions.  However, the risk 
associated with stochastic variables affecting conservation adoption has not been researched in 
much detail, particularly in stated choice applications.  In many cases, outcomes are simply 
assumed to happen with certainty, while in reality, farmers bear a risk of unknown changes in 
yields, costs and returns, as a result of adopting a particular practice or a bundle of practices, 
especially under contract.  
Conservation-based programs that promote the adoption of conservation practices by 
offering financial incentives can be used to ease farmers’ transition into the use of conservation 
practices and to reduce the risk faced by farmers from changes and variability of yields and 
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costs. However, withdrawal from these programs in some cases is significant (Cattaneo, 2003). 
To improve the environmental benefits from these programs, it is important to understand the 
factors that go into farmers’ decision, to ensure increasing levels of adoption and the continuous 
maintenance of conservation practices, especially for those practices that offer significant 
societal benefits. With greater understanding of how farmers go about making decisions when 
establishing a conservation system on their farms, policymakers can better design conservation 
programs that are tailored to farmers’ preferences, as well as limitations. Having programs that 
meet farmers’ needs would ensure that once practices are adopted, they are not abandoned later 
in the process. Knowing the factors affecting farmers’ adoption decisions is useful for the 
dissemination of informational materials in a more efficient manner, to encourage farmers to 
adopt and maintain sustainable production systems. 
 
3.2 Objective 
The purpose of this study is to examine farmers’ willingness to adopt in-field conservation 
practices under risk, using a stated preference approach. Farmers’ decision making for 
conservation practice adoption under risk was elicited using a stated choice experiment. 
Following Hensher, Greene, and Li (2011), a framework that accounts for the stochastic nature 
of net returns under a conservation contract is used. Probabilities of changes in net returns were 
included as an attribute in the choice experiment and were used to estimate an attribute-specific 
expected utility term within the random utility model, allowing for the estimation of a parameter 
for risk attitudes towards net returns in addition to the net return attribute parameter. Specifically, 
this study examines farmers’ willingness to adopt in-field conservation practices under different 
contractual arrangements with varying levels of conservation intensity, external environmental 
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benefits, levels of incentive payments, and incentive payment mechanisms. Marginal willingness 
to accept (mWTA) values were estimated for each conservation practice, incentive program 
mechanisms, and off-farm environmental benefit. The mWTA estimate for each conservation 
practice was calculated for both non-adopters (farmers who had not adopted a particular practice 
at the time of the survey) and adopters (farmers who were currently using the practice at the time 
of the survey). To study the effect of the risk associated with net returns on farmers’ willingness 
to adopt and intensify conservation practices, farmers’ risk attitude towards changes in net 
returns and the risk premium for the adoption and intensification of conservation practices under 
a conservation contract are estimated.  
 
3.3 Background Information  
3.3.1 Conservation practice background information 
Many conservation practices employed in agriculture provide benefits to the ecosystem, 
commonly referred to as ecosystem services. Some common ecosystem services derived from 
the use of in-field conservation practices are carbon sequestration, climate regulation, soil and 
nutrient cycling, water quality, erosion control, soil quality and productivity, groundwater 
recharge, pollination by wild species, biodiversity and bio-control (Robbins, 2005).  
Some in-field conservation practices that provide numerous benefits to the environment 
and will be examined in this study are continuous no-till, conservation crop rotations, cover 
crops, and variable rate application (VRA) of inputs (e.g. precision agriculture). These practices 
were selected because they are in-field practices commonly known and adopted at different 
degrees in the region of study. These practices provide benefits to the environment in terms of 
soil carbon sequestration, erosion reduction, runoff mitigation, as well as providing potential 
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yield increases and reductions in production costs. 
 
3.3.1.1 Continuous no-till 
The Soil Science Society of America (SSSA, 2012) defines conservation tillage as a sequence of 
tillage operations that leaves at least 30% of crop cover on the surface and whose objective is to 
diminish the loss of soil and water. Conservation tillage practices such as no-till, strip tillage 
(ST) and other tillage systems leaving at least 30% of surface cover have proven to be beneficial 
for the soil. In no-till systems, soil disturbance is limited to nutrient injection. Plant residue is 
left on the soil surface and only partial removal is allowed. No-till practices leave the greatest 
level of crop residue on the soil surface. Different from rotational no-till, in continuous no-till, 
all the crops in the rotation are planted using a no-till drill/planter and no-till equipment is used 
year round.  
Some of the benefits associated with conservation tillage systems are an increase in soil 
organic carbon, soil microbial biomass, reduction of wind and water soil erosion, and 
enhancement of nutrient cycling (Blanco-Canqui et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2001; Kladivko, 
2001; Kushwaha et al., 2001; Lal, 1999; Paustian et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2011; Zibilske et al., 
2002). Another advantage associated with no-till is the preservation of soil moisture (Blevins et 
al., 1983; Daniel et al., 1999), which may allow farmers to increase production intensity in dryer 
areas. While benefits can still be obtained when using rotational tillage, when no-till soils are 
disrupted with tillage, some of the soil benefits obtained while in no-till are lost, especially soil 
organic carbon and improvements to soil structure (Grandy et al., 2006).  
Along with the positive aspects attributed to conservation tillage, some negative effects 
have also been reported in the literature. A potential drawback from NT practices is the delay in 
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planting due to slower soil warming (DeJong-Hughes and Vetsch, 2007). In addition, large 
accumulations of crop and/or cover crop residue on the surface of no-till fields could obstruct 
other activities, such as planting, due to residue plugging up equipment. In some regions, 
moisture retention by crop residue left on the surface could increase the incidence of diseases 
(Anaele and Bishnoi, 1992; Bockus and Shroyer, 1998) and possibly result in lower yields (Heer 
and Krenzer Jr, 1989). The need to chemically control weeds and the increase in diseases could 
result in higher chemical costs that in some cases could offset the savings in labor and 
machinery (Williams et al., 2000).  
Overall, no-till practices have shown to be a great option for the improvement of soil 
health and to increase carbon sequestration (West and Marland, 2002; West and Post, 2002). 
No-till practices may result in lower fuel and machinery labor expenses due to a lower number 
of field passes (Epplin et al., 1982). This may allow for an increase in cropping intensity 
(Williams et al., 2012). The base cost associated with implementing no-till in Kansas is 
estimated at $19.8 per acre by the NRCS (2015b). A comparison of studies in the literature 
suggested that no-till systems are the least costly when compared to conventional systems 
(Kaval, 2004). Regarding yield risk, while some studies agree that no-till practices reduce risk 
(Ribera et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2000), other studies suggest that no-till increases risk 
(Larson et al., 2001a; Varner et al., 2011).  In order to improve the benefits associated with no-
till practices, other conservation methods such as cover crops and crop rotation are encouraged.  
 
3.3.1.2 Conservation crop rotation 
Crop rotation consists of rotating different unrelated crops within the same field in a 
predetermined sequence. A conservation crop rotation would include green manures, perennial 
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grasses, heavy residue cash crops and reduction of fallow periods (NRCS, 2015b).  Some 
benefits associated with crop rotation are the mitigation of diseases, pests, and weeds that 
accumulate from continuous cropping of the same taxonomic crop families. Other benefits are 
the carryover of residual herbicide and reduction of allelopathic or phytotoxic effects (Lodhi et 
al., 1987; Pierce and Rice, 1988; Roth, 1996).  
Fertility of the soil can be improved by avoiding depletion of common nutrients required 
by particular crops, using nitrogen fixing crops such as legumes (Zotarelli et al., 2012) or other 
crops that can introduce necessary elements back into the soil. The use of high residue crops (i.e. 
wheat, sorghum) and  legumes  in  the  rotation  have  the  potential  to  increase  carbon  and  
nitrogen concentration in the soil over the long-term (Kelley et al., 2003; Miglierina et al., 
2012). Additionally, improvements in soil structure arise when deep and shallow rooted crops 
are used in the crop rotation. The increase in soil aggregate stability and improvements in water 
utilization are further results from the use of crop rotations (Chan and Heenan, 1996; Raimbault 
and Vyn, 1991).  
Lastly, continuous crop rotation or increasing the number of crops in a rotation could 
increase carbon sequestration (West and Post, 2002). The benefits mentioned above could result 
in an improvement in soil health and soil productivity.  Additionally, studies have demonstrated 
yield advantages from crop rotation, reductions in yield variability (Helmers et al., 1986); and 
income diversification. The cost associated with a conservation crop rotation as estimated by the 
NRCS (2015b) is $14.0 per acre. Studies in the literature have stressed the importance of the 
joint use of crop rotation and other conservation practices. For example, the combination of crop 
rotation and no-till practices are important for weed control, soil carbon sequestration, and to 
increase nutrients in the soil (Cardina et al., 2009; Havlin et al., 1990; McConkey et al., 2003). 
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3.3.1.3 Cover crops 
Use of cover crops as a conservation practice consists of growing seasonal crop varieties 
between annual cash crops. The objective of the cover crop is to provide protection of the soil 
surface from soil and water erosion. Cover crops may be a cost-efficient alternative for 
improving crop nutrient management, while also providing additional conservation benefits. 
Additional benefits associated with the  use  of  cover  crops  are  the  reduction  of  wind,  water  
and  soil  erosion;  weed suppression; conservation of soil moisture; improvement in soil 
structure and the levels of organic matter; and the provision of habitats for beneficial organisms 
(Snapp et al., 2005).  
Some cover crops contribute to the addition of nitrogen into the soil while other crops 
are good nutrient scavengers. Grain, grasses and perennial legumes contribute to production of 
soil organic carbon. Legume cover crops are more effective at increasing cash crop yields 
compared to other cover crops (Miguez and Bollero, 2005). Cover crops in combination with 
no-till systems may provide significant benefits to the soil through increases in soil carbon 
sequestration and nitrogen concentrations (Nascente et al., 2013). Reicosky and Forcella (1998) 
stressed the importance of cover crops in conjunction with conservation tillage to maximize 
additions to soil carbon. For a comprehensive review of the use of cover crops varieties in 
conjunction with other conservation practices such as conservation tillage and crop rotations, see 
Clark (2008).  
Using cover crops can be costly and users face economic and operational constraints 
(Sarrantonio and Gallandt, 2003). The main cost in stablishing a cover crop is the seed cost (for 
seed varieties, planting rates and costs see Clark (2008). Cost estimates by the NRCS (2015b) 
for annual grass or legume covers are around $82 per acre. Cover crops could result in higher 
yields and reduce production risk (Jaenicke et al., 2003). However, this may not always be the 
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case. The benefits obtained in some cases may not compensate for the cost of establishing the 
cover crop (Larson et al., 2001b) and higher profits may not always be obtained (Lu et al., 
2000).  Some of the benefits of cover crops may not be realized in the first years during adoption 
and in many cases they may be difficult to quantify monetarily (Clark, 2008).  
 
3.3.1.4 VRA of inputs 
Variable-rate application of inputs consists of spatially varying input rates based on field 
requirements with the aid of computer-controlled devices. The objective of the VRA of inputs is 
to maximize the economic efficiency of input application. For example, fertilizer applications 
can be managed to increase fertilization in zones with high soil productivity and reduce 
fertilization in areas with low productivity.  
It has been argued that the primary cause of fertilizer pollution stems from the 
inefficiency in its use (Khanna and Zilberman 1997). It is estimated that leaching of residual 
nitrogen in major field crops ranges from 10 to 35 percent (Meisinger et al., 2008). VRA of 
fertilizer technology increases the efficiency of input application, reducing runoff and leaching 
of nutrients (Khanna and Zilberman, 1997), improving surface and ground water quality. This 
technology may increase output quantity and quality and reduce input cost, leading to an 
increase in profitability (Vellidis et al., 2013). The use of positioning systems also reduces the 
repetition of machinery passes over the same area, reducing labor costs (Adrian et al., 2005). 
The adoption of VRA technologies may require a large investment in new equipment 
and an in human capital  to  develop  the  necessary  skills  and  knowledge  that  are  required  
to  operate successfully (Batte and Arnholt, 2003). Equipment cost for precision fertilizer 
application is estimated around $11.30 per acre; however additional cost may be incurred, like 
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the use of special skilled labor and soil/tissue testing (NRCS, 2015a). The high cost of VRA 
technologies may lead to the use of custom applications by third parties in some areas. Although 
this technology may increase yields and reduce input cost, profitability is site-specific and varies 
according to the characteristics of the field (Roberts et al., 2000). In many cases however, the 
benefits may not be significant (Biermacher et al., 2009). The uncertainty about the benefits 
from this practice has been a factor slowing its adoption (Schimmelpfennig and Ebel, 2011). 
This technology results in additional environmental benefits to those provided by no-till, cover 
crops and dynamic crop rotations by reducing the risk of agro-chemical related pollution.  
 
3.3.2 Payment mechanisms and conservation programs 
In the last few decades, much attention has been given to environmental degradation and to the 
ways in which sustainable production can be achieved in agricultural systems.  Environmental 
degradation is defined as any disturbance to the environment that can deteriorate soil, water, 
and/or air resources (Johnson et al., 1997). Some agricultural activities such as soil 
mechanization and the application of agrochemicals can result in soil erosion, pollution of water 
bodies, and greenhouse gas emissions (Aneja et al., 2009; Carpenter et al., 1998; Galloway et al., 
2008; Kim and Dale, 2008; Lal, 1993). 
The ecosystem services produced when conservation practices are in place have a value 
to society, and by creating a market for these services, farmers could receive an incentive to 
adopt conservation practices (Ribaudo et al., 2010; Whitten and Coggan, 2013). While it has 
been argued that market-based instruments may be more efficient to encourage conservation 
(Freeman and Kolstad, 2006), to date, the U.S. government has primarily relied on cash 
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payments through voluntary contractual programs for the adoption of conservation practices 
(Claassen et al., 2008). 
Conservation-based programs that promote the adoption of conservation practices by 
offering financial incentives are in place in the United States (U.S.). These programs are used to 
ease farmers’ transition into the use of conservation practices and to reduce the risk faced by 
farmers from changes and variability of yields and costs. The Natural Resource Conservation 
Service (NRCS) administers voluntary federal conservation programs such as the Environmental 
Quality Incentive Programs (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), which 
have the main objective of promoting the adoption of structural or in-field conservation practices 
in agricultural and forest land to meet environmental conservation goals (NRCS, 2013). These 
programs primarily focus on water quality and conservation; soil conservation; land 
preservation; wildlife habitat; air quality; and energy conservation (Claassen et al., 2008). 
In some cases, the limited knowledge farmers have about the availability of conservation 
incentive programs, how they work, and the complexity of the programs may deter farmers from 
participating (Brewer et al., 2004; Reimer and Prokopy, 2014). In other instances, some of the 
practices in the contracts are never implemented or practices are withdrawn from already signed 
contracts (Cattaneo, 2003).  A study by Cattaneo (2003) revealed that 11% of the practices in 
EQIP contracts are never implemented, 17% of the contracts are partially withdrawn, and 6% are 
completely withdrawn.  The author attributed those results to the fact that practices may be seem 
attractive when farmers submit their proposals, while in practice, these conservation practices do 
not provide sufficient private benefits. Withdrawals from EQIP contracts were also found to be 
more likely to occur during the first years of implementation. 
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 An alternative approach to encourage conservation adoption is the use of market-based 
instruments. For example, given the greenhouse gasses (GHG) emissions mitigation potential of 
agriculture (Smith et al., 2008), market-based mechanisms have been developed in order to meet 
GHG reduction targets (Williams et al., 2009). An example of such a mechanism is carbon 
offsets issued through a carbon sequestration program that compensates landowners for the 
adoption of conservation practices that improve soil carbon sequestration and/or reduce carbon 
emissions (Williams et al., 2009). Under this mechanism, carbon offset credits are traded in a 
carbon exchange where companies who have emitted GHG above their target can buy carbon 
credits from sellers who are committed to provide carbon offsets from carbon sequestration 
efforts (Williams et al., 2009). For a comprehensive review of carbon offsets from agriculture 
refer to Williams et al. (2009) and González-Ramírez, Kling, and Valcu (2012). 
 In the U.S., carbon trading has mainly taken place under a voluntary cap and trade 
platform, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) that operated from 2003 to 2010 (Hamilton et 
al., 2009). However, in 2008 less than 1% of the carbon offset credits traded came from 
agricultural soils, where participating farmers were compensated per ton of carbon sequestered 
(Hamilton et al., 2009). Under this program, farmers did not directly trade their credits, but 
various offset aggregators served as trading representatives. Some of the offset aggregators were 
the National Carbon Offset Coalition (NCOC) in Montana; AgraGate, a subsidiary of the Iowa 
Farm Bureau; North Dakota’s Farmers Union; and the Environmental Carbon Credit Pool, LLC. 
The CCX closed in 2010 when carbon prices fell to 0.10-0.15 $/ton CO2 (See Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1  Chicago Climate Exchange, historical price and volume traded 
 
 
Source: Chicago Climate Exchange. Available at: https://www.theice.com/ccx 
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Another market-based carbon trading mechanism is “over the counter retail markets”, 
which are voluntary programs where consumers pay for activities to help reduce their carbon 
footprint (Ribaudo et al., 2010). An example of a well stablished carbon market was the 
European Union where a mandatory market was developed under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (Galatowitsch, 2009; Williams et al., 2009). In the U.S., there was an 
unsuccessful attempt to pass a policy, the Clean and Energy Security Act of 2009 (i.e. H.R. 
2454), to regulate carbon emissions (Golden et al., 2009).  The development of a carbon market 
has proved difficult without a binding GHG policy (Young, 2003). However, while carbon 
trading schemes and efforts to implement a cap-and-trade policy to regulate GHG emissions 
have not been successful in the U.S. (i.e. H.R. 2454), it is likely that efforts to pass a 
comprehensive policy will reappear in the future (González-Ramírez et al., 2012). Currently, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed rules to regulate GHG emissions. While 
the regulatory mechanisms proposed by the EPA do not use market-based instruments, 
discussions around the lower cost of market-based mechanisms have surfaced (Kotchen and 
Mansur, 2014).Thus, it is important to understand farmers’ preference for this mechanism as 
carbon markets could potentially develop again in the future.  
Currently, the level of adoption (including the level of voluntary adoption under 
conservation contracts), is low for some conservation practices. The National Crop Residue 
Management Survey showed that 21% of corn acreage, 39.3% of soybeans, 19.6% of sorghum, 
and 14-16% of small grains were managed under no-till (NT) by 2008 (CTIC, 2013).  This 
survey also found that conventional tillage (CT) and reduced tillage (RT) still accounted for 
approximately 58% of the cultivated land (CTIC, 2013).  A survey looking at the adoption of 
cover crops in the Corn Belt found that only 18% of the farmers had planted cover crops.  They 
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also found that adopters had used cover crops on only about 6% of their land (Singer et al., 
2007). Evidence found in the Agricultural Resource Management Survey also suggests that 
variable rate technologies have been adopted at a low rate of 8 to 14% between 2005-2009 
(Schimmelpfennig and Ebel, 2011). Considering the conservation benefits and carbon 
sequestration potential these practices provide, current adoption rates might not be socially 
optimal.  Farmers’ adoption decisions are mainly based on economic motives (Cooper, 2003), 
and in many cases economic incentives deter conservation on the farm (Antle and Diagana, 
2003). As Ribaudo et al. (2010) notes, if payments for environmental services do not reflect their 
value to society, given market price signals, farmers produce less environmental services than 
socially optimal. In addition, lack of knowledge of the social benefits may also contribute to sub-
optimal adoption levels (Kurkalova et al., 2006). As evidence in the literature suggests, off-farm 
environmental benefits are also important drivers for the adoption of conservation practices in 
agriculture (Reimer and Prokopy, 2014). 
The lack of knowledge about the benefits from conservation practices, lack of 
infrastructure, lack of support, practice incompatibility, and financial support are some of the 
potential constraints for the adoption of conservation practices (Rodriguez et al., 2009). 
Additionally, subsidy programs for certain agricultural commodities may have discouraged 
sustainable practices, causing slower rates of adoption (Derpsch et al., 2010).  For example, 
subsidies to agricultural inputs and subsidies to corn-ethanol production, which have also 
resulted in higher commodity prices, may have indirectly resulted in the intensification of 
agricultural production and the removal of land from conservation retirement programs (Comito 
et al., 2013; Gill-Austern, 2011). There is also evidence suggesting that higher commodity prices 
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have encouraged some producers to have less diversified rotations on their farms (Fargione et al., 
2009; Tyner and Taheripour, 2008). 
 
3.4 Literature Review 
3.4.1 Conservation practices adoption 
In recent years, great attention has been placed on the use of conservation systems in agricultural 
production. While the literature has presented evidence indicating that conservation practices 
offer a great alternative for enhancing soil and water resources, conventional systems still 
remain the prevailing norm in many regions.  
A large and growing body of literature has investigated factors affecting the adoption of 
conservation practices. Studies looking at the factors influencing the adoption of conservation 
practices date back to the 1950s (Ervin and Ervin, 1982). These studies have used different 
econometric models and sets of explanatory variables. Several of these studies have used 
revealed preference data and fewer have used stated preference methods. 
Early work in the adoption literature examined the adoption of single practices, often 
modeled as a discrete choice using univariate logit or probit models. Many of these studies 
examined the adoption of reduced/conservation tillage practices (Belknap and Saupe, 1988; 
Davey and Furtan, 2008; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; Soule et al., 2000). Other studies examined 
the adoption of newly introduced production technologies. Shapiro, Wade Brorsen, and Doster 
(1992) studied the adoption and the extent of adoption of double-cropping soybeans and wheat. 
Other studies evaluated the adoption of intensive sustainable and low input agricultural practices 
among farmers in Montana (Saltiel et al., 1994); the adoption of precision agriculture; and the 
adoption of genetically modified corn and soybean crops (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2002). Other 
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studies have also examined the adoption of best management practices (BMP) in agricultural 
production. Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2005) studied the adoption of  BMP (cover and green 
manure crops, critical area planting, filter border/filter strips, grassed waterways, heavy use are 
protection, livestock exclusion, regulating water, riparian forest buffer) in beef cattle production 
using probit models. They found that risk negatively affects the adoption of rotational grazing 
and cover crops in beef cattle production. 
There are a myriad of conservation practices farmers can implement on their cropland, 
and the adoption of a particular practice may not be independent or isolated from the decision to 
adopt other practices.  In some instances, examining the adoption of an individual practice may 
belay the complex decision farmers’ face. Several studies have attempted to analyze the 
adoption of multiple practices using multinomial logit models (Caswell and Zilberman, 1985; 
Fuglie, 1999). Caswell and Zilberman (1985) studied the factors affecting the adoption of drip, 
sprinkler, and surface irrigation by fruit growers in California. The adoption of drip and 
sprinklers was compared against traditional surface irrigation. A study by Fuglie (1999) 
examined the adoption decision for tillage practices (CT, NT, RT or conservation tillage) in corn 
production using data from a survey conducted by the USDA.  
The joint adoption of conservation practices has also been examined using multinomial 
logit models. Wu and Babcock (1998) conducted a joint analysis of the choice to adopt 
conservation tillage, crop rotation and soil testing in Central Nebraska using a multinomial logit. 
Another study looking at the choice of conservation practices in a joint framework is Bergtold 
and Molnar (2010) who examined factors affecting the adoption of conservation tillage, crop 
rotation and soil testing by small limited-resource farmers in the Southeast. While using a 
multinomial logit model allows examining joint adoption, in many cases the independence from 
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irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property of the model could be very restrictive in modeling the 
correlation between bundle of practices (Maddala, 1983).  
In order to model the correlation among the practices adopted by producers, Dorfman 
(1996) proposed a multivariate adoption model. His study modeled the adoption of integrated 
pest management (IPM) and improved irrigation using a multinomial probit model. Dorfman’s 
approach allowed for the modeling of interrelationships among conservation practice adoption 
choices, represented as the nonzero correlation among the errors from a system of adoption 
equations. Lichtenberg (2004) modeled the adoption decision of seven on-farm conservation 
practices (critical area seeding, contour farming, strip-cropping, cover crops, grass, terraces, and 
diversions) by farmers in Maryland. His study found evidence of cost responsiveness in the 
adoption decision and complementarity among some of the conservation practices considered. 
The previous studies mentioned all used revealed preference methods with observed 
choices. Stated choice methods have also been widely used to study adoption decisions as they 
provide some additional advantages. Stated choice methods allow for the examination of 
attributes that are not present in the market, or if they are present, do not have sufficient 
variation to estimate their parameters (Louviere et al., 2000). For example, the use of stated 
choice methods has allowed researchers to study the effect of varying incentive payments/cost-
share levels on the adoption and extent of adoption of conservation practices and programs. The 
use of stated choice methods have also furthered the study of other attributes in conservation 
programs that are of interest for policy makers.  Some of these attributes are contract length, risk 
attributes, payment mechanisms, availability of technical assistance or insurance through a 
conservation program, restrictions on land use, and contract default (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and 
Signorello, 2008; Espinosa‐Goded et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2012; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
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Some examples of studies eliciting the adoption of conservation practices using stated 
choice methods are Cooper and Keim (1996), Cooper (2003), Cooper and Signorello (2008), and 
Ma et al. (2012). Cooper and Keim (1996) studied farmers’ adoption of five EQIP practices 
(integrated pest management (IPM), legume crediting, manure testing, split applications of 
nitrogen, and soil moisture testing) using a dichotomous choice contingent valuation approach to 
elicit farmers’ WTA. They modeled the decision to adopt and the potential level of adoption 
(acres) given the incentives offered, by farmers not currently using the practice. In their study, 
the adoption for each of the practices was modeled independently.  
A study by Cooper (2003) examined the adoption of five conservation practices 
(conservation tillage, IPM, legume crediting, manure testing, soil moisture testing) in a joint 
framework. In their study, farmers were presented with hypothetical cost shares for adopting 
each practice individually, and the decision to adopt was modeled jointly using a multinomial 
probit to account for the correlation among conservation practice adoption choices through the 
errors in the latent adoption equations. In another study, Cooper and Signorello (2008) examined 
the adoption and risk premium for the adoption of a conservation protocol that included crop 
rotation, soil tillage, organic fertilizer, and mechanized weeding with data collected using a 
multiple-bounded format for the willingness to accept adoption question.  
In a study conducted by Ma et al. (2012) individuals were presented with four systems 
with bundle of practices with increasing level of intensity. The attributes examined in their study 
were payment, payment provider (government or a non-governmental organization), and 
sequence of conservation intensity (environmental benefit) in which the four systems were 
presented (increasing or decreasing). For each of the four systems, the authors modeled the 
willingness-to-consider decision using a probit model, and the acreage enrollment decision using 
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a tobit model.  
 
3.4.2 Risk in the adoption literature 
Various sources of risk affect agriculture (Beal, 1996). Studies in the literature have provided 
evidence of the importance of risk in agricultural decisions (Marra and Carlson, 1990) and it has 
been long argued that risk represents an obstacle in the adoption of new agricultural practices 
(Aimin, 2010). In some instances, risk factors may me more important than other production 
factors (Sattler and Nagel, 2010).  While risk is central to the study of farmers’ decisions to 
adopt agricultural technologies, studies addressing risk in context of adoption have been limited 
(Marra et al., 2003).  
Marra, Pannell, and Abadi Ghadim (2003) identified distinctive elements of risk that 
affect the adoption of new agricultural technologies, namely, perception of the probabilities of 
the distribution of net returns, the variance of net returns, and the strength and direction of risk 
attitudes (i.e. risk aversion). Measuring risk aversion without adequate data can be difficult. 
Researchers have used different strategies to measure the impact of risk on the adoption 
decision. 
Some studies examining adoption in the literature (both, with revealed and stated 
preference data) have included risk aversion as a dummy variable indicating whether the farm 
operator is perceived to be risk-averse (Kim et al., 2005; Shapiro et al., 1992). Shapiro et al. 
(1992) evaluated both the effect of risk attitudes and farmers’ subjective perceptions of risk on 
the adoption of double crop soybeans. However, while they estimated farmers’ Pratt-Arrow 
measures of risk aversion, in their empirical model they used dummy variables indicating if 
farmers were risk averse (they used the midpoint of the range of risk aversion as the dividing 
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point). Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2005) examined the adoption of BMPs in beef cattle 
production using probit models. In their study, they included farmers’ self-identified risk 
preference as a dummy variable indicating if the farmer was risk averse. Both studies found that 
risk aversion was an important factor affecting adoption.  
Other studies have included a risk aversion coefficient (i.e. Pratt-Arrow measure of risk 
aversion) when modeling adoption. Ghadim, Pannell, and Burton (2005) examined adoption of 
chickpeas in Australia using a probit and tobit model. They examined the effect of farmers’ risk 
preferences (Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient); the perception of riskiness of chickpeas 
production; an interactions between the risk aversion coefficient and area (hectares); relative 
riskiness of chickpea production; and perceived variance of the net revenue from chickpea 
production.  They found that both risk aversion and riskiness of the practice, reduced adoption 
of chickpeas and underweighted the benefits from farm diversification from undertaking this 
crop enterprise on the farm.  
In studies examining the adoption of conservation systems under conservation incentive 
programs, the incentive payment always plays an important role on farmers’ willingness to 
adopt.  Since introducing new practices on the farm may result in changes in net returns, famers 
may demand a higher incentive payment to offset any risks from adoption.  For example, risk-
averse operators may require a risk premium to induce their adoption of new practices, even if 
they obtain higher income as a result of their decision to adopt (Kurkalova et al., 2006).  The 
existence of this risk premium may result in higher WTA estimates. A study by Cooper and 
Signorello (2008) expanded on previous literature about conservation adoption by proposing a 
theoretical model that included a risk premium component, as a function of the variance of 
profits from adopting a new practice, within a random utility framework.  To estimate their 
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model empirically, the proposed risk component was estimated as the difference between the 
mean WTA and the difference in profits from the base state and the adoption state. While 
additional information on changes in profits is required to estimate the risk premium, farmers 
were not provided with this information during the decision process. Thus, there may be 
asymmetry of profit information across farmers, impacting results. 
 Several of the studies examining the effect of risk (e.g. risk preference) in adoption 
models have done so under a deterministic framework. Few have considered the stochastic 
nature of the adoption process (i.e. Ghadim, Pannell, and Burton, 2005). While the distinctive 
elements of risk identified by Marra, Pannell, and Ghadim (2003), have been partially or 
separately addressed in some studies, they have not been extensively studied, particularly in 
stated choice frameworks.  
 
3.4.3 Uncertainty and risk attitudes in stated preference methods 
In many cases, individuals are subject to decisions for which outcomes are not known with 
certainty, they are stochastic in nature. However, when studying decisions using stated choice 
frameworks, in most cases individuals are asked to choose between alternative options in a 
deterministic environment. Recent studies have attempted to study decisions under risk by 
introducing stochastic attributes in stated choice studies.  In these studies, the probability 
distribution of potential attribute outcomes is provided explicitly in the stated choice tasks.  
One approach to model risk is to introduce the probability of occurrence of the attribute 
in an additive form. That is, the outcome attribute and the risk (i.e. the probability of the attribute 
outcome) are treated as two separate attributes and a utility parameter is estimated for each one 
of them individually. A study by Glenk and Colombo (2011) followed such an approach. In their 
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study of public preferences for a climate change mitigation program, they assessed the 
introduction of risk associated with the program’s potential to achieve emission reductions. In 
their study, individuals were first presented with a set of choices with no risk. If they chose the 
program at least once, then they were presented with a second set of choices which provided 
information on both the percentage of annual emission reductions from a soil carbon 
sequestration program and the probability that the program fails to achieve that level of 
emissions reduction. They estimated three models: (1) no-risk, (2) risk (probability) was modeled 
as being continuous, and (3) risk (probability) was modeled as being discrete. They found that 
while risk did not affect the WTP estimates for the non-stochastic attributes, it did affect 
respondents’ preference for the program. They also found a larger WTP for a higher risk of 
program failure.  
In a study of the WTP for a program to reduce the risk of wastewater floods in 
Switzerland, Veronesi et al. (2014) examined the effect of risk by including an attribute with the 
frequency of flooding events and a forecast confidence attribute consisting of probabilities that 
the forecast was correct. They found that uncertainty (probability) of the forecast was not a 
statistical significant factor and was found to be the least important factor in individuals’ 
preference for the abatement program. The authors attributed this result to the respondents’ using 
heuristics to evaluate the probability of forecast occurrence.  
Another approach used by some researchers consisted of estimating the effect of the 
stochastic attribute, and the effect of an interaction term between the attribute and its probability 
of occurrence (this mirrors the expected value or the use of a linear utility function for the 
expected utility model). Burghart, Cameron, and Gerdes (2007) studied peoples’ preference for a 
program to invest in energy saving air-conditioning technologies funded with tax credits. They 
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examined the risk that the technology would be successful. Individuals were asked if they were 
willing to invest their tax credits in the development of energy saving technologies that would 
save them money in the future, but with caveat that there was a probability (risk) that these 
technologies would fail. They modeled risk using a linear discounted expected random utility 
framework.  
In a study of preferences for water quality in lakes, Roberts, Boyer, and Lusk (2008) 
included the risk associated with two attributes, an algae bloom and changes in water level. They 
presented risk as the probability of occurrence of the algae bloom and the probability to observe 
a given water level. They introduced aspects of prospect theory by using probability weights. 
Respondents were asked to complete stated choice tasks with either certain outcomes or risky 
outcomes. They modeled risk in a multiplicative fashion, by multiplying the probability of 
occurrence by the attribute outcome (expected value), and estimated a model coefficient for the 
expected value of the attribute (algae bloom and each of the water levels). They found higher 
WTP estimates in the presence of risk. They also found that a model using probability weights, 
instead of linear weights provided a better statistical fit.  
Akter, Bennett, and Ward (2012) studied public support for a climate change mitigation 
plan. The choice experiment presented choice alternatives varying by cost (higher household cost 
from higher electricity bills, fuel, etc.), expected rise in temperature, and its probability of 
occurrence. They estimated a parameter for the probability of a rise in temperature and another 
parameter for the interaction of the rise in temperature and its probability of occurrence 
(expected increase in temperature). They found greater support for the plan with greater 
probability of temperature rises.  
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A study by Rolfe and Windle (2013) analyzed different management programs for coral 
reefs. They introduced risk in their study by providing decision makers with the percentage of 
coral reef protected in good condition under each management mechanism conditional on the 
probability that this level of protection will be obtained. They modeled the choices using a mixed 
logit model where the condition of the reef, and an interaction term between reef condition and 
probability of protection were included in the model.  
While using the expected value of the stochastic attribute to model choices under risk 
allows a modeler to capture how respondents’ preferences are affected when faced with 
uncertain outcomes, it assumes risk neutrality (preferences for the risky attribute are assumed to 
be linear). In order to allow for risk aversion/risk seeking behavior in decision making under 
risk, some stated choice studies (mainly in the transportation literature) have incorporated risk 
and uncertainty into choice decisions by introducing aspects of expected utility theory and 
prospect theory into the random utility decision framework.  This approach allows for the 
estimation of a decision-maker’s risk attitude toward the stochastic attribute in addition to the 
marginal utility (parameter) for the stochastic attribute (Hensher et al., 2011). 
Hensher, Greene, and Li (2011) and Li et al. (2012) studied the risk associated with time 
variability in a scheduling model for car commuters using a choice experiment. Commuters were 
presented with a distribution of departure times with an associated probability of occurrence. The 
time attribute was incorporated in the random utility function using a general power 
specification, which exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Probabilities were transformed using 
separable probability weighting functions. That is, the probability transformation is independent 
of the outcomes (dependent only on the original probabilities). Other deterministic attributes 
were included in the random utility in a linear form. They found that the risk-based model 
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predicted optimal departure times better than a purely linear functional form where decision-
makers are assumed risk neutral. They also found evidence suggesting that commuters exhibited, 
in general, risk-taking attitudes.  
Other studies have modeled risk within the random utility framework using a non-
expected utility approach, which transforms probabilities of occurrence of an event using 
weighting functions. Probability weights are used as evidence in the literature suggests, 
individuals transform absolute probabilities into decision weights using heuristics (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Van Houtven et al. (2011) studied disease treatment preference in the 
presence of mortality risks. They estimated three model specifications with varying treatments 
for risk: (1) a categorical model for risk (dummy variables for the probabilities of each risk were 
used), (2) independent weighing functions, and (3) rank dependent utility where probability 
weights depend of both the original probability and the outcome. They found evidence that 
supports the use of probability weights and rank dependent utility models. A study by 
Wibbenmeyer et al. (2013) examined wildfire managers’ preferences for fire suppression 
strategies under two sources of risk: probability that the fire reaches homes or watershed in the 
absence of a suppression strategy, and the probability of success of the suppression strategy. 
They found larger responses to risk for lower probabilities in proportion to the response observed 
with greater probabilities. They also found that the risk of houses burning had a greater effect 
among managers than the risk of watersheds burning. 
Using data from a stated choice experiment examining people’s preferences for a soil 
carbon sequestration program, Glenk and Colombo (2013) tested different model specifications 
for the treatment of risk within the random utility model using combinations of: linear expected 
utility functions of emission reductions (expected value); non-linear expected utility functions, 
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linear probability weights (probability to achieve the emission reductions); non-linear probability 
weights; and inclusion of a separate disutility parameter for risk (i.e. probability of failure to 
achieve reduction levels) (Glenk and Colombo, 2011). Their results suggest that significant 
differences in WTP estimates can be obtained when using different model specifications, as each 
model revealed different behavioral assumptions. They recommend using models with a non-
linear specification for the expected utility component. 
Li and Hensher (2013) extended the above studies by embedding a ranked dependent 
expected utility model within a random utility framework, in which the probability weighting 
functions are determined by both, the original probabilities and the rank of the outcomes in terms 
of preference. In addition to revealing preferences and risk attitudes (like in Hensher, Greene, 
and Li, 2011; and Li, Tirachini, and Hensher, 2012), this approach reveals beliefs by 
differentiating how decision makers transform probabilities for preferred and least preferred 
outcomes. They found that commuters, in general, underweighted the probability of arriving on-
time, implying conservative beliefs. 
 
3.4.4 Summary 
Research has consistently pointed to the importance of risk in decision making. However, 
studies on the subject of conservation adoption have been mostly restricted to the effect of risk 
attitudes in the adoption of conservation. Few studies have addressed the stochastic nature of 
the factors involved in the adoption process. This study expands on previous research by 
examining conservation program attributes that have not been widely evaluated in the 
conservation adoption literature to-date, such as farmers’ risk attitudes and adoption decisions 
under risk, and preferences for conservation payment mechanisms through government 
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programs or market-based mechanisms. This study also examines if the environmental benefits 
obtained off the farm from the adoption of conservation practices is an important factor in the 
farmer’s decision to adopt conservation practices on the farm. Results from this study provide 
an understanding of farmers’ decision process when adopting conservation practices and 
conservation program participation. The identification of motivations, as well as obstacles in 
the adoption of conservation practices is a fundamental necessity for improving conservation 
policies and programs. 
 
3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Random utility framework 
Individuals’ choice decisions in stated preference models are constructed on the basis that 
individuals derive utility from product attributes - Lancaster’s theory (Lancaster, 1966). In this 
study, farmer i derives utility from choosing conservation contract j with a given set of attributes
jX . Now, let iq  be farmer i’s expected net return in the status quo and ij  be net returns 
(excluding any incentive payment) under a conservation contract for farmer i. Since there is 
uncertainty concerning the value of net returns, particularly under a conservation contract, iq  
and ij  are stochastic in nature with associated variances given by 
2
q
  and 2
j
 , respectively. 
Now let the i
th
 farmer’s utility )( ijU  from signing a conservation contract be a function of the 
contract attributes )( ijX , and the stochastic net returns )(
2
jij 
 . That is, farmers receive utility 
from contract j: 
1
2 )])((,[ iijijijij jFXVU    , where ijV  represents the systematic component of 
utility explained by contract attributes and is a function of net returns;  F  is a function 
describing farmers’ valuation of stochastic returns under the contract, allowing for the possibility 
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of a nonlinear relationship,  and ij  is the random component of utility accounting for 
unobserved factors unknown to the researcher.  
 Based on random utility theory, farmers choose to enter into a conservation contract if the 
contract provides them with the highest utility, i.e. ),max( iqiji UUU   where iqU  is the utility 
obtained if the farmer chooses to remain with the status quo or what they are currently doing on 
their operation. Following Hensher et al. (2005), the probability of entering into the conservation 
contract can be written as )()( iiiqiqijij VVV   PP . While ijV  and iqV  are not 
separably identifiable, the difference between the two utilities )( iV  is. The difference in 
utilities can be expressed as   ];,)([ 2 βiii XFfV  , where β is the vector of parameters of 
the utility function (e.g. marginal utilities).  
 
3.5.2 Choice under uncertainty and risk preferences 
A concept commonly associated with risk is variance, the dispersion of potential outcomes 
around its mean (Hardaker et al., 2004). An event is thought to be riskier, the higher the 
dispersion around its mean (i.e. the higher the variance). Hence, the expected value or mean 
][xE ) and the variance of an attribute ( 2 ) can be used as factors to analyze individuals’ 
responses to risk. This method is known as the mean-variance approach. The mean variance 
approach has been used in stated choice applications to study variability in attributes (Li et al., 
2010). The mean-variance approach can be represented by a corresponding variant, the mean-
standard deviation approach (Hardaker et al., 2004). While the mean-variance (mean-standard 
deviation) approach to modeling risk in decision making can be attractive, it is more restrictive 
in that it does not allow for the estimation of a quantitative measure of risk attitude. 
 78 
 
 
3.5.2.1 Expected utility 
Decisions under risk and risk preferences have long been evaluated using both expected utility 
theory and prospect theory. Expected utility theory initially introduced by Bernoulli and later 
refined by von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1945) postulates that individuals act as if they 
maximize expected utility. Under expected utility theory, individuals make decisions between 
gambles by evaluating the function  mmUpEU ; where E  is an expectation operator, and mU  
is the utility associated with a monetary outcome mx  with probability of occurrence mp . 
Assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the utility expression can be specified 
using a general power specification (Pratt, 1964). Individual utility for monetary outcomes can 
be specified as follows: 
(3.1)     
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where   represents the risk aversion coefficient (Pratt, 1964). If 0 , the utility function 
converges to a linear utility function (expected value) indicating risk neutrality.  If 0 , the 
utility function over net returns is concave indicating risk aversion. On the other hand, values of 
0 indicate risk seeking attitudes. CRRA utility specifications are widely used in the literature 
as they are simple to implement making them tractable in empirical applications (Meyer, 2010). 
For a review of other functional forms see Meyer (2010).  
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3.5.2.2 Prospect theory 
While expected utility has been widely used in modeling decisions under risk, it has received 
some criticism due to its failure to represent individuals’ behavior in some empirical applications 
(e.g. Allais paradox -Allais, 1953).  In a seminal paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility theory to model decisions under risk.  In 
prospect theory, probabilities are replaced by decision weights that represent the impact of the 
outcome from the appeal of the prospects evaluated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).   
 In prospect theory, individuals evaluate the function  )()( mm xpw   when faced with a 
gamble (prospect); where m is a value function (utility) and )( pw  is a probability weighting 
function with 0)0( w  and 1)1( w  (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Decision weights are used 
because as empirical research has shown, decision makers do not treat probabilities linearly, 
rather they transform probabilities by assigning different weights to low and high probabilities 
(Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). Under this assumption, risk attitudes are determined by both, the 
utility from monetary outcomes ( ) and the probability weighting function )( pw .  Here, the 
value function  can take different specifications. In this study, the utility specified in equation 
(3.1) will be adopted. Different probability weights have been proposed in the literature of which 
the most commonly used functions are (Stott, 2006): 
i. TK-PWF: The Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function is a one-
parameter function. When 1  the weighting function is reduced to the linear form: 
ppw )( . The function is specified as follows:  
(3.2)    0,)(
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ii. GE-PWF: The Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) probability weighting function is a two-
parameter function. This function is reduced to the TK-PWF when 1 . This function takes 
the following specification:  
(3.3)    0,,)( 
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iii. P1-PWF: This function is a one-parameter probability weighting function proposed by 
Prelec (1998), and is specified as follows: 
(3.4)    0,)( )ln(   

mp
m epw  
iv. P2-PWF: This function is a two-parameter probability weighting function proposed by 
Prelec (1998).  P1-PWF is a special case of the P2-PWF when 1 . The function is 
specified as: 
(3.5)    0,,)( )ln(   
 mp
m epw  
 
In these probability weighting functions,   is the parameter that controls the curvature (shape) 
of the functions, allowing for both concave and convex regions of the function.  If 1 , the 
function is characterized by an inversed S-shape with overweighting ( ppw )( ) of low 
probabilities and underweighting ( ppw )( ) of high probabilities. Conversely, if 1 , the 
function is characterized by a S-shape with underweighting of low probabilities and 
overweighting of high probabilities. For the two-parameter weighting function (i.e. GE-PWF 
and P-PWF), the additional parameter   controls the elevation of the inflection point where the 
function goes from concave to convex (or convex to concave). If individuals weigh probabilities 
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equally (assign the same weight to low and high probabilities), then a linear probability 
weighting function results, where mm ppw )( .  
 Separable decisions weights can be used. That is, probability weights can depend on the 
original probability only and not be affected by the outcome of interest. In a later study, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) proposed cumulative prospect theory, allowing the probability weighting 
functions to also depend on the outcomes.  
 
3.5.2.3 Incorporating risk in the random utility framework 
One of the approaches to evaluate the effect of risk is the mean-variance approach. Under this 
approach, the variance of an attribute is assumed to be a direct source of disutility. Introducing 
the mean-variance approach into the random utility framework, the systematic component of the 
indirect utility function can be written as: 
(3.6)   
k
kkxx XxEV  
2
0 ][  
where ][xE  is the expected value (mean) of the stochastic attribute, estimated as 
m
mm xpxE ][
; 2x  is the variance of the stochastic attribute, estimated as 
222 ][][ xExEx  ; and   is the 
parameter associated with the variance, directly capturing an individual’s response to the 
variability in the stochastic attribute x . kX  contains the deterministic attributes (attributes for 
which the outcome is known with certainty); and k is a vector of parameters associated with 
the deterministic attributes. 
 A richer specification following Hensher et al. (2011) combines the elements of expected 
utility and prospect theory into the random utility model. Using expected utility theory to model 
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risk allows for the estimation of individuals’ risk preferences based on the curvature of their 
utility over the stochastic attribute. This approach also draws from prospect theory the 
introduction of probability weights (Equation 1.2-1.5) to allow for individuals to subjectively 
assign decision weights to the original probabilities. This approach results in a non-linear utility 
specification within the random utility model. In addition, this approach is more flexible in that 
it allows for the estimation of a utility parameter for net returns in addition to farmers’ risk 
attitudes. By embedding the extended utility term into the random utility model, the systematic 
component of indirect utility can be written as follows: 
 (3.7)                                       








k
kk
m
m
mr X
α
x
pwV 

1
)(
1
0  
where r  is the parameter associated with the risky attribute x ; )( mpw  is a non-linear 
probability weighting function;   is an attribute-specific risk aversion coefficient, representing 
individuals’ attitude towards the risk associated with the stochastic attribute; kX  is a set of 
deterministic attributes (attributes for which the outcome is known with certainty); and k is a 
vector of parameters associated with the deterministic attributes. Hensher et al. (2011) refer to 
the term 

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  as the attribute specific expected utility. 
 
3.5.3 Model estimation 
Two modeling approaches are used to model the risk associated with net returns under a 
conservation contract. The first model considers the stochastic nature of net returns within the 
random utility framework by using a mean-standard deviation approach (using the standard 
deviation instead of the variance), however the assumption of risk neutrality is implicitly 
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imposed. The second model is an attribute specific extended expected utility model, which is a 
more complete specification as it takes into consideration the stochastic nature of farmers’ net 
returns and risk preferences by embedding expected utility and prospect theory within the 
random utility framework, allowing for the estimation of a parameter for net returns in addition 
to farmers’ risk attitudes.  
 
3.5.3.1 Mean-standard deviation approach 
In each choice situation, farmers faced potential changes in net returns when adopting a 
conservation contract under each choice scenario. Farmers were presented with three potential 
net return outcomes: gains in net returns (
 ), no changes in net returns ( 0 ), and losses in net 
returns (
 ). The baseline net return ( 0 ) indicates that farmers will receive 100% of their 
annual level of net returns. The gain (loss) in net returns is the percentage above (below) their 
current level of net returns (100%). Expected net returns can then be estimated as the probability 
weighted average of the three potential outcomes Equation (3.8).  
(3.8)   )()()( 030201
   pppENR  
In this study, a variant of the mean-variance approach was estimated using the standard deviation 
of expected net returns. This model is estimated to study the effect that expected net returns and 
the variation of net returns under a conservation contract exerts on farmers willingness to enroll 
in the conservation contract. The indirect utility model estimated using the mean-variance 
approach to model risk in net returns within the choice model is then given by the following 
expression:  
 84 
 
(3.9)  
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where ENR is expected net returns and SD_NR is the standard deviation of net returns. Pay 
represents the level of incentive payment in dollars per acre; Program is a binary variable taking 
a value of 1 if the program through which the incentive is offered is a carbon payment through a 
carbon market and 0 if the program is a direct government payment. NT , Rot , Cover , and 
VRA are binary variables indicating if continuous no-till, conservation crop rotation, cover crops, 
and VRA of inputs were included in the practices required under the conservation contract. 
SQNT , SQRot , SQCover , and SQVRA are binary variables indicating if a farmers has already 
adopted the specified conservation practices in the proposed conservation bundle. These 
parameters were interacted with the practices in the contract to adjust for the effect of prior 
practice adoption on the willingness of farmers to enter into the contract and to identify the 
maintenance payment necessary for farmers to maintain these practices. LowEnv and MidEnv 
denote the level of perceived offsite environmental benefits from the conservation contract, and 
could be low (LowEnv), medium (MidEnv), or high (used as the base case during estimation)
5
.  
 The parameter SD  directly captures farmer’s response to the variability of net returns 
(risk) under the conservation contract and it is expected to be a direct source of disutility. On the 
other hand, the parameter associated with expected net returns ( ENR ) is expected to be positive 
under the assumption that farmers are profit maximizers. The parameters nt , rot , ccrop , VRA  
are expected to be negative. Since adopting conservation practices may require additional 
                                                 
5 The levels of offsite environmental performance are a qualitative description of perceived benefits, and 
therefore can be subjectively interpreted by the decision maker. 
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investment, may increase labor requirements, and may require changing crop management; a 
lower willingness to adopt the contract is expected when this requires that the farmers adopts 
new practices into their operation. A larger negative effect is expected for practices that are not 
as widely adopted like cover crops and VRA of inputs. In contrast, the parameters sqnt _ , 
sqrot _ , sqccrop_ , and sqVRA _  are expected to be positive, as farmers  with previous conservation 
experience may  be more likely to enter into a conservation contract, particularly when the 
contract requires practices already in place on their farms. Incentive payment is an important 
element of conservation contracts and is expected to be a positive factor ( 0pay ) in farmers’ 
decision to enroll in the contract. There is no a prior expectation regarding the sign of prg  as 
there are different factors that could both negatively or positively affect farmers response. First, 
while a carbon payment can represent an additional source of income for the adoption of 
practices, payments are subject to market fluctuations and are not fixed as they would be under a 
federal conservation program. Second, carbon markets may produce a negative response 
because of negative views on the climate change debate potentially originating these carbon 
trading schemes. On the other hand, some farmers may favor a market-based mechanism where 
those using  the carbon offsets (in this case, GHG emitter companies) pay for the sequestration 
service and not the government (Ribaudo et al., 2010). Farmers are expected to have preference 
for contracts with higher offsite environmental benefits (used as the base case in estimation), 
thus a low or medium level of benefits is expected to be less preferred by farmers (i.e. 
0 and MELE  ).  
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3.5.3.2 Attribute specific extended expected utility 
Following Hensher, Greene, and Li (2011), the attribute specific expected utility term that 
models the stochastic component of net returns for the situation modeled here is given by the 
following expression: 
(3.10)             1/))(())(())(( 103102101 pwpwpwEEUT EUT  
where expected utility is the probability weighted average utility of the potential three net returns 
outcomes, and EUT  is a utility parameter measuring farmers preference for net returns. This 
parameter is expected to be positive under the assumption that farmers are utility maximizers. 
Risk perception is an important factor in individual’s choices (Weber and Milliman, 1997), 
especially in the agricultural sector where outcomes are stochastic in nature (Beal, 1996). A 
higher risk associated with the conservation contract is expected to result in a lower willingness 
to enroll in the contract. Under this model specification,   is the risk attitude towards net returns 
and is expected to be positive a priori, indicating risk aversion. Since risk attitude can vary across 
individuals, the risk attitude parameter was modeled as a function of regional characteristics and 
farm size measured by total acreage such that, FarmSizeCentralWestern 3210   .  
 The model where the attribute specific expected utility term is embedded into the random 
utility framework to model decisions under risk is estimated using the following functional form 
for the systematic component of the indirect utility function:  
(3.11)   
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In this functional form, the expected net returns (ENR) and the standard deviation of net returns 
(SD_NR) used to estimate the mean-standard deviation approach in equation (3.9)  are replaced 
by the attribute specific expected utility term (EEUT) specified in equation (3.10). Four different 
models were estimated using the probability weighting specifications outlined in Equations (3.2) 
to (3.5) and an additional model was estimated where the probability weighing function was 
assumed to be linear ( ppw )( ). Separable decision weights were used, that is, probability 
weights depend on the original probabilities only, and not on the outcomes. Since farmers form 
their own expectations of potential net returns based on their own (or their peers’) experiences, 
the probability weighing function’s parameters are expected to be statistically significant and are 
expected to result in an overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of large 
probabilities as findings in previous empirical applications suggest (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Lattimore et al., 1992; Prelec, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Since probability 
weights can also reveal risk, risk attitude is expected to be larger in the linear probability 
specification where no weighting functions are applied to the original probabilities. 
 
3.5.3.3 Error component model specification 
The models were estimated using a general error component framework to capture heterogeneity 
across farmers. Let the utility of farmer i (i=1,…,235) associated with contract j (j= 1,2) in each 
choice scenario t (t=1,…,12) be: 
(3.12)     ijijjijtijt EVU   ),( xβ  
where )(V is the systematic component of the utility and can take a linear specification 
following Equation (3.9), or a non-linear specification as described in Equation (3.11). The 
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models examined are embedded into this general specification, the systematic component of 
utility ( )(V ) changes in each model. ijE is the error component or alternative specific random 
individual effects, included to control for unobserved heterogeneity not accounted for in the 
model specification; and j is the standard deviation of the error component and assumed to be 
equal to one. The individual random component ij is independent and identically distributed 
(IID) extreme value Type I (Louviere et al., 2000). The structural model that estimates the 
conditional probability of farmer i choosing contract j is then given by (Bhat, 1998; Greene, 
2012): 
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A restriction was imposed by setting the systematic component of the utility associated with the 
status quo equal to zero ( 00 tiV ). Models were estimated using the PROC NLMIXED 
procedure In SAS
6
.  
 
3.5.3.3.1 Risk premium 
The risk premium P , is the dollar amount that would need to be paid to make risk averse farmers 
indifferent between adopting a risky contract versus a risk-free contract.  Farmers are said to be 
indifferent between the two contracts if the probability of adoption between the two contracts is 
equal as follows: 
                                                 
6 The PROC NLMIXED procedure fit the model by maximizing an integrated likelihood approximation 
by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
 89 
 
(3.14)         














 
k
kkr
k
kkr XPEUXUE 
~
][
~~
)]([
~
00  
where (.) is the logistic cumulative distribution function, and P is the risk premium. Equation 
(3.14) shows the probability of a risk-free contract in the right hand side, and the probability of 
adopting a risky contract in the left-hand side. This expression can be further simplified to:  
(3.15)     PEUUE  ][)]([  ,      or 
(3.16)      PEUE  ][)]([ 1   
The right hand side of Equation (3.16) is also known as the certainty equivalent )(CE and 
represents the sure amount farmers will be willing to accept to avoid a risky contract with a 
higher return. The risk premium then is estimated as the difference between the expected net 
returns (mean of net returns) under the contract and the certainty equivalent (Pratt, 1964).     
(3.17)            CEEP  ][  
The risk premium represents the amount farmers would be willing to pay to avoid a risky 
contract by replacing it for a contract with a sure payoff, that is, a contract where they obtain the 
mean net returns (expected profits under the contract). The risk premium was estimated 
numerically for each farmer using the parameter estimates from Equation (3.11) and individual 
farmer data. The average across farmers is reported in Table 3.8. 
. 
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3.5.3.3.2 Model assessment 
Since the different models evaluated in this section have different parameters and specifications 
for the probability weighing function, a test for non-nested hypothesis is necessary to judge 
goodness of fit across the different models. A method commonly used to evaluate a model in 
empirical applications is the likelihood ratio index or Pseudo R-squared (Greene, 2012). Let each 
model be indexed by ),,1( Ggg   with a set of Kg parameters given by ˆ , the likelihood 
ratio index adjusted for the number of parameters is then given by (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 
1985): 
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where  ˆgL  is the log-likelihood for the estimated model,  0L  is the log-likelihood for the 
constant only, and gK is the number of parameters in the model. The measure of   gg KL 2ˆ2    
is known as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and is also used to compare models, where a 
smaller AIC value is better (Greene, 2012). In order to discriminate between two models (model 
1 and model 2), on the basis of which performs better, Ben-Akiva and Swait (1986) proposed a 
test where under the assumption that model 1 is the true specification, and given that the 
probability that the measure of fitness for model 2 )( 22   is greater than that of model 1 )(
2
1  by 
some 0Z , it asymptotically holds that:  
(3.19)      )()0(2Prob 122122 KKLZZ    
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where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Equation (3.19) represents the 
upper bound for the probability of incorrectly selecting the wrong model based on the goodness 
of fit (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
   
3.6 Survey Design and Data 
3.6.1 Survey methods 
This study examined the adoption of conservation practices by farmers in Kansas. A stated 
choice survey was administered during a series of workshops held across 10 locations spanning 
the state of Kansas from December 2013 to March 2014. Workshop locations were selected 
based on different weather, landscape and farm demographic characteristics. The cities where 
the workshops were held are: Salina, Great Bend, Colby, Dodge City, Wellington, Pratt, 
Hiawatha, Topeka, Manhattan, and Parsons, Kansas. Prior to administering the stated choice 
experiment during the workshops, the stated choice survey was field tested with farmers during 
three focus groups held in Manhattan, Salina and Wellington. 
A sample of farms was obtained from the Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA), which has approximately 2,300 farms across Kansas in their database that produce 
crops and livestock. Of these farms, approximately 76% are identified as primarily crop 
producers and 16% are identified as crop/livestock producers. A map depicting KFMA’s 
membership by county is shown in Figure 3.2. Working with members of KFMA allowed for 
respondent data to be matched to historical financial data collected by KFMA for the 
participating farms. A total of 1,513 farmers from the KFMA were mailed letters asking them to 
attend a workshop. Of the farmers contacted, 40 were no longer farming, were deceased or 
could not be located; and 432 responded to the letter. The letters of request resulted in about 250 
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of the farmers attending the workshops. The rest of the farmers who responded were interested 
in participating, but could not attend the workshops on the dates these were held. This resulted 
in an adjusted response rate of approximately 30%, and an attendance rate of 17%. Workshop 
attendees were compensated for their time and travel expenses with a stipend of $125.  
The workshops consisted of an introductory presentation covering the basic aspects of 
the conservation practices under study, a time for farmers to answer a survey questionnaire and 
the stated choice experiment, and a focus group to discuss farmers’ views on conservation. Prior 
to administering the stated choice experiment, farmers were asked to complete a survey with 
questions to elicit their farming history, farm operation, and conservation practices used on their 
farm. Subsequently, farmers were provided with general guidelines on how to respond to the 
stated choice experiment questions. After farmers completed the stated choice exercise, a focus 
group was conducted where farmers discussed their views on conservation, their experience 
using conservation practices, benefits and disadvantages from using conservation practices on 
their farm, and their experience participating in conservation programs. 
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Figure 3.2  Kansas Farm Management Association membership by county  
 
 
 
Source: KFMA (2015) http://www.agmanager.info/kfma/  
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3.6.2 Survey data 
Data from farmers with incomplete responses for needed variates were not considered, leaving 
234 farmers’ data for analyses. Table 3.1 presents these farmers demographics reported in the 
survey and compares them to the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture (NASS-USDA, 2014) and the 
demographics of KFMA members in 2013 (KFMA, 2014).  All of the farmers in the study were 
between 20 and 84 years of age, with a sample average of 56 years which could be considered 
representative of the average Kansas farmer (58 years – as reported in the U.S. Census of 
Agriculture). However, the average size (including CRP land) of farm operations in the sample 
(2,508 acres and sales value of $400,000 to $599,999) is larger than the average farm size of 747 
acres and sales value of $298,845 in Kansas, as reported in the 2012 Census of Agriculture. It 
should be noted that, small size farms, hobby/residential farms or farms operated by retired 
operators (sales < $250,000) represent a significant share of the total U.S. farm population 
(Lambert et al., 2007). In the U.S. Census of Agriculture, farmers with sales lower than $99,999 
represent roughly 74% of the total farms (NASS-USDA, 2014). This study focuses on medium to 
large farms, excluding small hobby farmers, retired farmers, and very large operations. Medium 
and large farmers were chosen as the study group as the goal was to examine farmers that 
produce a higher percentage of the overall crop production. In addition, this group was selected 
because farm size plays an important role for conservation practice adoption, particularly for 
practices that are management intensive as they require operators to be devoted to farming 
because of the additional learning, time and financial investment needed (Lambert et al., 2007).   
When comparing the farm demographics of the farmers who participated in the survey to 
those of all KFMA members, the sample is representative of the KFMA group. KFMA members 
are a good sample of farmers to study as they generally operate medium to large size farming 
operations, which is the main target of this study. Hence, results in this study should be 
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interpreted as representing conservation practices adoption decisions by medium to large farm 
operators in Kansas. 
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of farms whose operators reported using the selected 
conservation practices. While the adoption numbers are high, some farmers may no longer use 
the practice or use the practice on a small amount of their crop land. A higher percentage of 
farmers reported the use of continuous no-till (62.4%) and conservation crop rotation (62.8%). 
While 86% of the farmers had periodically used no-till practices on a particular crop (rotational 
tillage), only 62.4% of them had practiced continuous no-till on some part of their farm 
operation. Consistent with findings by (Grandy et al., 2006), only a fraction of no-till producers 
have adopted continuous no-till. A fewer number of farmers indicated that they had used cover 
crops (33.3%) and VRA of inputs (27.8%). The adoption rates of these practices was high in the 
study group compared to adoption rates previously reported (CTIC, 2013; Schimmelpfennig and 
Ebel, 2011; Singer et al., 2007), this is due to the nature of the survey which focuses on 
intensification of conservation. Thus, the survey group sample targeted and design made more 
favorable for farmers that had already adopted some sort of conservation on their farm.  
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Table 3.1  Average farm characteristics  
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Mean 2012 
Census of 
Agriculture 
Mean 2013 
KFMA 
Age (yrs.) 234 56 13 20 84 58 ---- 
Acres 234 2,508 1,981 110 14,875 747 2,196 
Sales 234 6.20
b
 2.04 1 9 $ 298,845 $618,416 
a Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA (2014) 
b Mean sales of 6.20 corresponds to the sales category of $400,000 to $599,999 
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Figure 3.3  Percentage of farmers who currently used the selected conservation practices. 
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Figure 3.4  Percentage of farmers who currently use or have used the selected conservation 
practices for select cash crop.  
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Results of adoption rates at the crop level (Figure 3.3) indicate the highest rate of adoption of no- 
till is in soybeans (79.9%), while the lowest rate of adoption is in corn (68.0%). In the case of 
VRA of inputs, corn has the highest rate (32.4%) and sorghum has the lowest rate (13.8%). 
Several of the farmers who indicated using these practices have not fully adopted them on all 
their cropland; some of them have only experimented, whereby the minimum percentage of 
cropping land under each selected practice ranges from 1 to 3 percent (see Figure 3.5). Only a 
small fraction of farmers who have adopted conservation practices have participated in 
conservation programs. The program with the highest participation rate is Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), with 61.8% of the farmers participating. With respect to programs that provide 
incentive payments for the adoption of management practices, farmers reported current or past 
participation in EQIP (38.1%) and CSP (22.8%). This result is consistent with findings by 
(Reimer and Prokopy, 2014) who found higher rates of participation in CRP, and low 
participation rates in the EQIP and CSP programs. 
 The percentage of farmers who receive incentive payments through EQIP or CSP for 
using the practices in this study is reported in Table 3.2. Among farmers who have adopted these 
practices, continuous no-till and cover crops seem to be the most common practices for which 
they receive incentive payments through CSP (18.3% for no-till and 19.1% for cover crops).  
However, it is important to note that payments for tillage practices could include other types of 
conservation tillage and not strictly continuous no-till. A smaller percentage of cover crop 
adopters receive payments through EQIP (1.6%). VRA of inputs, which is the least adopted 
practice, has the lowest rate of incentives being received for its use on-farm. 
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Table 3.2  Farmer receiving incentive payments for practices used 
 
EQIP (%)ª CSP (%) 
Continuous no-till 6.62 18.38 
Conservation crop rotation 4.48 11.19 
Cover Crops 1.37 19.18 
Variable rate application of inputs 1.69 8.47 
ª Percentage calculated based on the number of current adopters 
EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program, CSP = Conservation Stewardship Program 
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Figure 3.5  Percentage of crop land under each practice 
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3.6.3 Stated choice design 
In order to assess farmers’ willingness to adopt and intensify conservation on their farms, 
farmers were asked to complete a stated choice exercise. The attributes in the contract were 
selected in a way to mimic current conservation programs. Under current government 
conservation program, farmers receive an incentive payment for a conservation plan consisting 
of various conservation practices. In order to address environmental concerns, through monetary 
incentives, programs like the CSP encourage farmers to maintain existing conservation practices 
and to intensify conservation on their working lands by adopting new conservation practices 
(NRCS, 2015a).  Farmers who adopt new practices are faced with potential changes in their 
bottom line as yields and input costs change due to the implementation of new agricultural 
practices.  
 Respondents were presented with twelve hypothetical contract choice scenarios with two 
contract alternatives, a conservation contract and a status quo contract. Contract attributes and 
attribute levels evaluated are presented in Table 3.3 and are as follows::  
i. Conservation practices to adopt under the contract: the conservation practices evaluated 
were continuous no-till, conservation crop rotations, cover crops and VRA of inputs. The 
conservation practices were treated as dichotomous attributes in the experimental design 
to determine if the practice was required under the contract. The practices present in each 
set were presented in the contract as a bundle to represent different levels of conservation 
intensification. This attribute was included not only to account for adoption but also for 
conservation intensification. Some practices are currently widely adopted; however, 
conservation programs strive for additionality by encouraging farmers to undertake more 
conservation efforts while also providing incentives to maintain and manage existing 
conservation practices.  
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ii. Incentive payment: the annual per acre incentive payments evaluated were $0, $15, $30, 
$45, $60, and $75. These payments, while hypothetical, are similar to base payments 
reported under CPS and EQIP in Kansas
7
. 
iii. Incentive program: this study evaluated two incentive programs, a federal program 
(EQIP/CSP-like program) and a carbon credit payment through a carbon market. 
Payments for carbon sequestration can be established though contracts where farmers get 
paid per ton of carbon sequestered, as an alternative to per-acre payments for the 
practices implemented (Antle et al., 2003). To avoid further complicating the choice task 
in the experiment, in this study farmers were presented with a payment per acre for the 
practices adopted.  
iv. Off-farm environmental benefits from adopting conservation practices: While economic 
drivers are a main factor in conservation contracts, the decision to adopt conservation 
practices is also affected by factors other than economic motivations (Bergtold et al., 
2012; Chouinard et al., 2008). It has been argued that famers who are more conservation-
minded are more likely to adopt conservation practices (Greiner et al., 2009a), and that a 
higher level of benefits from conservation motivates greater adoption (Reimer and 
Prokopy, 2014). This study examined the extent to which the effectiveness of 
conservation practices in achieving environmental benefits off-farm affects farmers’ 
actions on-farm. Three hypothetical levels of off-far environmental benefits were 
included: Low, Medium and High.  
                                                 
7 EQIP payment rates for the conservation practices examined in 2012 are: No-till practices=$12.26/acre; 
Conservation crop rotation=$6.73/acre; VRA of fertilizer=$13.94; and Cover crops=$27.40 for single 
species and $47.15/acre for multiple species. Kansas Practice Payment Schedule for EQIP - Fiscal Year 
2012 available at:  http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs142p2_031993.pdf.  
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v. Riskiness of the contract: While some agricultural practices have proved to be profitable, 
they have not been fully adopted. This indicates that there are factors other than the 
profitability of a technology affecting farmers’ choices. An important factor farmers 
consider is the risk associated with a technology. Risk is introduced to the operation as 
new practices are adopted that could increase the variability of costs, crop yields, and 
returns. In addition, the restrictions of the contract may introduce inflexibility which may 
affect a famer’s ability to react to external events. For example, if a farmer enrolls in a 
contract that requires him to plant cover crops for the next five years, planting a cover 
crop in a dry year may affect the yields of the following cash crop.  
 In this study, the riskiness of the contract was introduced in the experiment by 
presenting a distribution of potential changes in average net farm income over the 
timeframe of the contract with corresponding probabilities of occurrence. The design of 
the experiment had four distributions for potential changes in net returns for adopting the 
contract. The distributions of potential changes in net returns were assumed symmetric 
with equal potential gains and losses, varying only by the level of potential changes: (1) 
5% Loss, 0% change, 5% Gain; (2) 10% Loss, 0% change, 10% Gain; (3) 15% Loss, 0% 
change, 15% Gain; and (4) 20% Loss, 0% change, 20% Gain. The design also consisted 
of four distributions of probabilities associated with the potential changes in net returns. 
Two of the probability distributions are symmetric with equal probability of observing 
losses and gains. The first distribution (P: 30% of loss, P: 40% of no change, P: 30% of 
gains) is meant to represent a scenario where the outcomes are more uncertain with the 
probability of occurrence of the three outcomes being almost equal. The second 
distribution (P: 10% of loss, P: 80% of no change, P: 10% of gains), represents a 
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distribution where there is a high probability that net returns will not change, with a low 
and equal probability of obtaining a loss or a gain. The third distribution (P: 5% of loss, 
P: 60% of no change, P: 35% of gains) is more heavily weighted towards observing a 
gain than to observing a loss, while the forth distribution (P: 35% of loss, P: 60% of no 
change, P: 5% of gains) is more heavily weighted towards losses than to gains. While 
farmers were only presented with three probability outcomes (a discrete distribution as 
opposed to a continuous distribution), for illustration purposes Figure 3.6 depicts that 
distributions that are intended to be represented in the design, using the example where 
the distribution of outcomes is 20% Loss, 0% change, 20% Gain.  
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Figure 3.6  Distribution of the probabilities of net returns change in stated choice design 
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Table 3.3  Contract attributes and attribute’s levels   
Contract Feature Description Levels 
Continuous no-till Planting crops directly into the crop residue without disturbing 
the soil in all the crops in rotation in a particular field. 
Included, Not included 
Conservation crop rotation Three or more year rotation with three or more crop types, 
including a combination of high residue crops, grasses and/or 
legumes. 
 
Included, Not included 
Cover Crops Planting a single or multiple cover crop species between regular 
cash crops for primarily conservation purposes. 
Included, Not included 
VRA of inputs Use of site-specific information for input application rates within 
a field, including sensor-based and/or map-based methods. 
Included, Not included 
Incentive payment  
 
Payment ($/acre) offered annually during the length of the 
contract.  
$0/acre,    $15/acre,  $30/acre,  
$45/acre,  $60/acre,  $75/acre  
 
Incentive Program Type of mechanism through which the payment is offered, 
administered and regulated.  
Federal Program or  Carbon 
Credit Payment through a 
Carbon Market 
 
Offsite Environmental Impact Potential off-farm environmental benefits of the practices stated 
under each scenario (e.g. downstream water and air quality).  
Low, Moderate, High 
     Riskiness: Impact on Net Returns 
Average Change in Net returns 
over 5 years
1
 
Distribution of income changes over a 5 years period (length of 
the contract). 
-20% 
0% 
+20% 
-15% 
0% 
+15% 
-10% 
0% 
+10% 
-5% 
0% 
+5% 
Probability of changes in net 
returns
2
 
Probability distributions for potential net income changes. 
5% 
60% 
35% 
30% 
40% 
30% 
35% 
60% 
5% 
10% 
80% 
10% 
1,2 Each column represents a distribution. The first row in each column represents losses, second column represents no changes in net returns, and the third row represents gains. 
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The contract presented to farmers was a standard 5-year contract (like CSP contract length) with 
verification of compliance by a program professional. A clause included in the contract stated 
that farmers had to make a full repayment of the incentive payments received plus any 
administrative costs if they were found in violation of the contract (if they fail to provide the 
practices stipulated in the contract). The specifications of the contract shown to famers in the 
choice experiment are presented in Appendix A. 
 A fractional-factorial experimental design with 288 choice sets was obtained from a 
25 4362   full factorial design. This design allows for the identification of main effects and 
two-way interaction effects (Louviere et al., 2000).  The set of choice scenarios chosen was the 
candidate set with the highest D-efficiency score (D-efficiency =93.6). The 288 combinations 
were blocked into 24 blocks with 12 choice sets. Each farmer was presented with 12 choice 
scenarios, each containing a conservation contract and a constant status quo option. An example 
of a choice set is presented in Figure 3.7. The design was generated using PROC OPTEX in 
SAS® (SAS Institute Inc, 1999). 
 Descriptive statistics of the data, including contract attributes, demographics, and farm 
characteristics used in estimating the models are presented in Table 3.4. Observations from 234 
farmers were deemed appropriate for estimation, resulting in 2,808 usable observations.  
  
 109 
Figure 3.7 Example of choice task. 
Conservation Practices   
  Continuous No-till 
  Conservation Crop Rotation 
  Cover Crops 
  Variable Rate Application of Inputs 
Incentive Program Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market 
Incentive Payment   $45/acre 
Riskiness   
 
 Average Change in Net  
Returns Over 5 Years 
 
    10% Loss        
   No change        
   10% Gain      
 
Probability of 
Occurrence 
 
5%     Very unlikely    
60%   Likely    
35%   Medium likelihood 
Off-farm 
Environmental Benefits 
  Moderate 
   
Would you adopt this system or stay with the Status Quo?    
           Adopt          Status Quo           
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Table 3.4  Data summary statistics  
 
Complete Sample (N=2,808) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variable: (adopt=1, status quo=0) 0.462 0.499 0 1 
     
Contract attributes:     
Incentive payment ($/acre-year) 37.121 25.613 0 75 
Incentive program  (1= carbon market, 0= federal program) 0.504 0.500 0 1 
Conservation practices     
   Continuous no-till 0.516 0.500 0 1 
   Conservation crop rotation 0.507 0.500 0 1 
   Cover crops 0.517 0.500 0 1 
   Variable rate application of inputs 0.523 0.500 0 1 
Percentage change in net returns 
        Percentage of loss in net returns 12.46% 5.60% 5% 20% 
    Percentage of gains in net returns 12.46% 5.60% 5% 20% 
Probability of changes in net returns 
        Probability of loss in net returns 19.99% 12.75% 5% 35% 
    Probability of no change in net returns 59.95% 14.14% 40% 80% 
    Probability of gains in net returns 20.06% 12.75% 5% 35% 
Offsite environmental benefits     
    Low  0.337 0.473 0 1 
    Moderate  0.325 0.468 0 1 
    High  0.338 0.473 0 1 
Farm/farmers’ characteristics: 
    Adopted continuous no-till 0.624 0.484 0 1
Adopted conservation crop rotation 0.628 0.483 0 1 
Adopted  cover crops 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Adopted variable rate application of inputs 0.278 0.448 0 1 
Western 0.218 0.413 0 1 
Central 0.419 0.493 0 1 
Total acres (hundred acres) 25.088 19.814 1.1 148.75 
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3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Model results  
3.7.1.1 Mean-variance approach 
Results for the mean-standard deviation model are reported in Table 3.5. The parameters 
estimates for the contract attributes are all statistically significant and have the expected sign. 
Consistent with prior expectations, higher net returns increases farmers’ willingness to enter into 
the contract. The variability in net returns (standard deviation of net returns) was negative, 
indicating that farmers’ utility under a conservation contract is reduced as the variability of net 
returns increases. This result reveals aversion to risk, farmers’ willingness to adopt a 
conservation contract declines if the contract is risky. While this model reveals farmers’ response 
to risk, it does not provide a measure of the level of farmers risk attitudes, assuming risk 
neutrality.  
 The incentive payment parameter was positive indicating that a higher conservation 
incentive would increase farmers’ willingness to participate in the conservation contract. The 
results also indicate farmers’ preference for federal programs in lieu of carbon credit based 
programs. The conservation practice parameters were negative; indicating that adding a practice 
to the contract reduces farmers’ willingness to enter into the contract. The parameter estimates 
associated with interaction between the practices required in the contract and the variable 
indicating if the farmer had already adopted such practice (e.g. SQj NTNT  ) were positive. This 
result indicates that farmers who have already adopted the conservation practices are more likely 
to enter into a conservation contract. In addition, a lower off-site environmental performance is 
likely to reduce farmers’ enrollment in the conservation program. 
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Table 3.5  Model estimates for the mean-variance model 
 
Parameter  
estimates 
 
Standard  
   Error 
Constant -12.5537 *** (1.8503) 
returnsnetExpected  0.1191 *** (0.0183) 
returnsnetofDevSt ..   -0.0336 ** (0.0144) 
Payment 0.0492 *** (0.0025) 
Program -0.2531 ** (0.1037) 
NT  -1.2993 *** (0.1681) 
SQj NTNT   1.7732 *** (0.1998) 
Rot  -0.7019 *** (0.1602) 
SQj RotRot   0.4561 ** (0.1906) 
Cover  -0.7578 *** (0.1264) 
SQj CoverCover   0.5206 *** (0.1951) 
VRA  -0.8566 *** (0.1225) 
SQVRAVRA  0.8695 *** (0.2039) 
LowEnv  -0.3865 *** (0.1274) 
MidEnv -0.2545 ** (0.1264) 
EC  2.3615 *** (0.3568) 
  
No. of Observations 2808   
Log Likelihood 1452.9   
AIC 2937.8   
Pseudo R-squared 0.253   
Adjusted R-squared 0.244   
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
1 Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market was used as the base scenario. 
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The mean-standard deviation model was also estimated using a random parameters logit (results 
are reported in Appendix B). In this model, significant heterogeneity in farmers’ responses to net 
returns, variance of net returns, conservation program and conservation practices required in the 
contract were found as evidenced by the significance of their standard deviation estimates. No 
evidence was found of heterogeneity in famers’ preference for the off-farm environmental 
impacts of the conservation practices in the contract (see Appendix B).  
 
3.7.1.2 Attribute specific extended expected utility 
3.7.1.2.1 Model fit 
Results of the models estimated using expected utility and probability weights are reported in 
Table 3.6. The parameter estimates for incentive payment, incentive program, conservation 
practices and off-farm environmental benefits are consistent in sign and magnitudes across 
probability weighting specifications. Parameters results will be discussed in the following 
section. In terms of goodness of fit, the TK-PWF and GE-PWF models would seem to be 
preferred based on the adjusted Pseudo R-squared and the Information Criterion (AIC). Results 
from the Ben-Akiva and Swait (1986) test (Table 3.7) suggest that the GE-PWF is the preferred 
model, followed by TK-PWF and P2-PWF which are preferred to P1-PWF and to the linear 
probability weighting specification. For an example of how to interpret results, from the Ben-
Akiva and Swait (1986) test considerer the results comparing model P1-PWF and TK-PWF in 
Table 3.7. The resulting probability of 0.006 indicates that the probability that the goodness of 
fit of P1-PWF is larger than that of TK-PWF in a sample of 2,808 observations is less than 
0.006. 
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Table 3.6  Model estimate results for the attribute specific extended expected utility models 
 
Linear 
probability  
TK-PWF 
 
GE-PWF 
(Best model)  
P1-PWF 
 
P2-PWF 
               Constant -51.7204 *** 
 
-42.7103 
  
-60.8061 *** 
 
-35.7249 
  
-43.4662 
 
 
(8.0624) 
  
(54.2032) 
  
(10.1715) 
  
(31.5567) 
  
(64.2332) 
 
Risk attitude parameters ( )              
0  0.7528 ***  
0.7085 * 
 
0.8135 *** 
 
0.6440 ** 
 
0.7113 * 
 
(0.0105) 
  
(0.3718) 
  
(0.0159) 
  
(0.3194) 
  
(0.4298) 
 
Western  0.0485 
  
0.0153 
  
-0.0610 
  
0.0117 
  
0.0156 
 
 
(0.0322) 
  
(0.0439) 
  
(0.0414) 
  
(0.0084) 
  
(0.0553) 
 
Central  0.0125 
  
0.0082 
  
-0.0079 
  
0.0065 
  
0.0083 
 
 
(0.0087) 
  
(0.0195) 
  
(0.0064) 
  
(0.0052) 
  
(0.0240) 
 
Acres  -0.0004 ** 
 
-0.0002 
  
0.0002 * 
 
-0.0002 
  
-0.0002 
 
 
(0.0002) 
  
(0.0005) 
  
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0006) 
 
Probability weighting parameters 
          
   --- 
  
1.1398 *** 
 
0.9607 
  
0.9916 *** 
 
0.9924 *** 
    
(0.0994) 
  
(0.6510) 
  
(0.0242) 
  
(0.0215) 
 
   --- 
  
   --- 
  
0.9804 *** 
 
     --- 
  
1.0185 *** 
       
(0.0205) 
     
(0.0296) 
 
Contract parameters 
             
r  4.0307 ***  
3.2394 
  
4.7886 *** 
 
2.4154 
  
3.3127 
 
 
(0.6469) 
  
(5.5350) 
  
(0.8371) 
  
(3.5555) 
  
(6.5216) 
 
Payment 0.0491 *** 
 
0.0494 *** 
 
0.0492 *** 
 
0.0492 *** 
 
0.0494 *** 
 
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0025) 
 
Program -0.2501 ** 
 
-0.2462 ** 
 
-0.2474 ** 
 
-0.2502 ** 
 
-0.2462 ** 
 
(0.1025) 
  
(0.1027) 
  
(0.1026) 
  
(0.1026) 
  
(0.1027) 
 
NT  -1.3622 *** 
 
-1.3650 *** 
 
-1.3506 *** 
 
-1.3645 *** 
 
-1.3643 *** 
 
(0.1695) 
  
(0.1700) 
  
(0.1696) 
  
(0.1696) 
  
(0.1700) 
 
SQj NTNT   1.8234 ***  
1.8308 *** 
 
1.8188 *** 
 
1.8285 *** 
 
1.8304 *** 
 
(0.2031) 
  
(0.2038) 
  
(0.2034) 
  
(0.2033) 
  
(0.2038) 
 
Rot  -0.6514 *** 
 
-0.6554 *** 
 
-0.6491 *** 
 
-0.6610 *** 
 
-0.6561 *** 
 
(0.1608) 
  
(0.1616) 
  
(0.1611) 
  
(0.1609) 
  
(0.1619) 
 
SQj RotRot   0.4026 **  
0.4143 ** 
 
0.4013 ** 
 
0.4133 ** 
 
0.4147 ** 
 
(0.1938) 
  
(0.1948) 
  
(0.1942) 
  
(0.1940) 
  
(0.1951) 
 
Cover  -0.7479 *** 
 
-0.7626 *** 
 
-0.749 *** 
 
-0.7530 *** 
 
-0.7639 *** 
 
(0.1265) 
  
(0.1271) 
  
(0.1268) 
  
(0.1266) 
  
(0.1272) 
 
SQj CoverCover   0.4950 **  
0.5140 ** 
 
0.4926 ** 
 
0.5081 ** 
 
0.5166 ** 
 
(0.1989) 
  
(0.2001) 
  
(0.1994) 
  
(0.1991) 
  
(0.2006) 
 
VRA  -0.7953 *** 
 
-0.8038 *** 
 
-0.8053 *** 
 
-0.7962 *** 
 
-0.8041 *** 
 
(0.1206) 
  
(0.1211) 
  
(0.1208) 
  
(0.1207) 
  
(0.1211) 
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Table 3.6 continued.                
 
Linear 
probability 
  TK-PWF   
GE-PWF 
(Best model) 
  P1-PWF   P2-PWF  
SQVRAVRA  0.7676 ***  
0.7735 *** 
 
0.7798 *** 
 
0.7652 *** 
 
0.7737 *** 
 
(0.2061) 
  
(0.2068) 
  
(0.2063) 
  
(0.2063) 
  
(0.2068) 
 
LowEnv  -0.3646 *** 
 
-0.3675 *** 
 
-0.3755 *** 
 
-0.3653 *** 
 
-0.3671 *** 
 
(0.1255) 
  
(0.1258) 
  
(0.1257) 
  
(0.1255) 
  
(0.1258) 
 
MidEnv  -0.2401 * 
 
-0.2497 ** 
 
-0.2578 ** 
 
-0.2410 * 
 
-0.2495 ** 
 
(0.1253) 
  
(0.1257) 
  
(0.1256) 
  
(0.1253) 
  
(0.1257) 
 
EC  2.2312 ***  
2.2713 *** 
 
2.2413 *** 
 
2.2508 *** 
 
2.2711 *** 
 
(0.3263) 
  
(0.3313) 
  
(0.3278) 
  
(0.3281) 
  
(0.3316) 
 
               
 
------------------------------------------ Model fit statistics ----------------------------------------- 
No. of Observations 2808 
  
2808 
  
2808 
  
2808 
  
2808 
 
Log Likelihood -1415.6 
  
-1412.7 
  
-1411.1 
  
-1415.7 
  
-1412.6 
 
AIC 2869.1 
  
2865.3 
  
2864.1 
  
2871.5 
  
2867.1 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.273 
  
0.274 
  
0.275 
  
0.273 
  
0.274 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.263 
  
0.264 
  
0.264 
  
0.262 
  
0.263 
 
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
1 Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market was used as the base scenario. 
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Table 3.7  Ben-Akiva and Swait test results 
Model 1 Model 2 Probability
1
 
GE-PWF Linear probability 0.0041 
GE-PWF TK-PWF 0.0694 
GE-PWF P1-PWF 0.0019 
GE-PWF P2-PWF 0.0414 
TK-PWF Linear probability 0.0143 
TK-PWF P1-PWF 0.0066 
TK-PWF P2-PWF 0.1830 
P2-PWF Linear probability 0.0231 
P2-PWF P1-PWF 0.0105 
Linear probability P1-PWF 0.1221 
1 Probability of incorrectly choosing model 2 given that model 1 is the true model.  
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The alternative specific constant was negative in all the models and statistically significant in 
only two of the models (linear probability weighting specification and GE-PWF). Given that the 
alternative specific constant is associated with the contract alternative, this result could indicate 
a preference for the status quo. An error component was included in the model to control for 
unobserved variability across individuals. The error component was highly significant in all the 
models, indicating significant unobserved heterogeneity across respondents.  
3.7.1.2.2 Contract attributes 
The payment coefficient was positive and statistically significant in all the model versions 
(Table 3.6). Incentive payment has consistently been identified in the literature as an important 
factor in the decision to adopt conservation practices (Cooper, 2003; Dupont, 2010; Kurkalova 
et al., 2006; Lichtenberg, 2004; Ma et al., 2012). While to some farmers the incentive payment 
may not be the primary motivation for adoption, monetary incentives can ease their transition 
into a new production system (Reimer and Prokopy, 2014). Incentive payments can cover the 
cost of the practice, allowing farmers to experiment with conservation practices to determine if 
these are suitable for their operations. Results from a study of farmers’ participation in a cost-
sharing program for the adoption of BMP found that a one percent increase in the incentive 
payment increased participation by 0.23 to 0.25% (Dupont, 2010). It has been also suggested 
that the lack of benefits from conservation programs, in many cases is, a barrier for participation 
by adopters and non-adopters alike (Reimer and Prokopy, 2014).  
The program coefficient was negative and statistically significant in all models. These 
results provide evidence indicating a lower likelihood of adoption for the same level of incentive 
payment if the mechanism through which the incentive payment is offered is a carbon credit 
program. This result suggests a preference for federal programs over market-based programs. In 
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a study of farmers’ willingness to participate in conservation programs, Ma et al. (2012) found 
no statistical difference between a conservation incentive program provided through the 
government and a non-governmental organization. However, the type of program run by the non-
governmental organization was not specified in the choice experiment.  
A lower willingness to participate in a conservation program that offers incentives 
through a carbon market could be related to famers’ unfamiliarity with this type of program. 
Only 14.3% of the farmers in this study had participated or knew someone who had participated 
in any carbon credit trading program (specifically, the Chicago Climate Exchange). Of these 
farmers, about one third rated their experience as poor, specifically due to the lack of payment. 
Similarly, about 30% of the farmers agreed that the payments offered were fairly low. A negative 
experience with a previously established and failed carbon market could create unfavorable 
views towards market-based approaches to incentivize conservation adoption. In addition, 
uncertainty about the development of a GHG federal policy that would create demand for carbon 
offsets that could lead to the establishment of a robust carbon market may be another important 
factor affecting farmers’ perceptions and willingness to enroll in a carbon credit program. Zeuli 
and Skees (2000) argued that the risk of non-binding policies being developed is a factor that 
could affect the development of a carbon market, mainly due to the uncertainty about trading 
volumes and the price of carbon credits. Being locked into a contract to supply carbon credits in 
a market without legal binding of credits for potential buyers may be a deterrent to farmers’ 
willingness to participate. In addition, the past history of carbon markets, such as the Chicago 
Climate Exchange could have colored farmers’ views about this potential payment mechanism. 
 The parameters associated with the four conservation practices were negative and 
statistically significant in all the models. In agreement with prior expectations, the magnitude of 
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the utility parameters indicates a lower likelihood of adoption for farmers who have not 
previously adopted these practices. For farmers who have adopted these practices, the likelihood 
of enrolling in a conservation program increases as the positive parameters estimated from the 
interaction between the practices required in the contract and the indicator of previous practice 
adoption suggest. Figure 3.6 depicts the differences in the likelihood of adoption for each of the 
conservation practices for adopters and non-adopters. As shown in the graphs, farmers are more 
likely to enter into a five year contract if they have previously adopted the practice. This 
difference is more significant for continuous no-till, where for each level of incentive payment, 
non-adopters are less likely to adopt continuous no-till than any other practice, but for the same 
level of incentive, adopters of no-till are more likely than adopters of the other practices to enter 
into the contract.  
 The parameters for low and medium off-farm environmental benefits were negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that farmers were less likely to adopt contracts with lower off-
farm environmental benefits. Consistent with previous research, this finding suggests that 
farmers care for the environmental impacts of their practices, not only at the farm level, but also 
off the farm. In a study of famers’ participation in U.S. Farm Bill Conservation Programs, 
Reimer and Prokopy (2014) found that off-farm environmental benefit was one of the main 
drivers of program participation. They also found that awareness of external environmental 
benefits was an attitude that characterized the highest adopters (adopters of numerous 
conservation practices). In addition, their results indicated that on-farm environmental benefits 
and financial benefits were likewise important to those farmers who cared about external 
environmental impacts. A study by Ma et al. (2012) found that a higher environmental 
performance increased farmers’ likelihood to consider entering into a conservation program, 
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however, farmers were less likely to enroll land in these programs potentially due to the higher 
costs associated with higher conservation intensity. An application that stems from this result is 
the importance of stressing the benefits from conservation not only on-farm but also off-farm to 
encourage higher levels of conservation adoption. Based on the results of a study of carbon 
offset program for the adoption of no-till and permanent covers, it has been suggested that 
incentive payments coupled with farmers’ better understanding of the benefits from adopting 
these practices could encourage greater adoption levels (Morand and Thomassin, 2005). 
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Figure 3.8 Probability of adoption for each practice under varying incentive payments 
 
 
 
Note: Probabilities estimated assuming high off-farm benefits, mean values for changes in net returns, and a federal program. 
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3.7.1.2.3 Probability weights, risk attitude, and risk premium 
Results corresponding to the probability weights showed minimal transformation of probabilities 
into decision weights. While the probability weighing function parameters were statistically 
significant, the results suggest little use of subjective judgments of original probabilities when 
assessing risk. This reveals limited use of heuristics, that is, the use of previous experience 
and/or current knowledge about the likelihood of net returns outcomes. Probability weighting 
responses are illustrated in Figure 3.9. The direction of the GE-PWF and P1-PWF models 
showed a behavior consistent with overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of 
large probabilities, while TK-PWF suggests underweighting of low probabilities and 
overweighting of large probabilities. Both, overweighing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Lattimore et al., 1992; Prelec, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and underweighting of low 
probabilities have been found in empirical applications (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004; 
Roberts et al., 2008). However, as discussed above, there is minimal transformation of original 
probabilities in this study. The lines are nearly flat and virtually undistinguishable from the linear 
specification, as seen in Figure 3.9.  
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Figure 3.9  Probability weighing functions  
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 Subjective probabilities could reflect people’s perception of uncertainty (Anderson and 
Dillon, 1992) and aversion to risk as certain outcomes are underweighted, revealing some level 
of pessimism (Lattimore et al., 1992). For example, consider the probability associated with no 
changes in net returns.  While it was the most certain outcome in each choice set (with a 
probability of occurrence ranging from 50-80%), it was slightly underweighted. In addition, no 
strong evidence of prospect pessimism was found as the sum of the probabilities was close to 
one in all the models (when the sum of the weights is less than one, this is referred to as prospect 
pessimism (Lattimore et al., 1992). However, it is important to note that, as evidence in the 
psychological literature suggest, the context and format in which the probabilities are presented 
during the experiments affects respondents’ transformation of probabilities and assessment of 
risk (Visschers et al., 2009). 
 The parameters associated with the expected utility of net returns (
r ) was positive in all 
models but only statistically significant in the linear probability weighting specification and GE-
PWF models (Table 3.6). A positive parameter indicates that farmers are more likely to enter 
into a conservation contract as the value they place on net returns increases. However, the 
insignificance of the parameter may indicate that the risk associated with the contract and 
farmers’ assessment of uncertainty through probability weights could have a greater effect on 
farmers’ likelihood of entering into the contract than the value they place on the actual outcome. 
 The constant parameter of risk attitude towards net returns was positive and statistically 
significant across all models (Table 3.6). Risk attitude parameters corresponding to 0  
indicate risk aversion. In this study, regional variables were not found to significantly affect 
farmers’ level of risk aversion. Farm size as measured by acres was found to be positive and 
statistically significant in the GE-PWF model, indicating that farmers with larger farms are more 
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likely to exhibit higher risk aversion. This could be associated with the fact that more acres under 
the contract could represent a larger potential change in and impact on total net returns. The 
distributions of the predicted risk attitude parameter for each model specification are depicted in 
Figure 3.10. It can be seen from this graph that the risk parameters have little dispersion; this is 
due to the small effect of regional and farm size characteristics. It can also be noted that the 
predicted level of risk aversion varies across model specifications, with the linear probability 
specification and the GE-PWF models having more dispersion and revealed risk attitude. It is 
expected that risk attitudes would fluctuate according to the model used, as these have different 
underlying behavioral assumptions. It is important thus, to identify the model that best suits the 
data. Risk aversion parameters found in agriculture-related literature differ depending on the 
model used and the context of the study. However, most studies agree that, in general, farmers 
exhibit risk aversion. For some risk aversion estimates in previous studies see (Kumbhakar, 
2002; Pennings and Garcia, 2001; Saha et al., 1994). 
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Figure 3.10  Distribution of predicted risk attitude parameters 
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The risk attitude parameters estimated in this study was relatively small, indicating 
modest risk aversion. However, risk attitude is context specific (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 
1990). In numerous studies, individuals’ risk attitude is elicited using money lotteries. When 
assessing risk using lottery ticket experiments, responses may represent risk attitudes for 
extreme events. Nonetheless, issues in agricultural production (e.g. yields, prices) are mainly 
associated with non-extreme probabilities (Just, 2003). In this study, farmers where presented 
with a situation where deviations from their expected returns could occur as a result of their 
decision to enter into a conservation contract. In this scenario, farmers may behave as to prevent 
losses, especially if adopting these practices is not considered a production priority.  
 It has also been suggested that risk may be related to outcome expectations, whereby 
expectations of a better outcome could also influence people’s perception of risk (March and 
Shapira, 1987; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Commonly, farmers adopt practices if they receive a 
private benefit (e.g. profit improvements through increasing yield or cost reductions). If farmers 
expect to improve their income streams when adopting conservation practices, then an outcome 
with lower or unchanged net returns may be perceived as an undesirable outcome. For example, 
62% of the farmers in this study reported that that they would not adopt conservation practices if 
these failed to improve net farm income. In addition, further analysis of the data reported by 
these farmers (see Figure 3.11) revealed that increases in yields is the factor most desired in a 
conservation practice (ranked as the top three benefits by 62.2% of the farmers), above both soil 
erosion reduction (48.1%) and soil moisture retention (41.3%). Thus, it is plausible that famers 
have higher expectations for net returns under conservation. 
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Figure 3.11  Benefits from conservation practices selected by farmers as the three most 
important factors  
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Another factor affecting risk perception is contract restrictiveness. Contract restrictiveness seems 
to be a major factor in farmers’ decision to not enter into a conservation contract. Contract 
restrictiveness was listed by 34.8% of the farmers as one of the top three reasons for opting out 
in the stated choice experiment (Figure 3.11). Contracts could potentially limit farmers’ ability to 
respond and adjust their cropping systems to varying weather and market conditions. As De 
Pinto, Magalhaes, and Ringler (2010) suggest, being locked into a contract with certain practices 
increases a farmer’s vulnerability “to shocks and economic fluctuations”. Ma et al. (2012) found 
that the type of conservation program and the restrictions of the program affect farmers’ 
experience with these programs, influencing their willingness to adopt conservation contracts. 
Risk from restrictions imposed by a conservation contract could have a larger effect if farmers 
perceive that under a five year contract, their decision could have consequences that extend into 
the long-term. As Just (2003) pointed out, long-term changes pose a greater risk to farmers. Zeuli 
and Skees (2000) also note that the risk that stems from this type of contract, specifically carbon 
contracts, is the irreversibility of the decision. Some farmers may be less willing to commit to the 
contract if they have to bear risk for an extended period of time.  
 As previously discussed, there are different factors affecting farmer’s attitude towards 
risk and in some cases gains in net returns are not sufficient to induce farmers’ adoption of 
certain agricultural practices. In a study of the adoption cost of conservation tillage, Kurkalova, 
Kling, and Zhao (2006) found that the incentive to induce adoption was higher than the gains in 
net returns from the adoption of conservation tillage. The premium for the adoption of 
conservation practices could be the result of aversion to risk and sunk costs (Kurkalova et al., 
2006). However if not accounted for directly, the effect of sunk costs could be revealed in 
farmers’ risk attitudes (Ridier et al., 2012).  Some of these sunk costs could include the cost of 
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machinery ownership. In this study, results also indicated that equipment cost was an important 
consideration affecting farmers’ choices in the experiment.  
 Risk premiums for the adoption of the conservation contract estimated using the 
regression results are reported in Table 3.8 for the different attribute specific extended expected 
utility models. There are differences in the resulting measures of risk premiums across the 
different probability weighting specifications. From the results, it is also apparent that the use of 
probability decision weights increases the estimated level of risk, taking into account farmers’ 
subjective interpretation of the presented probability distributions and preferences. As shown in 
Table 3.8, the premium obtained with the linear probability weighting specification is lower 
compared to the estimates obtained with the nonlinear weights (TK-PWF, GE-PWF, P1-PWF, 
and P2-PWF). The risk premium obtained when using probability weights ranged from 3.56% to 
4.36% of net returns per acre for the preferred models (GE-PWF, TK-PWF, and P2-PWF).  
 The risk premium is the cost from risk bearing and in this application is found to be 
moderate. Results suggest that in order for farmers to enter into the contract, they require on 
average 3.56% to 4.36% of their current net returns as a payment for bearing the risk associated 
with the contract. Including subjective probability introduces farmers’ personal judgment/beliefs 
of how likely net returns outcomes are to occur, which could also reflect how optimistic or 
pessimistic farmers’ expectations are. In this study, subjective probabilities did not reveal strong 
pessimism in terms of the expectation of outcome occurrences. When perceptions about the 
probabilities of outcomes are largely pessimistic, this can result in a higher revealed level of 
risk. Nonetheless, while transformation of probabilities were not large, the effect from using 
probability weights was significant, as differences in risk premium estimates when compared to 
using a linear probability suggest. Since the models with probability weighting specifications 
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were preferred over the model with original probabilities, this suggests that it is important to 
evaluate respondents’ subjective probabilities; otherwise, estimates of risk perceptions could be 
underestimated.   
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Table 3.8  Risk premium estimates 
 
Risk premium 
Linear probability 0.25% 
TK-PWF 3.56% 
GE-PWF  4.36% 
P1-PWF 0.15% 
P2-PWF 3.90% 
Percentage levels are relative to the level of net returns. For example, 
the risk premium for the TK-PWF is 3.56% of a farmer’s net return. 
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3.7.2 Marginal Willingness to Accept  
Estimates of marginal willingness to accept (mWTA) per acre for the contract attributes are 
reported in Table 3.9. The range of mWTA estimates across farmers was also reported.  
Estimates of mWTA were estimated as the ratio of the marginal utility of the contract attributes 
to the marginal utility of incentive payment, i.e. payattribute  .  Estimates of willingness to accept 
for farmers, who have already adopted conservation practices, were adjusted using the estimates 
associated with previous adoption. For example, the mWTA for farmers who had not adopted 
continuous no-till was estimated as payjntNT   and as paySQjsqntjnt NTNTNT  )( _  for 
farmers who were using continuous no-till. Asymptotic standard errors were estimated using the 
delta method (Greene, 2012). As can be observed in Table 3.9, mWTA estimates are very 
consistent across the different model specifications, with estimates from the mean-standard 
deviation model differing, but only slightly, from the estimates from the attribute specific 
extended expected utility models. The mWTA estimates for the mean-standard deviation 
approach estimated using random parameters logit are shown in Figure B.1, in the Appendix. 
From these graphs, it can be seen that significant variability exists at the individual level. 
 
3.7.2.1 mWTA for conservation practices 
The mWTA estimates for the conservation practices (no-till, cover crops, conservation crop 
rotation and VRA of inputs) represent the per acre payment amount farmers require in order to 
adopt these practices. The mWTA for the conservation practices was estimated separately for 
adopters and non-adopters. Some of the factors that could affect the mWTA estimates for the 
conservation practices are opportunity cost of adopting these practices in comparison with 
alternative production methods and sunk costs that could include investment in human capital 
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and/or equipment ownership (Kurkalova et al., 2006). The cost of the practice is also an 
important factor in the adoption of conservation practices (Lichtenberg, 2004). Some studies 
have estimated the level of incentive necessary to encourage adoption for different conservation 
practices under different arrangements (Cooper, 1997; Cooper and Signorello, 2008; Peterson et 
al., 2012). 
The mWTA for farmers who have not adopted continuous no-till was estimated at 
$27.45 - $27.74 per acre across models with different probability weighting specifications (the 
estimate for the mean-standard deviation approach was $26.44). In a study conducted in Iowa, 
Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2006) found that the incentive level to encourage the adoption of 
conservation tillage in corn was $4.10/acre and $6.00/acre in soybeans. Peterson et al. (2012) 
found a mean estimate of $9.68 for continuous no-till and $4.78 for rotational no-till.  
Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2006) found that farmers’ premium for the adoption of 
conservation tillage in corn or soybeans represented ~13% of farmers’ expected returns under 
conventional tillage and for other crops it represented ~62%. Large willingness to accept 
estimates in the present study could be the result of the requirement that no-till would be 
continued over the five years of the contract, without room for soil disturbance if needed (as 
seen by the farmer). It was been suggested that some no-till farmers may till the ground in 
response to economic or seasonal drivers (Llewellyn et al., 2012).  
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Table 3.9  Farmers’ marginal willingness to accept ($/acre) 
  
Mean-SD 
 
Linear probability 
 
TK-PWF 
 
GE-PWF 
(Best model)  
P1-PWF 
 
P2-PWF 
Estimates for non-adopters 
                       Continuous No-till -26.44 (3.45) *** 
 
-27.73 (3.50) *** 
 
-27.65 (3.49) *** 
 
-27.44 (3.49) *** 
 
-27.74 (3.50) *** 
 
-27.64 (3.49) *** 
 [-33.22, -19.65]  [-34.62, -20.84]  [-34.53, -20.77]  [-34.33, -20.57]  [-34.63, -20.85]  [-34.51, -20.76]  
Crop Rotation -14.28 (3.28) *** 
 
-13.26 (3.29) *** 
 
-13.28 (3.29) *** 
 
-13.19 (3.28) *** 
 
-13.44 (3.29) *** 
 
-13.29 (3.29) *** 
 [-20.73, -7.84]  [-19.73, -6.78]  [-19.75, -6.80]  [-19.67, -6.70]  [-19.91, -6.96]  [-19.78, -6.80]  
Cover Crops -15.42 (2.60) *** 
 
-15.22 (2.59) *** 
 
-15.45 (2.59) *** 
 
-15.22 (2.59) *** 
 
-15.31 (2.59) *** 
 
-15.47 (2.59) *** 
 [-20.52, -10.32]  [-20.33, -10.11]  [-20.55, -10.34]  [-20.33 ,-10.11]  [-20.42, -10.2]  [-20.58, -10.36]  
VRA of inputs -17.43 (2.50) *** 
 
-16.19 (2.46) *** 
 
-16.28 (2.46) *** 
 
-16.36 (2.46) *** 
 
-16.19 (2.46) *** 
 
-16.29 (2.46) *** 
 [-22.34, -12.52]  [-21.04, -11.33]  [-21.13, -11.43]  [-21.22, -11.51]  [-21.04, -11.33]  [-21.14, -11.44]  
Estimates for adopters 
                       Continuous No-till 9.64 (2.55) *** 
 
9.39 (2.54) *** 
 
9.44 (2.53) *** 
 
9.51 (2.54) *** 
 
9.43 (2.54) *** 
 
9.44 (2.53) *** 
 [4.64, 14.65]  [4.39, 14.39]  [4.45, 14.42]  [4.52, 14.51]  [4.44, 14.43]  [4.46, 14.43]  
Crop Rotation -5.00 (2.55) ** 
 
-5.06 (2.53) ** 
 
-4.88 (2.53) * 
 
-5.04 (2.53) * 
 
-5.04 (2.53) ** 
 
-4.89 (2.53) * 
 [-10.01, 0.001]  [-10.05, -0.08]  [-9.86, 0.09]  [-10.02, 0.05]  [-10.02, -0.05]  [-9.87, 0.09]  
Cover Crops -4.83 (3.33) 
  
-5.15 (3.35) 
  
-5.04 (3.35) 
  
-5.21 (3.36) 
  
-4.98 (3.35) 
  
-5.01 (3.36) 
  [-11.36, 1.71] [-11.76, 1.46] [-11.64, 1.57] [-11.82, 1.40] [-11.58, 1.62] [-11.62, 1.61] 
VRA of inputs -0.26 (3.62) 
  
-0.57 (3.63) 
  
-0.61 (3.62) 
  
-0.52 (3.62) 
  
-0.63 (3.62) 
  
-0.62 (3.62) 
  [-6.85, 7.38] [-7.71, 6.58] [-7.74, 6.51] [-7.66, 6.62] [-7.77, 6.51] [-7.74, 6.51] 
Estimates for other attributes 
                       Incentive Program1 -5.15 (2.11) ** 
 
-5.09 (2.09) ** 
 
-4.99 (2.09) ** 
 
-5.02 (2.09) ** 
 
-5.09 (2.09) ** 
 
-4.99 (2.09) ** 
 [-9.30, -1.00]  [-9.22, -0.97]  [-9.10, -0.88]  [-9.14, -0.90]  [-9.21, -0.97]  [-9.10, -0.88]  
Low off-farm Env. Benefits -7.86 (2.60) *** 
 
-7.42 (2.56) *** 
 
-7.44 (2.55) *** 
 
-7.63 (2.56) *** 
 
-7.43 (2.56) *** 
 
-7.44 (2.55) *** 
 [-12.98, -2.75]  [-12.47, -2.38]  [-12.48, -2.41]  [-12.67, -2.58]  [-12.46, -2.39]  [-12.47, -2.40]  
Medium off-farm Env. Benefits -5.18 (2.58) ** 
 
-4.89 (2.55) * 
 
-5.06 (2.55) ** 
 
-5.24 (2.56) ** 
 
-4.90 (2.55) * 
 
-5.05 (2.55) ** 
  [-10.24, -0.12]    [-9.92, 0.15]    [-10.08, -0.03]    [-10.28, -0.20]    [-9.93, 0.13]    [-10.08, -0.03]   
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors were estimated using the Delta method. Lower and upper estimates across farmers in brackets. 
1 Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market was used as the base scenario. 
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For adopters of continuous no-till, the results in this study suggest that they would be 
willing to pay around $9.39 - $9.51 to keep using continuous no-till. This result may be related 
to sunk costs and irreversibility, particularly equipment ownership and human capital 
investment. These farmers may have already incurred the required investment to establish the 
practice on their farms. In addition, famers may be willing to pay as a result of the private 
benefits obtained (e.g. yield benefits, soil quality, etc.). A similar conclusion was reached by 
Cooper (1997) regarding conservation tillage in Iowa. Chouinard et al. (2008) also found 
evidence suggesting that farmers are willing to pay for stewardship. Specifically, they estimated 
that farmers were willing to pay $4.52/acre (estimated as forgone income). This result may also 
shed some light on the additionality to enrollment in conservation practices. It is apparent from 
this result than some farmers would adopt these practices in the absence of incentive payments. 
However, with low incentive payments, new adopters are less likely to be added. In a study of 
additionally from enrollment in federal programs in Ohio, Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 
(2013) found low levels of additionality for conservation tillage (19%), while additionality for 
cover crops was around 90%.  
 The mWTA for non-adopters of conservation crop rotation ranged from $13.19 to $13.44 
across probability weighting specification, and $14.28 for the mean-standard deviation approach. 
The estimate for adopters was around $5 per acre, but the estimate was not statistically 
significant. The mWTA estimated for cover crops ranged from $15.22 to $15.47/acre across all 
models. This estimate is lower than expected, considering the costs of plating cover crops and 
farmers’ lack of experience with this practice. Singer, Nusser, and Alf (2007) estimated that on 
average farmers in the U.S. Corn Belt required about $23 per acre to induce the adoption of 
cover crops. The estimated mWTA for VRA of inputs ranged from $16.29 to $16.36 across the 
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models with embedded expected utility. Farmers may be reluctant to adopt VRA technologies 
and may require a higher payment if they perceive these technologies as not being suitable for 
their operation and if they perceive they have relatively homogenous land (Hudson and Hite, 
2003). In addition, given the complexity of this practice, the lack of knowledge may deter 
adoption, especially for farmers who are not first-time adopters (Batte, 2000; Lamb et al., 2008). 
  
3.7.2.2 mWTA for other contract attributes 
The mWTA estimates for the incentive program ranged from $4.99 to $5.10/acre in Table 3.9. 
This result indicates that farmers require an additional payment if the channel through which the 
conservation program provides and administers the incentive payment is a carbon market. The 
lack of farmers’ awareness of this type of program, the lack of policies for the creation of a 
binding carbon market, and negative experiences with previous carbon markets may all explain 
this result. From the sample of farmers who previously participated in a carbon trading scheme, 
it seems likely that the low payments offered attracted mainly farmers who had already adopted 
conservation tillage, in the absence of any incentive payment. Thus, low incentive payments may 
result in low levels of additionality, a major component of program effectiveness (Mezzatesta et 
al., 2013).   
Findings in this study also suggest that conservation bundles with lower off-farm 
environmental benefits require a larger incentive payment when compared to bundles with higher 
benefits.  Farmers require an additional payment of ~$4.9 to $7.63/acre if the bundle of practices 
they are required to adopt under the conservation contract does not deliver high environmental 
benefits. This result has important implications for the development of conservation programs. It 
  
138 
is important to work towards improving farmers’ awareness of the external benefits (social 
benefits) of their production decisions (Bergtold et al., 2012). With higher benefits from 
conservation, adoption in the absence of monetary incentives could increase (Mezzatesta, 
Newburn, and Woodward, 2013). As the results in this study suggest, if farmers recognize the 
public (social) environmental benefits from the use of conservation on their farms, they may be 
more willing to enroll in conservation programs, and it may reduce the level of incentive 
payment required to encourage enrollment and adoption of bundles of conservation practices. 
 
3.8  Conclusion 
This study was designed to determine the factors affecting the adoption of conservation practices 
under a contract. Various factors involved in a conservation contract were analyzed, the risk of 
net returns, practices required under the contract, the type of conservation program, and the off-
site benefits from the program.  
 The results in this study suggest that the incentive payment required for farmers who 
have adopted conservation practices is significantly lower than the necessary payment for non-
adopters (farmers who are currently not using the practice). It is possible that if incentive 
payments are too low, programs may be more attractive to farmers who have already adopted 
these practices, reducing the potential additionality and associated benefits from these programs. 
While it is important to encourage adopters to maintain and manage existing conservation 
practices, for a program to be economically efficient, additional land should be put into 
conservation at the least cost. As the results in this study suggest, some farmers would adopt in 
field conservation practices in the absence of incentive payments. In the case of continuous no-
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till, adopters may be willing to pay to continue using this practice. This result could indicate that 
these adopters perceive private benefits from the use of this practice. The experience of farmers 
who are willing to pay to continue using a practice could be leveraged by extension agencies and 
conservation programs when promoting the benefits from conservation. 
The results in this study also suggest that farmers prefer federally-run programs over 
market based carbon programs. Given that a limited number of farmers are aware of the 
mechanism under which carbon offset programs work and that some of the farmers who 
previously participated in a carbon trading program had negative experiences, it is important to 
consider these factors if efforts for the establishment of a carbon market are to take place in the 
future. Farmers may require a premium if incentives are offered through a carbon market, and if 
incentives payments are low, mainly famers who have already adopted the practices may be 
attracted, resulting in low additionality to enrollment in such programs. More importantly, 
policies are to be in place if a carbon market is to be established. If a binding market exists and 
public trust in the programs increases, farmers’ willingness to participate could be higher.  In 
addition, findings in this study suggest that views regarding the off-farm benefits from 
agricultural conservation may have an important effect in farmers’ willingness to participate in 
conservation programs and the incentive required under adoption. Hence, education about the 
societal benefits of on-farm conservation may be an important element to increase the 
effectiveness of conservation programs. 
This study assessed the effect of risk on the adoption and intensification of conservation 
on the farm by evaluating the effect of the nonlinearity of expected utility for net returns and by 
including farmers’ subjective assessment of probabilities. This method allowed for the estimation 
of the marginal utility from stochastic net returns and a parameter that measures farmers’ risk 
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attitude towards variability in net returns. In this study, farmers were found to exhibit risk 
aversion and to moderately use subjective probabilities when evaluating risk of net returns under 
a conservation contract. Together, these results showed that risk exposure has a significant effect 
on the adoption of conservation practices. Net returns are stochastic (in part due to the variability 
in yields), and the distribution of potential outcomes affects farmers’ willingness to use 
conservation programs that may result in changes in their expected returns. These results offer 
some insight into the importance of considering uncertainty in outcomes when designing 
incentive programs and extension programs to encourage the adoption of conservation systems 
(Isik and Yang, 2004).  
The results in this study provide important information for extension applications. As 
some studies have previously suggested, it is important to provide farmers with the range of 
potential outcomes when promoting new technologies (Ghadim et al., 2005). As farmers are 
informed about the impact of these technologies in the first years of adoption, efforts can focus 
on providing farmers with tools to improve their probability of obtaining favorable outcomes to 
reduce their perception of uncertainty and the effect of perceived risk on the decision to 
implement and intensify conservation on their farms.   
While this study did not directly measure the effect of contract length, further analysis of 
farmers’ responses indicated its negative effect. Farmers reported that the inflexibility of the 
contract was the main reason for opting out on a contract option in the stated choice experiment. 
Longer contracts can increase the risk for farmers. Given the dynamics in commodity markets 
and the development of new technologies, it becomes difficult for farmers to anticipate what will 
happen in five years (Cattaneo, 2003). Shorter and more flexible contracts may increase farmers’ 
participation in conservation contracts and may reduce the risk of defaulting or withdrawing 
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from the contract (Cattaneo, 2003). Knowing the potential risk and what incentives farmers may 
require to reduce potential risks introduced to the farm would ensure that practices, once 
adopted, are not discontinued.  
Previous research findings have indicated that withdrawals from conservation contracts 
were more likely to occur during the first years of implementation (Cattaneo, 2003). This 
indicates that there is gap between farmers’ expectations and the reality when adopting 
conservation practices. When expectations are not met, then conservation practices may be 
unadopted. Thus, conservation education may be the most important factor when promoting 
conservation programs. It is important that farmers have realistic expectations about the benefits 
of the practices and how to manage them to obtain better results. A better understanding about 
the practices and how to manage them to reduce risk, the program mechanism, and the on-farm 
and off-farm benefits from using conservation may reduce the incentive needed to encourage 
adoption and may increase the effectiveness of conservation programs. 
 
3.9 Limitations and future research 
There are some limitations to this study that need to be acknowledged. This study does not make 
distinction among the crops for which the practices in the contract had to be implemented, and as 
findings in previous research suggest, the adoption premium may be vary across different crops 
(Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao, 2006). Thus, the incentive payment estimated may be interpreted 
as a general estimate of the incentive required for the main crops grown in the studied region. In 
addition, the scope of this study was limited in terms of the sample of farmers studied. The 
sample of farmers surveyed was medium to large farmers in Kansas who were part of the same 
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farm management association. Thus, the extrapolation of results to the farmers in the Great 
Plains of the U.S. and beyond needs to be done with that in mind. 
 Notwithstanding its limitations, this study offer some important insights into the adoption 
of conservation practices and how some factors affect farmers’ decisions to enroll in 
conservation contracts. Further work needs to be done to establish how gains and losses affect 
the risk associated with potential net returns. This can be done by estimating a rank-dependent 
expected utility model or by adopting cumulative prospect theory in which a different utility is 
estimated for gains and losses. In addition, to improve the analysis, more net returns outcomes 
could be included to better trace the curvature of the utility of net returns and the risk attitude 
parameter. Further research may also explore heterogeneity across individual responses by 
adopting a random parameters logit model. However, as additional levels of complexities and 
nonlinearities are included, a larger sample size would be needed. 
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Appendix A - Stated choice contract instructions 
 
Name: _____________________________ 
Workshop: __________________________      
We are interested in your willingness to adopt and intensify conservation practices on your cropland 
under different contractual arrangements and different system characteristics. You will be asked to 
evaluate 12 scenarios. For each scenario you will be asked whether you would be willing to adopt a given 
bundle of conservation practices or to stay with the status quo. The status quo represents what you are 
currently doing. Although you may have already adopted all the practices presented to you under a 
particular scenario, please take into consideration the rest of the contract features before making your 
decision. You could still choose to adopt the contract if it is favorable. 
When considering each scenario, assume a program professional will inventory the land you enroll and 
will verify that you are complying with the contract.  The length of each contract is 5 years. If you fail to 
comply with the contract you will be required to make a full repayment of the incentive payments you 
have received plus any administrative costs. For a given contract option, there is not a minimum acreage 
requirement for enrollment and you choose the number of acres to enroll. 
Please evaluate each scenario independently. Other programs may exist that have different contract 
features, but when evaluating each scenario please consider only the contract features presented to you in 
this exercise.  
 
Each scenario will present different contractual options with the following features: 
Contract Feature Description 
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
  
 
 
Continuous No-Till 
 
 
 
Conservation Crop 
Rotation 
 
 
Cover Crops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Rate 
Application of Inputs 
 
Consists in planting crops directly into the crop residue without disturbing the soil with tillage. 
This practice will be in place year round on the cropland enrolled during the length of the contract. 
 
Implementation of a three or more year rotation with three or more crops types. The rotation 
includes a combination of high residue crops, grasses and/or legumes. 
 
Planting a single or multiple cover crop species between regular cash crops to protect the soil and 
improve soil organic matter. The crop residue should not be burned. Some cover crops species that 
could be grown are:  
-Legumes: winter peas, hairy vetch, cowpeas, crimson clover, sunn hemp, etc. 
-Cereal: rye, oats, millet, etc. 
-Grass: sorghum-sudangrass hybrid, etc. 
Variable costs of planting and managing (fertilizing, applications and termination) cover crops in 
Kansas range from $40/acre to $100/acre. 
 
This practice requires using site-specific information for input application rates within a field. 
Methods used can be sensor-based (input application equipment has sensors that calculate 
application rates in the field) and map-based (consisting of information gathering methods like 
remote sensing, topographical mapping, soil and/or plant tissue testing, yield monitoring to create 
site-specific application maps). 
Variable rate application of fertilizer (deliver and spread) could range from $8/acre to $25/acre. 
Extra charge for variable rate seeding could range from $2/acre to $5/acre. 
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Incentive 
payment 
 
 
The incentive payment is offered annually during the length of the contract. The incentive 
payment is in addition to any difference in net farm income.  
 
Incentive 
Program 
 
 
Incentive program refers to the type of mechanism through which the program is offered, 
administered and regulated. Two programs evaluated here are: 
  
a) Federal program: 
A voluntary conservation program administered by the government via the USDA’s Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). This program is comparable to the Conservation 
Stewardship Program (CSP) or the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) where 
farmers and ranchers are rewarded for taking on conservation activities that improve the long-
term sustainability of natural resources on their farms.  
 
b) Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market: 
Climate change policy has long been debated in the U.S. A carbon credit trading mechanism 
that controls carbon emissions has been one instrument proposed to mitigate climate change.  
 
The conservation practices evaluated here have the potential to reduce emissions and/or to 
enhance the storage of carbon in the soil (this is known as soil carbon sequestration). Carbon 
sequestration is believed to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, there are 
additional benefits from sequestrating carbon in the soil. These benefits are the improvement 
of water and nutrient retention, reduction of soil erosion, improvement of soil tilth and 
productivity, and improvement of wildlife habitat and biodiversity.  
 
Carbon stored in the soil (carbon credits) can be aggregated by a third party and traded in a 
private market where large polluting companies can buy them to offset their emissions. You 
as a farmer could contract with this third party to receive a payment for the carbon credits 
earned from the carbon sequestered in your land as a result of using certain conservation 
practices.  
 
Off-farm 
Environmental 
Benefits 
 
Sediments, nitrogen and phosphorus are the number one pollutants of water bodies in Kansas. 
These pollutants can be transported to downstream water bodies in water runoff and through 
nutrient leaching. Another important pollutant is carbon dioxide which is believed to 
contribute to climate change.   
 
The conservation practices evaluated here reduce runoff and soil removal, reduce nutrient 
losses and improve nutrient cycling. They can also result in soil carbon sequestration or 
reduction of carbon emissions. You will be provided with a measure of the potential impact of 
the bundle of practices stated under each scenario. This benefit does not refer to the 
environmental benefits on your farm but rather the benefits to downstream water 
quality and air quality.  
 
Combinations of these practices can result in Low, Moderate or High off-site environmental 
benefits  according to their ability to reduce  sediment and nutrients transported to water 
bodies off the farm, reductions in carbon emission and carbon sequestration potential. The 
level of benefits provided is affected by your management of these practices as well as other 
climate variables.  
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Riskiness: 
Impact on Net 
Farm Income  
 
 
Introducing new practices into your cropping systems may change its dynamics. Some of the 
practices evaluated in this exercise can increase yields if implemented correctly. However, 
optimal benefits may not be observed in the first years. Some of these practices can reduce 
costs by reducing labor requirements, fuel, and pesticides use, but may require some 
additional investment or more intensive management. This could increase costs. In addition, 
many other environmental factors like weather or soil characteristics can affect your final 
costs and crop yields. Proper management is a key factor in ensuring income gains and 
stability. 
 
You will be presented with potential net income changes with their probability of occurrence 
for each combination of conservation practices. When evaluating changes in net farm income, 
take into consideration the average net farm income reported earlier in this survey to get an 
idea of the impact change. 
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Appendix B - Mean-standard deviation approach estimated with a 
random parameters logit 
 
Table B.1 Mean-standard deviation approach – Parameter estimated with a random 
parameters logit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Parameter  
estimates 
 
Standard  
   Error 
Constant -12.5537 *** (1.8503) 
returnsnetExpected  0.1191 *** (0.0183) 
returnsnetofDevSt ..   -0.0336 ** (0.0144) 
Payment 0.0492 *** (0.0025) 
Program -0.2531 ** (0.1037) 
NT  -1.2993 *** (0.1681) 
SQj NTNT   1.7732 *** (0.1998) 
Rot  -0.7019 *** (0.1602) 
SQj RotRot   0.4561 ** (0.1906) 
Cover  -0.7578 *** (0.1264) 
SQj CoverCover   0.5206 *** (0.1951) 
VRA  -0.8566 *** (0.1225) 
SQVRAVRA  0.8695 *** (0.2039) 
LowEnv  -0.3865 *** (0.1274) 
MidEnv -0.2545 ** (0.1264) 
2
u  2.3615 *** (0.3568) 
  
No. of Observations 2808   
Log Likelihood 1452.9   
AIC 2937.8   
Pseudo R-squared 0.253   
Adjusted R-squared 0.244   
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
1 Carbon Credit Payment through a Carbon Market was used as the base scenario. 
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Figure B.1 Distribution of farmers’ WTA for the mean-standard deviation approach 
estimated with a random parameters logit 
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Chapter 4 - Modeling the factors affecting farmers’ timing of 
adoption of in-field conservation cropping practices 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Current and future agricultural production needs to tackle problems such as environmental 
degradation, increasing public awareness of environmental concerns and demand for sustainable 
production (Sassenrath et al., 2008). Conservation practices play an important role in the 
sustainability of agricultural production. There is a large variety of conservation practices that 
address different environmental issues or simply prevent environmental degradation from 
occurring. Some conservation practices that improve soil conservation, like conservation tillage 
and crop rotation, have largely been adopted in the US. However the adoption of practices, like 
variable rate application of inputs, has been slower. This lower adoption rate may be due in part 
to farmers being unaware of or uneducated about this technology (Daberkow and McBride, 
2003). Given the significant conservation efforts by different local and federal government 
agencies, understanding farmers’ motivations and their decision-making processes concerning 
conservation on-farm is important. Studying farmers’ adoption decisions and the process 
provides government, extension and agribusiness with important insights into the adoption of 
important conservation technologies and the key aspects that need to be addressed to increase the 
level of conservation efforts being made by producers. 
Numerous modeling approaches have been used to study the adoption of conservation 
practices and new agricultural technologies (Feder and Umali, 1993; Knowler and Bradshaw, 
2007; Prokopy et al., 2008). Many adoption studies rely on approaches to model the adoption at 
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a given point in time or are cross-sectional in nature and are not able to take account of the 
timing (speed)
8
 of adoption. These studies often compare the differences in the factors between 
the group of adopters and those of non-adopters from a static point of view. Thus, these studies 
do not consider the process of adoption over time and how some factors may not only affect the 
decision to adopt, but also the timing of adoption. In the same token, some factors do not directly 
restrict the adoption of conservation practices, but may in fact delay adoption of a practice 
(Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). 
The diffusion of technologies is a gradual process; it takes time for the information about 
these new practices to be disperse within the farming community (Jabbar et al., 2003; Jaffe et al., 
2002). Given that farmers adopt a conservation practice based on their knowledge or 
expectations about the benefits of the practice, the timing of information collection (learning) 
and formation of expectations is important (Au and Kauffman, 2003) and may not be captured in 
traditional binary adoption models, which are often cross-sectional (Burton et al., 2003). 
Diffusion studies, while accounting for the dynamic nature of the diffusion of agricultural 
technologies, have done so at the aggregate level and have not been able to capture farm-level 
characteristics that affect the adoption process at the individual level (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001).  
Differences in farmers’ and farm management characteristics make farmers likely to 
adopt at different points in time (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). The process and timing of the 
adoption of agricultural technologies is important (Hoppe, 2002). Interaction and learning from 
other adopters and the process and knowledge accumulation which takes place over time are 
                                                 
8 Timing and speed of adoption are used interchangeable in this study and they indicate the time it takes 
for a farmer to adopt a certain agricultural practices. 
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important determinants in the diffusion of technologies (Fischer et al., 1996; Jabbar et al., 2003; 
Llewellyn, 2007). In addition, the adaptability of conservation practices into farmers’ production 
systems is important (Hudson and Hite, 2003), and is likely to change over time as farmers 
systems are adapted to changing agronomic, climate, ecological, economic, policy, social and 
technological changes. Knowing the factors that play a role in the timing of adoption is important 
for agricultural educators (e.g. extension and agribusiness) and policymakers. Knowledge about 
the factors that accelerate or slow adoption for particular practices can be a useful information 
tool used to identify target populations where adoption can be potentially slow, allowing for the 
creation of programs that tackle barriers to adoption faced by farmers.  
The study presented here uses duration analysis to examine the timing of adoption of 
continuous no-till, cover crops and VRA of inputs. While previous studies have examined the 
adoption of these practices, they have done so from a static point of view. The time it takes for 
farmers to adopt a practice and the factors that accelerate or slow the adoption process have not 
been extensively evaluated. This study will examine farmer and farm management characteristics 
and how these factors affect the timing of adoption of in-field conservation practices in Kansas.  
 
  
4.1 Objective 
The purpose of this study is to examine factors affecting the timing of adoption of continuous no-
till, cover crops, and variable rate application of (VRA) of inputs for Kansas farmers to gain 
insight regarding the time-path diffusion of these conservation cropping practices since their 
introduction into the agricultural community. These practices provide numerous benefits to the 
environment, can provide profit advantages, and are commonly known and adopted at different 
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degrees in the study region. A duration analysis was used to account for the dynamics of 
adoption and changing factors that affect farmer’s likelihood of adoption. Specifically, this study 
will analyze the effect of profitability factors, farmers’ demographics, farm and farm 
management characteristics, attitudinal factors, and site-specific characteristics on the duration of 
farmers decision to adopt a particular practice. This duration begins from the date on which a 
farmer started operating their farm or from the date the practice was available if the practice was 
introduced after the farmer started their operation and until the date in which the practice was 
adopted on the farm. In other words, the study is examining what factors impact how long it 
takes a farmer to adopt these conservation practices. In addition, the study seeks to investigate 
how conservation on the farm affects the speed (timing) of adoption of other conservation 
practices.  Using duration models allows for the temporal modelling of adoption and the 
heterogeneity in the timing of the adoption decision (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Conservation practice adoption 
There is a large body of literature examining the adoption of conservation practices. Many of 
these studies have used discrete choice models, such as the binary logit or probit model to 
analyze factors that differentiate adopters from non-adopters at a particular point in time 
(commonly at the time a survey was conducted) or across a particular cross-section with no time 
dimensions examined (Belknap and Saupe, 1988; Davey and Furtan, 2008; Rahm and Huffman, 
1984; Soule et al., 2000).  
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Gould et al. (1989) studied the adoption of conservation tillage as a two-stage process. In 
the first stage of the process, farmers recognized the existence of a problem with soil health and 
in the second stage the farmer decides upon the level of conservation to help remedy the 
problem. Gould et al. (1989) found that the perception of a soil problem was an important factor 
affecting farmers’ decisions. Other factors that have shown to affect the adoption of soil 
conservation practices, such as conservation tillage, are education, farm size, income, age, debt 
ratio, percentage of land devoted to row crop production, and weather. Rahm and Huffman 
(1984) found that the size of the farm operation and soil characteristics affected the adoption of 
reduced tillage in corn production and that farmers’ level of education is an important 
determinant in the decision process. Soule et al. (2000) studied the factors affecting the adoption 
of conservation practices and structural practices among corn producing farmers, with different 
types of contractual arrangements. They found that land tenure was an important factor in the 
adoption of conservation tillage practices.   
A study of conservation tillage adoption in Oklahoma found factors such as age, farm 
size and crop rotation to be important factors explaining the adoption decision. This study found 
that farmers with a continuous wheat rotation and livestock production were less likely to adopt 
these practices (Vitale et al., 2011). Davey and Furtan (2008) studied the adoption of 
conservation tillage in Canada using a binary probit model and census data over three different 
years: 1991, 1996 and 2001. They found that farm size, weather and soil characteristics were 
important determinants of adoption. (D’Emden et al., 2008) studied the adoption of conservation 
tillage in Australia using a binary logit model. They found that attendance at extension programs 
and the benefits of conservation tillage to cropping systems in the short term were both important 
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factors affecting adoption of this practice. Long-term benefits like erosion reduction were not as 
significant.  
Larson et al. (2008) investigated the factors affecting the adoption of remote sensing for 
variable-rate application of inputs in cotton production in the southern US. They found that 
younger, educated farmers who operated larger farms were more likely to adopt VRA 
technologies. Daberkow and McBride (2003) used a two-stage model to evaluate farmers’ 
awareness of precision technologies and the adoption of these practices. They found that 
farmers’ awareness of VRA technologies, computer knowledge, on-farm employment and farm 
size positively increased the likelihood of adoption.  
A study of the adoption of cover crops by Singer et al. (2007) identified the factors 
affecting the use of cover crops by farmers in the US Corn Belt, including current or past use of 
cover crops. Their results suggested that crop diversity was the most significant factor affecting 
the use of cover crops. Perceived yield and soil benefits seem to also increase farmers’ likelihood 
of adopting cover crops. In addition, this study revealed that farmers who used covers crops 
planted them in only 6% of their crop area (Singer et al., 2007). A study by Bergtold et al. (2012) 
examined the factors affecting the adoption of cover crops and the perceive yield benefits from 
adoption by farmers in Alabama. They found that farmers who irrigate their crops and perceived 
greater environmental benefits from cover crops were more likely to adopt. Their results 
suggested that the percentage of rented land was a negative factor in farmers’ likelihood of 
adoption. Other studies have examined the adoption of different conservation practices and 
agricultural technologies. For a review of other studies in the adoption literature, see Feder and 
Umali (1993), Knowler and Bradshaw (2007), and Prokopy et al. (2008). 
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4.2.2 Duration analysis and technology adoption 
Duration analysis has been commonly used in the medical and engineering fields, and is 
becoming more common in economic and agricultural studies.  Specifically, a number of studies 
have employed duration analysis to examine the time path of adoption and to account for the 
dynamic nature of the adoption process of agricultural technologies. In the adoption literature, 
duration models that account for the temporal aspect of adoption and have been applied to the 
study of organic farming (Burton et al., 2003); conservation tillage (D'Emden et al., 2006; Fuglie 
and Kascak, 2001); soil nutrient testing and integrated pest management (Fuglie and Kascak, 
2001); weed control practices (Murage et al., 2011); fertilizer and herbicide (Dadi et al., 2004); 
drip irrigation (Alcon et al., 2011); and other production technologies (Abdulai and Huffman, 
2005). 
Burton et al. (2003) studied the adoption of organic horticulture in the United Kingdom 
using duration analysis. They found that the probability of adopting organic farming methods 
declines after the farmer has been farming for five years. In addition, attitudinal factors were 
important determinants of the timing of organic adoption, while factors such as education, farm 
size, household size, and income from farming were not found to be significant factors.  
Dadi et al. (2004) studied the adoption of fertilizer and herbicide by farmers in Ethiopia. 
Their findings suggest that the speed of adoption of fertilizer was more rapid than the speed of 
adoption of herbicides. Factors that accelerated adoption in their study were the availability of 
credit, output prices, and closeness to markets. Factors such as farmers’ education, awareness of 
technologies, and farm size were not significant determinants of the speed of adoption. Murage 
et al. (2011) studied the timing of adoption of weed control technology in corn production in 
Kenya using a duration model. They found that education, farm size and household size 
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increased the speed of adoption of this technology. Their results also suggested that field days 
were a more effective method at accelerating the adoption decision.  
Alcon et al. (2011) investigated the adoption of drip irrigation in Spain from 1975 to 
2005. They found that factors such as credit availability, water availability, price of water, 
information sources and trialing of prior technologies were significant determinants of the rate of 
adoption. The adoption of water conservation practices in Kenya and the Philippines was also 
analyzed by (Oostendorp and Zaal, 2012) using duration analysis. They found that land 
ownership was an important factor affecting adoption. Their findings also suggested that the 
likelihood of adoption decreased over time.  
Abdulai and Huffman (2005) examined the timing of adoption of crossbred-cow 
technology in Tanzania. They found that reductions in the price of the technology, farmers’ 
education, access to credit, and the number of farmers who have adopted the practice in the same 
village reduced the timing of adoption. In contrast, distance to the local market slowed the rate of 
adoption. They also found positive duration dependence, indicating that farmers were more 
likely to adopt the technology with time.  
Fuglie and Kascak (2001) used duration analysis to examine the dynamics of the 
adoption of conservation tillage, soil nutrient testing, and integrated pest management using data 
from a USDA survey conducted from 1991 to 1993, covering different watersheds in the High 
Plains, Iowa-Illinois, Central Nebraska basins, Mississippi Embayment, Upper Snake River 
Basin, Susquehanna River Basin, and White River Basin. In their study, they investigated the 
effect of farmer and farm characteristics, as well as natural resource characteristics (e.g. soil 
quality and rainfall) on adoption. They found a faster rate of adoption for conservation tillage 
during the late 1980s. Education, farm size, source of farm income, and soil characteristics were 
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important factors in explaining the timing of adoption in their study. They also found that 
farmers with better soil quality adopted more rapidly than farmers with poor soil quality. 
Duration analysis was also applied by (D'Emden et al., 2006) to study the adoption of 
conservation tillage by grain producers in Australia from 1983 to 2003. They found that the 
decrease in the price of glyphosate was an important factor accelerating adoption and that lower 
precipitation levels increased farmers’ likelihood of adoption. 
 
4.3 Methods and data  
4.3.1 Conceptual framework 
The adoption of conservation practices is a dynamic process. Farmers evaluate a practice and 
decide to adopt at a precise point in time when introducing the practice into their production 
systems maximizes their utility (Pannell et al., 2011). Different components may be evaluated as 
part of the utility farmers derive from adopting a particular technology, including economic, 
social and/or environmental benefits (Pannell et al., 2006; Pannell et al., 2011). For example, if 
farmers are profit maximizers, they would adopt a technology if they find it profitable (Hoppe, 
2002). More than likely, farmers have multiple goals or objectives (Pannell et al., 2006). Farmers 
may also seek to maximize their utility through environmental stewardship, by improving soil 
health. In this case, in addition to profit, the farmer would want to adopt a technology if doing so 
achieves their environmental objectives, as well. If a practice does not maximize farmers’ utility 
at a particular point in time, then farmers delay adoption until new information or knowledge 
about the suitability of the practice for meeting their economic, social and environmental goals 
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becomes available (e.g. cost of the technology, profitability, soil or environmental benefits, etc.) 
(Hoppe, 2002).  
An important temporal aspect in the adoption process in assessing a technology’s 
suitability is the adaptability of the practice. At the beginning, the uncertainty from adopting a 
new practice is high, however, with time the uncertainty is reduced (Pannell et al., 2006). In 
some cases, farmers may find it optimal to delay adoption until the practice becomes viable for 
their cropping system. That is, the new technology or practice can most easily be assimilated into 
their current cropping system with the lowest transaction cost, while meeting their objectives for 
adopting the practice (Ghadim and Pannell, 1999; Pannell et al., 2006). In some cases, this point 
is reached when sufficient information has been gathered to make an optimal decision (Fischer et 
al., 1996; Jabbar et al., 2003).Some factors that may affect the adaptability of a practice or 
technology and knowledge acquisition could be farm size, physical capital requirements, human 
capital requirements, weather, geography, and complementarity with other agricultural practices 
already used in the farmer’s cropping system (Ghadim and Pannell, 1999; Jabbar et al., 2003).  
The compatibility of a conservation practice, which concerns the stage of development of 
the technology, is another factor that will affect the adoption of a new technology or practice. For 
example in the case of VRA adoption, constraints to adoption have been linked to equipment and 
software issues (Robertson et al., 2012). External factors such as the complexity of the practice, 
the extent of trial ability, social network interactions,  and farmer’s characteristics will impact 
farmers’ perceptions of the adaptability and compatibility of a new practice, affecting the 
evaluation of that practice in the adoption process and in turn the decision of when to adopt 
(Pannell et al., 2011). For example, risk averse farmers may delay adoption to avoid uncertainty 
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and minimize the cost of information, which may become available as more farmers adopt a 
practice (Sassenrath et al., 2008). 
 The conceptual framework examines the timing of adoption of conservation practices by 
farmers, building on the framework used by Abdulai and Huffman (2005). Consider a farmer, 
indexed by i, who is considering the adoption of a conservation practice. Let )( it
E
it x represent 
the expected profitability of the adoption of the conservation practice at time period t as a 
function of a set of explanatory factors that can vary across individuals and time ( itx ). While 
profit is a strong motivation to adopt a practice, as mentioned earlier, it may not be the only 
objective. That is, farmers may be environmental stewards or want to provide security for the 
farm for future generations. Thus, a utility framework is utilized to capture these multiple 
objectives by the farmer. Let farmer i’s expected utility from farming in time period t be 
represented by ],,,),(,[ itiititit
E
itit
E
i
E
it rwzxIUU   . It is assumed that farmers’ expected utility is 
increasing in 
E
it such that 0
E
it
E
itU  . itI  is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if the 
farmer adopts the conservation practice in time period t and zero otherwise. The other arguments 
of farmer i's expected utility are farmer demographics )( itz ; farm and farm management 
characteristics )( itw ; attitudinal factors )( ir ; and site-specific characterisitics it . These different 
factors play an important role in farmers’ motivation to adopt a conservation practice as shown 
in prior research (Robison et al., 1984; Skaggs et al., 1994).  
The goal of the farmer is to maximize expected utility over time, i.e.  
t
E
itU )(max . 
Letting 
t  represent the optimal time to adopt the conservation practice, the utility maximization 
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problem implies the following condition: 
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where itI  is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 to indicate adoption beginning in time 
period t* and zero otherwise. The utility is maximized over the indicator variable and adoption 
occurs when the above condition is met. That is, a farmer will adopt in time period 
t if the 
stream of utilities over time after adopting a conservation practice at time 
t is greater than or 
equal to the sum of utilities when the practice is not adopted (or adopted at a different time). This 
suggests that a conservation practice is adopted not only when its expected benefit is positive, 
but by choosing 
t , we ensure that the adoption occurs at the point in time when that benefit is 
maximized (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). Operationalizing this model requires that what is 
observed for the farmer is the actual point of adoption or 
t . Thus, we can look at the timing of 
adoption from a probabilistic framework empirically. 
 
4.3.2 Empirical model 
Duration analysis will be employed to study the length of time it takes a farmer to adopt a 
conservation practice (i.e. transition states). Let the time of adoption be represented by a random 
variable T . Then the probability distribution of the length of time (i.e. the duration) to adoption 
can be represented by the distribution function )(Prob)( tTtF  . That is, the probability of 
adopting a conservation practice before time period t is given by )(tF , where t is a particular 
realization of T . Associated with this distribution, is its corresponding density function 
dttdFtf /)()(  , which provides the relative frequency of adopting at time period t (Greene, 
2012; Kiefer, 1988).  
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The probability that a farmer adopts after time t can be represented by the well-known 
survival function (Lancaster, 1992):  
(4.1)                                             )(Prob)(1)( tTtFtS   
Using )(tF and )(tS , the probability that a farmer would adopt in a given interval of time t  can 
be modeled using the hazard rate (or function): 
(4.2)                   
dt
tSd
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The hazard rate represents the rate at which a farmer would adopt after he has farmed for t years, 
or alternatively, after the practice has been available for t years, whichever is latest. Different 
parametric specifications for the hazard function have been proposed, namely, exponential, 
Weibull, log-logistic, lognormal, and inverse normal (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011; Lancaster, 
1992).  
A graphical nonparametric assessment of the proper functional form to utilize to model 
)(tF  can be done using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which can be used to graphically assess the 
shape of the distribution to determine the distributional form of the survival and hazard functions 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011; Lancaster, 1992). Based on the analysis of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator of the survival curve (discussed later in the results section), the Weibull model, which 
is widely used to model monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard functions, was chosen to 
model the duration of adoption in this study (Greene, 2012).  
The hazard, survival and density functions, assuming a Weibull distribution for )(tF , are 
given by (Greene, 2012): 
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(4.3)                                               
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(4.4)                                             ])(exp[)(
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(4.5)                                        ])(exp[)()( 1 pp ttptf     
where   and p  are distributional parameters. Equation (4.3) is the hazard function, Equation 
(4.4) represents the survival function, and Equation (4.5) represents the density function for the 
timing of adoption. When 0p , the distribution reduces to the exponential case, where the 
probability of adopting is the same in any year after the farmer begins farming.  
 
4.3.3 Survey method  
A survey was administered during a series of workshops held across 10 locations spanning the 
state of Kansas from December 2013 to March 2014. Workshop locations were selected based 
on different weather, landscape and farm demographic characteristics. The cities where the 
workshops were held were: Salina, Great Bend, Colby, Dodge City, Wellington, Pratt, 
Hiawatha, Topeka, Manhattan, and Parsons, Kansas. Prior to administering the survey, the 
instrument was field tested with farmers during two focus groups held in Salina and Wellington, 
Kansas. 
The sample of farmers contacted for the survey was obtained from the Kansas Farm 
Management Association (KFMA), which services over 2,300 farms that grow crops and 
livestock across the state of Kansas. Of these farms, approximately 76% are identified as 
primarily crop producers and 16% are identified as crop/livestock producers. A total of 1,513 
farmers from the KFMA were mailed letters to attend face-to-face workshops. Of the farmers 
  
177 
contacted, 40 were no longer farming, were deceased or could not be located and 432 responded 
to the letter. Some of the farmers who responded were interested in participating, but were not 
able to attend the workshops on the dates they were held. Of the farmers who responded to the 
letter, 250 farmers were able to attend the workshops, yielding a response rate of 30% and an 
attendance rate of 17%. Workshop attendees were compensated for their time and travel 
expenses with a stipend of $125 in cash. It is important to note that farmers who had 
conservation practices in place may have been more likely to attend the workshops; however, 
given the nature of slightly more intensity of the practices under study, they were the target 
population.  
Participating farmers were asked to complete a survey with questions covering their 
farming history, farm operation, and conservation on their farm. The survey required 
respondents to provide information on the practices adopted and the date in which these 
practices were adopted. Farmers also provided information on the date in which they started 
operating any part of their farm. Specifically, Question 22 in the survey was used to estimate the 
time of adoption for the different conservation practices. Explanatory factors and summary 
statistics are provided in subsection 4.4.4.2. 
 
4.3.4 Survey data 
Table 4.1 presents a comparison of respondents’ demographics with those of Kansas farmers 
using the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture (NASS-USDA, 2014) and the demographics of 
KFMA members in 2013 (KFMA, 2014).  The average sample age was 56 years and was 
comparable to the average Kansas farmer (58 years) (U.S. Census of Agriculture). The average 
farm size (including CRP land) of the respondents (2,508 acres and sales value of $400,000 to 
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$599,999) was larger than the average farm size reported in the 2012 Census of Agriculture (747 
acres and sales value of $298,845). This particular study focuses on medium to large farms, 
excluding small hobby farmers, retired farmers, and very large operations which represented a 
significant share of the total farms in Kansas (Lambert et al., 2007; NASS-USDA, 2014).  
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Table 4.1  Average farm characteristics  
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Mean 2012 
Census of 
Agriculture 
Mean 2013 
KFMA 
Age (yrs.) 234 56 13 20 84 58 ---- 
Acres 234 2,508 1,981 110 14,875 747 2,196 
Sales 234 6.20
b
 2.04 1 9 $ 298,845 $618,416 
a Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA (2014) 
b Mean sales of 6.20 corresponds to the sales category of $400,000 to $599,999 
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4.3.5 Model estimation 
This study examined the timing of adoption of continuous no-till, cover crops and VRA of 
inputs. For the purpose of this research, the conservation practices examined are defined as 
follows: 
 Continuous no-till: Consists in planting crops directly into the crop residue without 
disturbing the soil with tillage, for all the crops in a rotation within a particular field. 
 Cover crops: Planting a single or multiple cover crop species between regular cash crops 
to protect the soil and improve soil organic matter. 
 VRA of inputs: This practice consists in using site-specific information for input 
application rates within a field. Methods used could be sensor-based and/or map-based. 
These practices were selected because they are cropping practices commonly known and 
adopted at different degrees in the region of study. An individual model was estimated for each 
practice to examine the time relative to the beginning of farming or introduction of the practice, 
when adoption of the conservation practice occurred. Given that farmers did not provide 
information regarding the date of adoption for some practices, the number of observations for 
each practice modeled varied. The start of the time period to adoption ( 0T ) begun at different 
years for each farmer. Fallowing (Alcon et al., 2011; Burton et al., 2003; D'Emden et al., 2006), 
the beginning of the duration for each farmer was estimated as either the year in which the 
farmer started operating the farm, or alternatively, the year at which the practice was 
commercially introduced if the farmer started operating the farm prior to the introduction of the 
practice. For adopters, the dependent variable was then calculated by subtracting the year in 
which farmers started operating the farm from the year in which the practices was adopted. If 
the conservation practice was not available until after the initial year of farming, then the timing 
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of adoption was calculated using the year in which the practice was available to the farmer.  
For no-till practices, the year used as the initial year of farmers’ exposure to the practice 
was 1962. While no-till practices were used since the existence of ancient cultures (Triplett and 
Dick, 2008), those used by mechanized farmers have only occurred in the last century. No-till 
experiments were conducted as early as 1951 in the U.S., however the practice was not adopted  
and field trials conducted until 1961 (Derpsch et al., 2010; Doraszelski, 2004). Successful 
introduction of no-till practices in mechanized farms was reported in 1962 (Derpsch, 2004). 
Specifically, the development of this practice in corn started in 1960 (Triplett and Dick, 2008). 
For VRA, 1993 was used as the date in which farmers had initial access to precision 
technologies. By 1993, the introduction of GPS made it possible for the development of crop 
monitoring and yield mapping (Taylor and Whelan, 2005), technologies that have been 
commercially available since the early 1990s (Daberkow and McBride, 2003). For cover crops, 
there was not an identifiable date when the practice was introduced since different types of cover 
crops have been used for a long time. 
In some cases, conservation practices were adopted on a farm by previous operators. This 
represents a case of left truncation if information on the adopter and the path of adoption are 
unknown. In this study, observations with left truncation were omitted following (Alcon et al., 
2011). The exit or date of adoption was estimated as the year when adoption took place for 
adopters ( tT  ). For right censored observations, where adoption had not taken place by the date 
of the survey ( c ), the survey date was taken as the exit time, i.e. ),min( ctT   (Kiefer, 1988). 
For censored observations, the process is still ongoing and adoption could take place sometime 
after t, but it is not observed.  
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4.3.5.1 Maximum likelihood estimation 
The parameters of the duration model can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood estimation. 
Given that the time of adoption for farmers who had not adopted a practice by the time of the 
survey is unknown, the data is censored and estimation needs to account for the censored nature 
of the data (Greene, 2012). Censoring is accounted for in the Likelihood function, where the 
likelihood function for a farmer who has adopted a practice is the density of time it took for the 
farmer to adopt, )()()( ttStfL  . On the other hand, the contribution to the likelihood function 
for a farmer who has not adopted a practice is its survival function, )(tSL  . The log likelihood 
function accounting for censoring can then be written as (Greene, 2012): 
(4.6)                             )|(ln)1()|(ln)(ln
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where i represents the index of farmer observations, ),( p   is a vector of parameters, c
indicates the censoring time (time of the survey), and i is an adoption indicator (taking a value of 
1 if farmer i adopted and zero otherwise). When a farmer has not adopted a practice ( 0i ), this 
indicates that the observation is right censored, adoption has not been observed but it could occur 
in the future.  
The hazard rate can also be allowed to be a function of a vector of explanatory variables 
x  such that: 
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(4.8)                                               ),();(  xxti   
where   is a constant or baseline hazard. A commonly adopted functional form for )(  is 
)'exp()(  x , making Equation (4.8): 
(4.9)                                       )'exp()();(
1  xtpxt pi
  
Equation (4.9) indicates that the explanatory variables enter the adoption rate (log failure rate) in 
a linear fashion. The explanatory variables do not affect duration dependence, (which is given by 
the parameter p), the explanatory variables affect the Weibull hazard multiplicatively (duration 
dependence is not a function of the exogenous variables) (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011). It 
follows then, that the hazard, survival and density of T (Equation 4.3 – 4.5) can be written as: 
(4.10)      )'exp()()( 1  xtpt p  
(4.11)    )]'exp()(exp[)(  xttS p  
(4.12)              )]'exp()(exp[)'exp()();(
1  xtxtpxtf pp    
Using the density of time in Equation (4.12) in the Log Likelihood expression in Equation (4.7), 
this later form reduces to (Greene, 2012):  
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where p/1 . Models like that in Equation (4.9), where the hazard (  ) is a function of 
exogenous variables are often called accelerated failure time models (Greene, 2012). For more 
details on how the estimation model is derived, see Greene (2012). 
 
4.3.5.2 Explanatory variables used in the analysis 
There are multiple factors that affect farmers’ adoption of agricultural technologies. These 
factors differ by the type of technology adopted and the region where adoption takes place. Some 
of the determinants of adoption for conservation practices identified in the literature are farm and 
farm management characteristics; biophysical factors or site-specific characteristics; economic 
factors; attitudinal factors; and market factors such as input and output prices (Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007). For a comprehensive review of the factors affecting the adoption of different 
conservation practices in the literature see Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) and Prokopy et al. 
(2008). In many cases, the factors evaluated in empirical applications are restricted to the 
availability of data. In this study, the factors evaluated are: profitability factors (perception of 
increased income), farmer demographics (age and education), farm and farm management 
characteristics (farm acres, farm income, crop income, previous practices adopted on the farm), 
attitudinal factors (risk aversion, stewardship, and if the farmer is a first-time technology 
adopter), and site-specific characteristics (regional variables). Descriptive statistics of the data 
are reported in Table 4.2. 
In this study, conservation practice profitability is a discrete variable that takes a value of 
1 if the farmer indicated that they would only adopt the conservation practices (evaluated in this 
study) if they perceived it would increase profit, and zero otherwise. This variable was used to 
control for the profitability of the practice at the time of adoption. If farmers indicated that they 
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would adopt these practices only if these resulted in higher profits, then it follows that they 
adopted a practice at a particular point in time because expected profits were higher with the 
practice than without it. Conversely, if farmers have yet to adopt these practices, then it indicates 
that they do not perceive these practices as necessarily being economically profitable for them at 
this point in time (i.e. the production, opportunity or transaction costs could be too high). 
Age of the farm operator is expected to be negatively correlated with the speed of 
adoption of a conservation practice. Older farmers have a shorter planning horizon and are 
thought to be more averse to change. While some studies have found that younger farmers are 
more likely to adopt conservation tillage (Davey and Furtan, 2008; Soule et al., 2000) and VRA 
of inputs (Hudson and Hite, 2003; Larson et al., 2008), other studies have found no statistical 
relation between the age of the farmer and their willingness to adopt agricultural practices 
(Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Finger and El Benni, 2013). In a duration analysis, age was found 
to slow the time of adoption of drip irrigation (Alcon et al., 2011). 
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Table 4.2  Descriptive statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard Error) 
Definition 
Continuous 
no-till  
Cover 
Crops  
VRA 
Dependent Variable 
Duration 25.753 
 
32.043 
 
17.810 Time measured in years that it took for farmers to 
adopt.  (14.315) (14.727) (5.723) 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Profitability 2.252  2.236  2.227 The farmer would adopt the practice only if it 
increases net returns )0,1( noyes  .  (0.970)  (0.974)  (0.976) 
Age 49.188 
 
55.112 
 
55.310 Farmer's age in years. 
 
(14.247) 
 
(13.680) 
 
(13.896) 
College 0.507 
 
0.502 
 
0.513 Farm operator has a college degree 
)0,1( noyes  . 
 
(0.501) 
 
(0.501) 
 
(0.501) 
Acres 2458.34 
 
2469.60 
 
2493.12 Total crops acres (including crops, grazing, CRP). 
 
(2049.30) 
 
(2021.54) 
 
(2012.58) 
FarmInc 74.253 
 
73.610 
 
73.872 Percentage of household income derived from 
the farming operation.  (29.946) (30.128) (30.305) 
Crops 73.344 
 
72.437 
 
74.187 Percentage of farm income from crop production. 
 
(27.308) 
 
(27.764) 
 
(26.970) 
CNT ------- 
 
0.548 
 
0.576 Farmers was using continuous no-till before 
adopting this practice )0,1( noyes  .   (0.499) (0.495) 
CCRot 0.431 
 
0.541 
 
0.578 Farmers was using crop rotation before adopting this 
practice )0,1( noyes  .  (0.496) (0.499) (0.495) 
CCrop 0.072 
 
------- 
 
0.250 Farmers was using cover crops before adopting this 
practice )0,1( noyes  .  (0.259)  (0.434) 
VRA 0.076 
 
0.393 
 
------- Farmers was using VRA of inputs before adopting 
this practice )0,1( noyes  .  (0.266) (0.000)  
Risk 0.749 
 
0.747 
 
0.728 Risk taking behavior in farm management 
decisions )0,1( otherwiseaverserisk    (0.435) (0.436) (0.446) 
Stewardship 0.489 
 
0.481 
 
0.487 Maximizing farm profit is more important than 
environmental stewardship to the farm's 
operator )0,1( yesno  . 
 
(0.501) (0.501) (0.501) 
Innovators 0.507 
 
0.494 
 
0.504 Farm operator usually adopts new technology 
(e.g. no-till, new seeds, etc.) before neighbors 
)0,1( noyes   
 
(0.501) (0.501) (0.501) 
Western 0.215 
 
0.215 
 
0.220 If the farm is located in Western Kansas 
)0,1( noyes   
 
(0.412) 
 
(0.411) 
 
(0.415) 
Central 0.413 
 
0.412 
 
0.409 If the farm is located in Central Kansas 
)0,1( noyes   
 
(0.493) 
 
(0.493) 
 
(0.493) 
      
 
No. Obs. 223 
 
233 
 
232  
VRA = Variable rate application of inputs 
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Education was included to evaluate the effect of human capital in the timing of adoption.  
Farmers with a higher level of education are thought to have better access to information and to 
be able to make more efficient and informed decisions (Rahm and Huffman, 1984). Education 
has been found to be a significant factor in the adoption of no-till and other conservation tillage 
practices (D’Emden et al., 2008; Gould et al., 1989; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; Soule et al., 
2000). Other studies found no statistically significant effect (Davey and Furtan, 2008). The effect 
of education is expected to be larger for more complex technologies like in the case of cover 
crops and VRA application of inputs. Highly educated farmers have been found to be more likely 
to adopt various VRA technologies (Adrian et al., 2005; Larson et al., 2008; Robertson et al., 
2012). In duration analysis applications, education has been found to speed the adoption of 
agricultural technologies (Murage et al., 2011). A study conducted by (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001) 
found that farmers with a high school or college degree adopt conservation practices two years 
earlier than farmers without a high school diploma. Another study found that farmers’ education 
speeds the adoption of drip irrigation (Alcon et al., 2011). A priori, education is expected to 
accelerate the adoption process of the three conservation practices evaluated in this study. 
Total acres was included in the models to evaluate the effect of operation size on the 
speed of adoption of a conservation practice. Given that some of these practices may require 
human/capital investment and may have transaction costs, farmers that operate at a larger scale 
may be able to distribute the costs of adoption among more acres or enterprises, reducing the unit 
cost by taking advantage of economies of scale. Therefore, total acres is expected to be a positive 
factor in the timing of adoption.  Previous studies have found a positive relation between size 
measured in acres and conservation tillage adoption (Davey and Furtan, 2008; Soule et al., 
2000). In practices where the investment is greater, as in VRA of inputs, the presence of 
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economies of scale could be larger. Evidence in the literature suggests that VRA of inputs is 
more likely to be adopted on larger farms (Adrian et al., 2005; Daberkow and McBride, 2003; 
Hudson and Hite, 2003; Larson et al., 2008; Robertson et al., 2012). For mid-term or structural 
practices where there is no gain in economies of scale (e.g. investment is done at the acre level), 
a negative relation has been found between farm size and adoption (Soule et al., 2000). In 
duration analysis applied to the adoption of agricultural technologies, the effect of farm size has 
been mixed. Farm size was found to accelerate the adoption of a weed control technology in 
western Kenya (Murage et al., 2011). Fuglie and Kascak (2001) found longer lags of 
conservation tillage adoption as farm size decreased. They estimated an adoption lag of 7 years 
between the largest and smallest farm in their sample. Conversely, farm size was not found to 
have a significant effect in duration applications for the adoption of no-till (D'Emden et al., 
2006) and drip irrigation systems (Alcon et al., 2011). 
The percentage of off farm income is used as a proxy for the time devoted to work on the 
farm. A higher percentage of off-farm work is expected to slow the adoption of conservation 
practices. The adoption of agricultural practices require time and investment in learning the new 
technology (Llewellyn, 2007), which could represent a constraint to adoption for farmers whose 
main activity is not farming. For technologies like VRA, where a greater investment is required, 
particular investment in the development of technical skills and time devoted to operating the 
farm is particularly important. Farmers devoted to full-time farming were more likely to adopt 
VRA of input technologies (Daberkow and McBride, 2003) and were more likely to adopt 
conservation tillage (Soule et al., 2000). No significant effect was found in the adoption of other 
agricultural practices like extensive wheat production systems (Finger and El Benni, 2013).  
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Another variable included in the analysis was the percentage of farm income from crop 
production. This variable is expected to have different effects on each practice. Farmers with 
more livestock are expected to be more likely to adopt cover crops because these can be used for 
a dual purpose, such as feeding livestock. On the other hand, farmers whose income primarily 
comes from livestock and who allow their livestock to graze crop residues may be less likely to 
adopt conservation tillage (Vitale et al., 2011). 
Conservation practices used on the farm at the time of adoption was also included to 
examine that effect of complementarity or substitionability of conservation practices. A dummy 
variable was included to indicate if the farmer was using continuous no-till, conservation crop 
rotations, cover crops or VRA of inputs prior to adopting the practice being examined. Adopting 
different conservation practices on the farm could also indicate an attitude towards conservation 
and it is expected to speed the timing of adoption. However, a study by Bergtold and Molnar 
(2010) did not find evidence that the adoption of one practice influenced the adoption of other 
practices.   
Risk affects the adoption of agricultural technologies in different ways (Marra et al., 
2003) and has been found to reduce the adoption of agricultural technologies (Ghadim et al., 
2005). Risk affects farmers’ willingness to try new practices and the process of knowledge 
accumulation (Greiner et al., 2009b). Risk averse farmers are thought to adopt practices more 
slowly than risk-neutral or risk-loving farmers to avoid the cost of uncertainty and the cost of 
learning the new technology (Sassenrath et al., 2008). For example, (Krause and Black, 1995) 
suggested that risk averse farmers adopt conservation tillage slower because of the learning 
costs. In the case of no-till, at initial stages of the diffusion of the technology, studies found the 
practice to be riskier, and risk aversion was found to be negatively associated with adoption 
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(Bultena and Hoiberg, 1983). However as no-till technologies improved and improved herbicides 
were introduced, the risk associated with the practice decreased (Bosch and Pease, 2000). In 
addition, the way a conservation practices impacts soil quality, production costs, and crop yield 
variability may affect the way in which risk affects adoption (Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 
1994). Generally, farmers with higher risk tolerance adopt more practices on their farms (Lynne 
et al., 1988) and are expected to adopt practices more rapidly than risk averse farmers (Chatterjee 
and Eliashberg, 1990). 
 Attitudinal factors such as farmers’ attitudes toward environmental stewardship are 
expected to speed the adoption of the conservation practices evaluated in this study. Farmers 
with conservation motivations were found to be more likely to adopt best management practices 
in previous empirical studies (Greiner et al., 2009b). In addition, innovators (farmers who 
considered themselves first time adopters), are expected to adopt more rapidly. However, as 
discussed by (Pannell et al., 2011), innovators are not always the first to adopt conservation 
practices. In some cases they may become later adopters if the practice is not attractive or 
suitable to their production system.  
Regional indicators were included to account for differences in the adoption across 
regions. Due to heterogeneity in land quality and weather, weed pressure and other factors that 
are not accounted for in the set of explanatory variables, it is important to capture the effect of 
geographical differences impacting the adoption of agricultural technologies (Green et al., 1996). 
D’Emden et al. (2008) found differences in the speed of adoption of conservation tillage across 
regions in Australia. Fuglie and Kascak (2001) found larger lag differences in the adoption of 
conservation practices across regions in the U.S. Regional factors have also been found to be 
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significant explanatory variables in the adoption of VRA of inputs (Daberkow and McBride, 
2003). 
Given the way the variables enter the model and method of data collection, it is implicitly 
assumed that the explanatory variables do not vary over time, which can be a strong assumption 
for many covariates. Education may not change much over time as it may be likely that the level 
of education attained at the time farmers started operating their farm may not have changed 
afterwards. While attitudinal factors and risk aversion may be affected by knowledge and 
experience, they could also be related to farmers’ personality and it could be argued that, in 
general, they are relatively constant over time. However, farm size and sales may have been 
affected by the adoption of the practices and other exogenous factors, and may not be constant.  
 
4.4 Results and Discussions 
Kaplain Meier survival estimates for the three practices are illustrated in Figure 4.1. The survival 
function represents the likelihood that a farmer continues farming without adopting the 
conservation practice. It can be noted that the survival curve for the three practices decreases 
over time, indicating that the likelihood that a farmer would adopt any of these practices 
increases over time. The three survival estimates decrease over time, indicating positive duration 
dependence (i.e. 0/)( dttd in Equation 3). That is, the likelihood of adoption increases with 
the number of years of farming (Greene, 2012). It can be noted that the adoption of these 
practices is more rapid during the first years of farming (or introduction of the practice) and later 
years are characterized by a slower pace of adoption.  It can also be noted from the graphs that 
the adoption of VRA has been slow. Under some conditions, farmers may have an incentive to 
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delay adoption until a technology is improved or more information becomes available 
(Chatterjee and Eliashberg, 1990), which could be the case for VRA of inputs.  
Since the survival function for the exponential distribution is constant,  and first 
increasing and then decreasing for the lognormal and logistic distributions, the Weibull 
distribution, characterized for being monotonically increasing (or decreasing), was a good fit for 
the data in this study (Greene, 2012). The Weibull distribution is appropriate as the probability of 
adoption is not expected to be constant over time, but to gradually increase. The parametric 
models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation in LIMDEP 10. The model 
estimated was an accelerated failure time model. The “accelerated” refers to the fact that the 
hazard function is a function of exogenous variables and “failure time” refers to the time 
measured being the time until adoption occurs (i.e. in some applications this is referred to as 
failure time). The results of the models estimated are reported in Table 4.3. 
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Figure 4.1 Kaplan Meier survival estimates 
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The parameter p, is greater than one for all the conservation practices, indicating positive 
duration dependence. That is, the likelihood that a farmer would adopt any of these practices 
increases with the number of years of farming. Over time the cost of technology tends to 
decrease (Jaffe et al., 2002). In addition, over time, farmers acquire more farming experience and 
accumulate knowledge and capital. These factors are more likely to increase the likelihood a 
farmer adopts a conservation practice as more time passes. Given that the adoption of 
conservation practices by farmers creates an important source of information to assist with the 
diffusion of the technology to other farmers, the longer a farmer operates a farm, the more they 
are in contact with an increasing number of adopters over time, reducing uncertainty about the 
benefits and costs of using a particular practice. There are other external factors that overtime 
ease the adoption of some practices. For example, the development and improvement of 
technologies and equipment that facilitate the implementation of a practice. In the case of no-till, 
it has been suggested that the introduction of herbicides made it possible to speed adoption rates 
(Doraszelski, 2004). 
The parameter estimates for each model represent the effect of an explanatory variable on 
the conditional probability of adoption at time period t. While the magnitude of the coefficients 
cannot be readily interpreted, the sign of the parameters can be interpreted as speeding or 
slowing adoption.  A negative coefficient indicates that the effect of a particular variable is to 
accelerate adoption. On the other hand, a positive coefficient would indicate a factor that would 
delay adoption.  A highly significant factor in the adoption of all conservation practice models 
was a farmer’s age.  Younger farmers were found to adopt the three practices faster than older 
farmers. A potential implication of this result is that, as farmers start operating their farms at a 
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younger age, efforts should be directed towards those farmers to adopt environmentally sound 
conservation practices, because as they grow older, they are less likely to adopt. 
Farmers who adopt practices only when there is a corresponding increase in profit were 
found to lag behind those farmers for whom profitability of the practice is not the main driver for 
adoption. This result was found statistically significant for both continuous no-till and cover 
crops. This result may indicate that some farmers do not always perceive these practices as being 
profitable. In addition, farmers for whom profit maximization was more important than 
stewardship were found to adopt VRA of inputs at a higher speed. This result could indicate that 
adoption of VRA of input is driven by profit motives and not environmental motives.  
A surprising result was that farmers who adopted conservation crop rotation or VRA of 
inputs adopted continuous no-till at a slower pace than farmers who had not adopted these two 
practices. Similarly, the adoption of cover crops was found to slow the adoption of VRA of 
inputs. It has been previously suggested that while farmers may consider the adoption of various 
conservation practices, when it comes time to adopt additional practices, the higher cost of 
conservation intensification may make farmers less likely to adopt more practices (Ma et al., 
2012). In addition, Cattaneo (2003) found that conservation contracts with a larger bundle of 
conservation practices in the EQIP program were more likely to be withdrawn. It is possible that 
farmers see some of these practices as substitutes. They may obtain some benefits from a 
particular practice, and as a result, the likelihood of adopting an additional practice that provides 
the same or similar benefits may decrease. 
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Table 4.3  Accelerated Failure Time estimates 
 
Continuous no-till 
 
Cover Crops 
 
VRA of inputs 
 
Coefficient SD 
 
Coefficient   SD 
 
Coefficient    SD 
Intercept 0.564 ** (0.221) 
 
1.265 *** (0.257) 
 
2.219 *** (0.483) 
Age 0.058 *** (0.004) 
 
0.047 *** (0.004) 
 
0.038 *** (0.005) 
College -0.118 
 
(0.082) 
 
-0.099 
 
(0.099) 
 
-0.055 
 
(0.150) 
Acres 0.000 
 
(0.000)  
 
0.000 
 
(0.000)  
 
0.000 
 
(0.000)  
FarmInc 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Crops 0.000 
 
(0.001) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.001) 
 
-0.008 ** (0.003) 
Profitability 0.000 *** (0.000) 
 
0.000 ** (0.000) 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.057) 
CNT ---- 
 
(0.000)  
 
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
 
0.001 
 
(0.059) 
CCRot 0.000 * (0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.001) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.059) 
CCrop 0.001 
 
(0.148) 
 
---- 
 
(0.000)  
 
0.317 * (0.174) 
VRA 0.459 ** (0.179) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.036) 
 
---- 
 
(0.000)  
Risk 0.082 
 
(0.083) 
 
0.185 * (0.099) 
 
0.325 ** (0.142) 
Stewardship 0.008 
 
(0.070) 
 
-0.074 
 
(0.087) 
 
-0.253 * (0.135) 
Innovators -0.166 ** (0.077) 
 
-0.240 ** (0.097) 
 
-0.478 *** (0.172) 
Western 0.102 
 
(0.112) 
 
0.387 ** (0.166) 
 
0.838 ** (0.404) 
Central 0.056 
 
(0.086) 
 
-0.014 
 
(0.103) 
 
0.097 
 
(0.143) 
  0.326 *** (0.018) 
 
0.315 *** (0.025) 
 
0.428 *** (0.044) 
  0.033 
 
(0.022) 
 
0.021 
 
(0.003) 
 
0.020 
 
(0.035) 
p  3.068 *** (0.168) 
 
3.170 *** (0.255) 
 
2.335 *** (0.238) 
             ------------------------------------------------ Fit Statistics ------------------------------------------------ 
No. observations  
 
223 
 
 
 
233 
 
 
 
232 
Log likelihood function 
 
-121.2 
 
 
 
-107.5 
 
 
 
-98.7 
AIC  
 
274.3 
 
 
 
247.0 
 
 
 
229.3 
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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 Risk aversion was found to delay the adoption of cover crops and VRA of inputs. It has 
been previously suggested that risk averse farmers may find it optimal to delay adoption to avoid 
the cost of learning. Risk aversion was not found to significantly affect the speed of adoption of 
continuous no-till. Similar to the findings in the first essay, this result could indicate that no-till 
practices are not seen as a risk increasing practice, and risk aversion does not slow the speed of 
adoption. As expected, farmers who considered themselves innovators adopt the three 
conservation practices at a faster rate than their counterparts.  
 The speed of adoption of cover crops and VRA of inputs in the western region of Kansas 
was found to be slower than in the eastern part of the state. Differences in the time of adoption 
across regions could indicate differences in climatic and soil conditions, as well as the 
profitability of the practices. In cases such as with the adoption of VRA of inputs, this could be 
related to the availability of custom options for precision services.  A slower rate in the adoption 
of cover crops in the western region of Kansas could be the result of dryer weather. During the 
workshops, some farmers expressed concern about the use of water by cover crops and the 
availability of water for subsequent cash crops.  
 The speed at which conservation practices are adopted are subject to various factors as 
the results of this study suggest. While some factors cannot be controlled, information and 
knowledge generation are important sources of change. For farmers who are not innovators, 
knowledge acquisition is an important step and precedes their decision to adopt (Jabbar et al., 
2003). It has been suggested that the slow rate of adoption for some practices could be related to 
slow rates of information acquisition (Fischer et al., 1996). Hence, extension plays an important 
role, not only in the levels of adoption, but also in the time of adoption. For practices with a 
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potential to provide large environmental benefits to society, a critical role for extension services 
then may be to help accelerate the rate of adoption of these practices (Marsh et al., 2000). 
In addition, since farmers may delay the adoption of conservation practices until they find 
it optimal, an important element to conservation efforts could be helping farmers to adapt 
practices to the conditions of their farming operation. Education efforts could focus on providing 
farmers with tools to successfully adapt conservation practices in a way that the perceived risks 
can be mitigated and synergies in the cropping system can be explored.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study examined the factors affecting the timing of adoption of continuous no-till, cover 
crops, and variable rate application of (VRA) of inputs for Kansas farmers to gain insight 
regarding the time-path diffusion of these conservation cropping practices since their 
introduction into the agricultural community. A duration analysis was used to account for the 
dynamics of adoption and changing factors that affect farmer’s likelihood of adoption. Some of 
the factors examined are profitability factors, farmers’ demographics, farm and farm 
management characteristics, attitudinal factors, and geography. 
Findings in this study suggest that the adoption of certain practices delay the adoption of 
other conservation practices. For example, the adoption of conservation crop rotation and VRA 
of inputs were found to delay the adoption of continuous no-till, and the adoption of cover crops 
delayed the adoption of VRA of inputs.  In addition, the findings in this study suggest that risk 
aversion is not a significant factor delaying the speed of adoption of continuous no-till. Similar to 
the first paper, it is possible that farmers do not see no-till as a risky practice, thus risk aversion 
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may not affect its adoption or speed of adoption. However, risk aversion was found to delay the 
adoption of cover crops and VRA of inputs. In addition, the results in this study suggest that 
farmers who considered themselves innovators adopt the three conservation practices at a faster 
rate than their counterparts. Given that profitability factors and risk aversion seem to be 
important factors delaying the adoption of cover crops and VRA of inputs, information about the 
benefits obtained by these practices and how they may mitigate soil degradation and/or may 
increase profits may be an important message to deliver by extension educators.  
 
4.6 Limitations and future research 
Given the cross section nature of the data used in this study, the timing of adoption was modeled 
under the assumption that some of at factors measured at the time of the survey were the same at 
the time of adoption, which can be a strong assumption for some of the factors evaluated. For 
example, the size of the operation may have significantly changed since the date farmers started 
operating their farms to the date they adopted the conservation practice and finally to the date the 
survey data was collected. It could be argued, for example, that operational size may have 
increased over time. However, the time of adoption in this study is modeled under the 
assumption that farmers are operating at the same scale over time. This is an important issue for 
future research. A natural extension to this study is to include time-varying covariates to evaluate 
how changing factors affect the point in time at which farmers decide to adopt new conservation 
practices. Obtaining such data, however, can be difficult if the researcher does not have access to 
historical data at the farm level. If the data is collected from farmers it can be unreliable if based 
on recall (Burton et al., 2003).    
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